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571 
When the federal welfare system was reformed in 1996, Congress 
gave States the option to contract out administration of their welfare pro-
grams to private entities. Moreover, after enactment of the welfare reform, 
welfare recipients are expected to work to receive benefits. This means 
that front-line welfare office workers must engage in intensive interper-
sonal counseling rather than simply confirm objective eligibility criteria 
and dispense checks. This results in vastly increased discretion for these 
front-line workers. When privatization is layered over this discretionary 
scheme, issues of accountability to program beneficiaries becomes signifi-
cant. For over thirty years, it has been a tenet of public benefits law that 
due process protections attach to the government's delivery of benefits. 
Yet when private entities deliver the same benefits, constitutional protec-
tions may fall by the wayside. This article explores the implications of 
welfare privatization on welfare beneficiaries' procedural rights. It ex-
plains how the Supreme Court's current state action doctrine may well in-
sulate private welfare providers and their state contracting partners from 
constitutional claims. Accordingly, the Article also explores other poten-
tial federal and state bases for enforcing accountability in welfare pro-
grams in privatized jurisdictions, ranging from statutory to contractual to 
equitable claims. The Article concludes that the procedural rights of wel-
fare recipients after welfare reform are greatly diminished. 
INTRODUCTION 
Lockheed Martin, the defense contracting giant, has found a new 
business niche in an era of declining defense spending: running welfare 
offices. Private companies like Lockheed Martin, along with various non-
profit organizations, have become an integral part of the massive welfare 
reform effort started in 1996 with the enactment of the Personal Responsi-
bility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act (PRA).l The Act, com-
monly known for turning "welfare" into "workfare," is designed to push 
welfare recipients into the workforce.2 The PRA restructured welfare ad-
ministration by eliminating the country's main assistance program for poor 
1. Pub. L. No. 104-193, 110 Stat. 2105 (1996) (codified in scattered sections of 42 u.s.c.). 
2. Pub. L. No. 104-193, § 401, 110 Stat. 2105, 2113 (1996) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 601). 
572 CALIFORNIA LA W REVIEW [Vol. 89:569 
families, Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC), and by giving 
states fixed block grants for "temporary assistance for needy families," 
known as TANF? The Act also devolves significant control over welfare 
administration from the federal government to the states, and it further 
gives the states the option of devolving welfare operations to the county 
and city level, and to private organizations if they choose.4 State and local 
governments have eagerly embraced this new opportunity to privatize wel-
fare in the hopes that private organizations can deliver welfare cheaper, 
faster, and better.s 
Despite the growing privatization of social services, there has been 
little discussion of the ramifications of this change on welfare recipients 
themselves from either a practical, empirical, or legal perspective.6 While 
government has relied heavily on contracting with private nonprofit entities 
for social service delivery since the 1960s, these entities have usually been 
limited to providing discrete services such as job training or child care. The 
PRA makes two major changes to this existing scheme of public/private 
interdependence. First, under the PRA, private entities are allowed to run 
entire welfare offices. This means that, for the first time, they can perform 
eligibility determinations and sanction recipients for noncompliance with 
program requirements. Second, the PRA has opened the door for large for-
profit organizations such as Lockheed Martin to enter into welfare 
delivery. These for-profit entities have different incentives, and more 
political power, than the nonprofit entities typically engaged in social 
service delivery in the past. 
After the PRA, welfare office employees are no longer dispensers of 
checks. They are expected to put people to work, and this requires inten-
sive interpersonal interactions. As a result, front-line workers have vastly 
increased discretion. When privatization is layered over the PRA's broad 
discretionary scheme, accountability issues heighten. Stories of failed so-
cial service privatization programs have already surfaced. For instance, 
Maryland cancelled a contract with Lockheed Martin to conduct child sup-
port enforcement in the face of service complaints after Lockheed failed to 
meet collection objectives.? Likewise, California cancelled a contract with 
Lockheed to build a statewide computer system for child support 
3. See infra note 52. 
4. See infra notes 56-58 and accompanying text. 
5. See inji'a Part II.B. 
6. Some of the few exceptions include Daphne Barak-Erez, A State Action Doctrineforan Age 
of Privatization, 45 SYRACUSE L. REv. 1169 (1995), and David J. Kennedy, Due Process in a 
Privatized Welfare System, 64 BROOK. L. REv. 231 (1998). These articles, however, are limited largely 
to constitutional issues. See infra notes 257 and 259. 
7. See Greg Garland, Lockheed Called Failure on Child Support Goals: State Announces 
Collection Contract Will Not Be Extended, BALT. SUN, Mar. 4, 1999, at IB; Greg Garland, Collections 
of Child Aid Questioned; Lockheed IMS Defends Peifonnance in State's Program, BALT. SUN, Jan. 10, 
1999, at lB. 
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enforcement when cost projections escalated from $99 million to $277 
million (and where Lockheed's contract limited its own liability to just $3 
million).8 Lockheed is not the only culprit of headline-grabbing malfea-
sance. Another big player in welfare privatization, Maximus, Inc., has its 
welfare contracts with New York City under criminal investigation for al-
leged nepotism and corruption.9 Its contract with Connecticut to handle 
child care benefits for welfare families was threatened with termination 
because "[h]nndreds of families have waited for months without receiving 
aid they were promised, the company has been unable to process a deluge 
of paperwork and its phone lines have been overloaded with pleas for 
help."lo 
Apart from this anecdotal evidence, empirical evidence suggests that 
privatization is ill-fitted for the complex, long-term tasks associated with 
welfare delivery after the PRA. This area lacks the definable yardsticks and 
competition necessary to sustain accountability to taxpayers and to service 
beneficiaries. As a result, legal mechanisms for enforcing accountability of 
welfare providers are more important than ever. 
Unfortunately, privatization also strips away the traditional legal 
methods for enforcing accountability. Under AFDC, the predecessor wel-
fare program to the PRA, welfare benefits were an entitlement to which 
due process protections attachedY Moreover, since beneficiaries were in-
teracting with government bureaucrats, there was no question that state 
actors were involved and that due process protections therefore applied. 
Under the PRA, it is less clear whether welfare benefits retain their enti-
tlement status. As a result, welfare advocates across the country are strug-
gling with questions concerning the continued availability of federal 
constitutional protections. In privatized jurisdictions, these issues are even 
more complex. Even if a federal constitutional right to due process remains 
in the receipt of welfare benefits, it is questionable whether a private entity 
such as Lockheed Martin will be deemed a state actor to whom constitu-
tional guarantees apply.12 
This Article explores the implications of privatization on welfare 
beneficiaries' due process rights. The piece focuses on procedural rights 
for several reasons. To begin with, fair procedures increase the likelihood 
of success of substantive claims for benefits. Under the PRA, states and 
localities have increased discretion in running their welfare programs. As a 
result, welfare recipients must rely less on statutes and regulations as a 
8. William D. Hartung & Jennifer Washburn, From Warfare to Welfare: Lockheed Martin 
Wants to Make Huge Profitsfrom Social Programs, BALT. SUN, Mar. 22, 1998, at IF. 
9. See infra notes 206-209 and accompanying text. 
10. Jonathan Rabinovitz, In Connecticut. a Privately RUn Welfare Program Sinks Into Chaos, 
N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 24,1997, at B1. 
11. See infra Part IV.A. 
12. See infra Part IV.B. 
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basis for asserting their substantive rights, and more on fact-based 
advocacy focusing on their individual claims. 13 For example, if a welfare 
recipient disagrees with a caseworker's decision to sanction the recipient 
for failing to participate in a job training program, the recipient will have to 
contest that decision through the hearing process. Perhaps the recipient 
failed to attend job training because of a lack of child care or 
transportation, or because of domestic abuse.14 That individual needs a fair 
and impartial forum in which to be heard. Moreover, the fair hearing 
process serves as a constraint on arbitrary and capricious decision making 
by front-line workers, who now possess more discretionary power than 
ever. Finally, fair hearing procedures provide empowerment and dignity to 
welfare recipients, a group traditionally voiceless. 15 
The implications of privatization for the due process rights of recipi-
ents are best illustrated by the experiences of real people navigating the 
choppy waters of welfare reform. In August 1998, Lue Garlick was cut off 
from public benefits because New York's Office of Employment Services 
claimed that she did not go to a required work assignment on one day four 
months earlier.16 Although she had indeed worked that day (failing only to 
sign out), she lost the fair hearing challenging her termination of benefits 
because she was unsure of what the judge expected her to prove.17 She was 
told she could reapply for benefits on November 16, 1998.18 On November 
16, she went to a Job Center at 8:00 a.m. to reapply for cash assistance, 
food stamps, and Medicaid. 19 By this time, she was homeless and pregnant 
with twins, and suffering from severe anemia and low blood pressure.20 
She informed the receptionist that she had no food or money and needed to 
apply for expedited food stamps as well as Medicaid benefits so that she 
could buy prenatal vitamins and medication for her low blood pressure.21 
The woman at the information window told her that there were no more 
expedited food stamps and that she would have to be in the "system" 
13. Alan W. Houseman, Civil Legal Assistance for the Twenty-First Century: Achieving Equal 
Justicefor All, 17 YALE 1. & POL'y REv. 369, 386-87 (1998). 
14. Although many welfare recipients do not appeal adverse decisions (often because they are 
never made aware of their fair hearing rights), statistics demonstrate that those individuals who pursue 
appeals have a high success rate. Barbara Sard, The Role of the COllrtS in Welfare Refonn, 22 
CLEARINGHOUSE REv. 367 (1988). At the same time, '''[flair' procedures cannot guarantee 'fair' results 
when the substantive rules themselves are inequitable." [d. at 379. 
15. See Rebecca E. Zietlow, Giving Substance to Process: Countering the Due Process 
Counterrevolution, 75 DENV. U. L. REv. 9, 31-32 (1997). 
16. Class Action Complaint '\1149, Reynolds v. Giuliani, 35 F. Supp. 2d 33 I (S.D.N.Y. 1999) 
(No. 98 Civ. 8877). 
17. [d. '\I 150. 
18. [d. 
19. [d. '\I 151. 
20. [d. '\I 144. 
21. [d.'\IISI. 
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before she could receive any food stamps or get Medicaid.22 The recep-
tionist then gave her an envelope with many fonns and told her to fill them 
out.23 The packet was missing an application form, and although Ms. G~r­
lick requested the form, she was told she would have to wait.24 
At about 10:00 a.m., a Job Center employee told her that the computer 
did not show that her sanction had been lifted and that she would have to 
wait five more days and return to the center on November 23.25 Again, she 
requested expedited food stamps, explaining that she was pregnant and 
anemic, but she was told to apply for them when she returned on the 
twenty-third. The Job Center employee then refused to return her docu-
ments, including the letter stating she was eligible to work as of November 
16.26 When Ms. Garlick returned on the twenty-third at 8:00 a.m., the re-
ceptionist told her that she had no information about Ms. Garlick having 
been there on November 16, nor of her having applied for expedited bene-
fits. She also was told that her documents had been lost, and that she would 
have to reapply.27 
Seven hours later, at 3:00 p.m., Ms. Garlick was finally called for her 
interview.28 The employee told Ms. Garlick that she had only nine months 
left of benefits and that after those nine months were over, she would not 
be eligible for any assistance, including food stamps and Medicaid.29 She 
also told her that there were no emergency food stamps any longer and re-
ferred Ms. Garlick to a food pantry. She then gave Ms. Garlick a fifty-day 
Calendar of Appointments and told her that she was required to report to 
the Hamilton Job Center every day.30 
Ms. Garlick reported to the Hamilton Job Center every day as re-
quired, from November 23, 1998 until December 3.31 During that time, she 
had a great deal of trouble obtaining food, and she frequently got sick with 
headaches and fevers.32 She went to the food pantry to which the Job Cen-
ter had referred her, but because the Job Center required her to be at the 
center from 9:00 a.m. to 5:00 p.m., by the time she got to the pantry it usu-
ally was closed.33 In the meantime, the Eligibility Verification Review of-
fice and the Job Center failed to coordinate her application, and thus 
permission granted by one office to miss an appointment for a doctor's 
22. [d. 
23. [d. 
24. [d. ~ 152. 
25. [d. ~ 153. 
26. [d. ~ 153-54. 
27. [d. ~ 155-56. 
28. [d. ~ 158. 
29. [d. 
30. [d. 
31. [d. ~ 159. 
32. [d. 
33. [d. 
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visit was not forwarded to the other office, and Ms. Garlick's application 
was not acted upon. Instead, she was bounced around from office to of-
fice.34 Her name was subsequently lost in the computer, and promises by 
the Job Center to call her back when her file was found were ignored.35 
When Ms. Garlick called the Hamilton Job Center again on December 8 to 
see if they had found her records, she was told that they had not, that her 
application was rejected, and that she would have to reapply.36 Ms. Garlick 
received no benefits until December 19, 1998, over one month after her 
initial application.37 During that month, she went entirely without food on 
several occasions.38 
Ms. Garlick was just one of several named plaintiffs in a class ac-
tion against New York State and City welfare officials.39 The class alleged 
that the defendants were systematically preventing eligible individuals 
from obtaining food stamps, Medicaid, and cash assistance by deterring, 
discouraging, and preventing plaintiffs from filing applications for and re-
ceiving benefits.40 Specifically, the class alleged that the Job Centers pro-
vided false and misleading information about the availability of both 
ongoing and expedited assistance; refused to allow people to file applica-
tions; pressured people to withdraw their applications; denied food stamps 
and Medicaid benefits for reasons that apply only to cash assistance eligi-
bility; and failed to provide written notice, including notice of hearing 
rights, to people who were denied benefits.41 Based on its findings of fact, 
drawn from the affidavits and testimony of class members, the district 
court issued a preliminary injunction ordering the defendants to comply 
with a complex corrective plan designed to ensure that the defendants 
obeyed the requirements of due process as well as Medicaid, food stamp, 
and cash assistance statutory requirements.42 
The court awarded its relief pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, commonly 
known as Section 1983,43 a civil rights statute that permits plaintiffs to en-
force rights created under federal statutes and the Constitution. However, 
Section 1983, as well as the constitutional guarantees it enforces, applies 
only to state actors.44 Thus, if Ms. Garlick was applying for benefits at a 
34. Id. '11160-63. 
35. Id. '11163. 
36. Id. '11164. 
37. Reynolds v. Giuliani, 35 F. Supp. 2d 331, 331, 339 (S.D.N.Y. 1999). 
38. Id. at 339. 
39. Id. at 331. 
40. Id. at 336-37. 
41. Class Complaint at '114, Reynolds (No. 98 Civ. 8877). 
42. Reynolds, 35 F. Supp. 2d at 347-48. Subsequently, the court refused to modifY or vacate its 
preliminary injunction and it certified the plaintiff class. Reynolds v. Giuliani, 2000 WL 1013952 
(S.D.N.Y.2000). 
43. Id. at 337. Section 1983 is discussed in detail infra Part II.S. 
44. See infra note 258 and accompanying text. 
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similarly operated office run by Lockheed Martin, the question arises 
whether she would have any of the same protections obtained through the 
New York litigation. Would she have a constitutional right to due process? 
Would the Lockheed Martin employees be state actors? The answers to 
these questions will greatly impact welfare recipients in the new privatized 
economy of welfare. 
Of course, it could be argued (and is) that the Kafka-esque conditions 
encountered by Ms. Garlick are the very reason why privatization should 
be explored as an alternative to government bureaucracies. Indeed, there is 
ample evidence that government welfare bureaucracies are quite capable of 
acting without regard to the rule of law and contrary to the interests of the 
disenfranchised persons they are supposed to serve.45 Yet in publicly run 
welfare jurisdictions, as the Giuliani litigation demonstrates, the legal sys-
tem is available as a last line of attack against such behavior. As this Arti-
cle argues, that may no longer be true in privatized jurisdictions. Because it 
is not clear that private entities perform any better than public ones, priva-
tization needs to be approached with extreme caution. Currently, it is not. 
The Article proceeds as follows. Part I describes the changes man-
dated by the PRA and specifically addresses how the Act devolves power 
downward from the federal government to local institutions, both public 
and private. Part II sets forth the historical background of welfare in this 
country, with an emphasis on the intertwined roles of public and private 
poor relief, and then explains how the landscape of welfare delivery has 
begun to change in the midst of the PRA. Part ill discusses the arguments 
for and against privatization, and attempts to sort through the empirical 
evidence to draw some conclusions about the practical impact privatization 
will have upon the rights of welfare beneficiaries. Part IV explores whether 
constitutional protections remain for welfare beneficiaries in privatized 
jurisdictions. It also explains, in depth, how the Supreme Court's current 
state action doctrine may well insulate private welfare providers from con-
stitutional claims. Accordingly, Part V explores other potential bases for 
enforcing accountability in privatized jurisdictions. Potential theories in-
clude statutory, contractual, and equitable claims; yet, all of these strategies 
have serious limitations. This Article concludes that under the current state 
of the law, welfare privatization poses great dangers to the procedural 
rights of beneficiaries. 
45. See Susan D. Bennett, "No Relief But Upon the Tenns of Coming Into the House "-
Controlled Spaces, Invisible Disentitlements, and Homelessness in an Urban Shelter System, 1 04 YALE 
L.J. 2157, 2157 (1995) (describing discouragement practices at the District of Columbia's Office of 
Emergency Shelter and Support Services, including "a waiting room ethos of undisclosed information, 
unexplained delays, and, above all, endless waiting, punctuated by humiliating demands for 
information''). 




In 1996, Congress passed, and President Clinton signed, the Personal 
Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996 (PRA), 
legislation designed to "end welfare as we know it."46 The Act eliminated 
the existing welfare program, Aid to Families with Dependent Children 
(AFDC),47 which was the subject of almost two decades of persistent criti-
cism by policymakers, the media, and the public, who accused AFDC of 
causing increased government spending and of fostering dependency while 
failing to eliminate poverty.48 As Congress' response to these criticisms, 
the PRA's stated purposes are to reduce welfare dependency and out-of-
wedlock births and to encourage the formation of two-parent families.49 
The PRA also gives the states the flexibility to create their own programs 
as long as they meet these objectives.so Accordingly, the Act changes not 
only the structure and funding of welfare delivery in this country, but it 
also attempts to change the behavior and perceived lifestyle of welfare re-
cipients.sl 
The Act eliminates AFDC' s open-ended federal funding and guaran-
tee of assistance to all eligible persons and replaces it with a capped block 
grant to the states, called Temporary Assistance to Needy Families 
46. This was one of President's Clinton's campaign promises. Jason DeParle, The Clinton 
Weljare Bill: A Long, Stonny Journey, N.Y. TIMES, July 15, 1994, at AI. 
47. 42 U.S.C. § 601 (repealed 1996). 
48. Much of the attack on AFDC centered around a racist stereotype of the "welfare queen," an 
unemployed, teenage, African-American, unmarried, ghetto resident with many children. See HELEN 
HERSHKOFF & STEPHEN LOFFREDO, THE RIGHTS OF THE POOR 5-6 (1997); Kathleen A. Kost and Frank 
W. Munger, Fooling All of the People Some of the Time: 1990's Weljare Refonn and the Exploitation 
of American Values, 4 VA.]. Soc. POL'y & 1. 3, 29 (1996). The empirical evidence does not support 
this stereotype. HERSHKOFF & LOFFREDO, supra, at 38-46; see also Joel F. Handler, "Ending Weljare 
As We Know 1t"-Wrongfor Weljare, Wrong for Poverty, 2 GEO.]. ON FIGHTING POVERTY 3,12-16 
(1994). 
The PRA also replaced the Job Opportunities and Basic Skills Training Program (known as JOBS), 
enacted in 1988 as part of the Family Support Act to provide incentives for AFDC recipients to work. 
Pub. L. No. 100-485, 102 Stat. 2343 (1988) (repealed); see infra notes 132-134 and accompanying text. 
49. Pub. 1. No. 104-193, § 401,110 Stat. 2105, 2113 (1996)(codified at 42 U.S.C. § 601). 
50. The Act followed several years of state experimentation with welfare-to-work programs 
conducted purspant to waivers from the federal government. 42 U.S.C. § 1315 (1996). Under AFDC, 
states had to submit a plan for Health and Human Services (HHS) approval setting forth how they 
would comply with their federal obligations under the law. § 602(a). However, states could obtain 
waivers from the "State plan" requirements for "experimental, pilot, or demonstration project[s]." § 
1315. Forty-three states obtained waivers, but reformers argued that the waiver approval process was 
overly burdensome. These complaints, along with calls by state officials for greater state freedom, 
provided part of the impetus for welfare reform. See, e.g., H.R. REp. No. 104-651 (1996), reprinted in 
1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2183 (complaining about Ohio's experience with the waiver process; "the 
administration rejected four parts of the Ohio plan, or requested substantive changes that essentially 
gutted certain provisions .... "). 
51. See GWENDOLYN MINK, WELFARE'S END 103-108 (1998); Tonya 1. Brito, The Weljarization 
of Family Law, 48 U. KAN. 1. REv. 229, 234-35 (2000). 
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(TANF).52 Although states must adhere to some national requirements, 
such as the PRA's requirement that all TANF recipients engage in "work 
activity" ,vithin two years of getting benefits and its five-year lifetime limit 
on the receipt of benefits, states have broad discretion to determine the 
conditions of eligibility for TANF funds.53 For example, states can choose 
to limit the receipt of benefits to less than five years, to deny benefits to 
mothers who do not identify their children's biological fathers or to chil-
dren born while their family is receiving benefits, to sanction families that 
include adults under age fifty-one who neither have nor are seeking a high 
school diploma, to declare noncitizens ineligible for assistance, to require 
recipients to take drug tests, or to cut benefits to families with truant chil-
dren.54 States can even choose to provide no cash benefits at all.55 
By allowing states to design their own welfare programs, TANF de-
volves much of the authority over administering welfare from the federal 
government to the states.56 The federal government's role essentially is 
limited to reviewing state plans, monitoring the perfonnance of states in 
putting welfare recipients to work, and sanctioning or rewarding states 
based on their performance. Even more significant than this federal-to-state 
devolution is the discretion states have under T ANF to delegate authority 
to local governments and private nonprofit or for-profit entities. The law 
allows states to provide welfare services through contracts with charitable, 
religious, or private organizations.57 They can also choose to provide bene-
ficiaries with certificates, vouchers, or other forms of disbursement that are 
redeemable with such private organizations.58 
52. Each state receives a portion of the annual $16.4 billion block grant in an amount based upon 
its past welfare expenditures. Pub. L. No. 104-193, § 103, 110 Stat. 2105, 2116 (1996) (codified at 42 
U.S.C. § 601). As a capped grant, TANF ends the federal cost-sharing that covered fluctuations in 
welfare rolls due to economic and/or demographic changes. 
53. See § 103, llO Stat. at 2137 (adding new Sec. 408(a)(7) to Title IV of the Social Security 
Act). States can exempt up to 20% of their caseload from the five-year limit in cases of hardship. ld. 
(codified at 42 U.S.C. § 408(a)(7)(C». They can also use their own funds to provide benefits after the 
five-year limit. ld. 
54. ld. 
55. States have the discretion to use their grants for any activity reasonably designed to achieve 
the Act's purposes. See id. (adding new Sec. 401 to Title IV of the Social Security Act). The stated 
purposes are to provide for needy children, decrease dependency and out-of-wedlock births, and 
encourage the formation and maintenance of two-parent families. ld. 
56. Despite the Act's block grant system, at least one author has argned that the devolutionary 
nature of the PRA has been overemphasized given the Act's ''burdensome and expensive federal 
requirements," for example, the maximum lifethne limit on T ANF assistance to adults of sixty months. 
Candice Hoke, State Discretion Under New Federal Welfare Legislation: lllusion, Reality and a 
Federalism-Based Constitutional Challenge, 9 STAN. L. & POL'y REv. 115, 118 (1998). As a result, 
Hoke argnes that "states with more compassionate political leadership who wish to counter the national 
trend may seek areas of flexibility in vain." ld. at 116. 
57. Pub. L. No. 104-193, § 104, 110 Stat. 2105, 2163 (1996) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 604a). 
58. ld. 
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Given TANF's emphasis on finding people jobs and sanctioning those 
who fail to work, front-line workers have a great deal of discretion, and 
thus, power.59 Putting welfare recipients to work necessarily requires a per-
sonalized, hands-on approach that delivering monetary benefits pursuant to 
objective fmancial eligibility criteria does not. Under AFDC, front-line 
workers were state employees who focused on assessing whether appli-
cants met income and other standardized eligibility requirements.6o They 
might have referred welfare beneficiaries to private social service providers 
for job training, job placement, child care, or other discrete services, but 
these private agencies did not operate as the program's gatekeepers.61 By 
contrast, front-line workers generally now engage in. a variety of counsel-
ing and evaluative tasks. These include educating applicants about the 
T ANF program; assessing their work histories and attempts to obtain em-
ployment; reviewing their eligibility for entitlement benefits such as SST, 
Medicaid, and food stamps; determining their eligibility for cash grants, 
loans, or other services to divert them from the T ANF program; assisting 
them in securing child support from noncustodial parents; helping them 
with job searches; assessing their child care and transportation needs, as 
well as domestic violence problems or alcohol or drug abuse; drafting indi-
vidualized plans to attain economic self-sufficiency; and assisting them in 
locating job training, GED, ESOL, and other skill building activities.62 
Thus, front-line workers are being asked to shift from a people-sustaining 
role to a people-transforming role.63 
59. See generally Mathew Diller, The Revolution in Welfare Administration: Rules. Discretion. 
and Entrepreneurial Government, 75 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1121 (2000) (examining changes in the 
adminstrative structure ofthe welfare system since 1996). Diller points out that many welfare programs 
are consolidating eligibility and counseling functions "so that each worker has several roles." Id. at 
1161. 
60. A study of Wisconsin's welfare reform statute, Wisconsin Works, explained the prior system: 
Under AFDC in 1988, an adult with a dependent child applied for assistance at the offices of 
the county social services agency. The application process consisted of filIing out a form, 
providing certain documentation, and meeting with an intake worker. Payments began once 
the necessary information was provided to ensure that the children were the applicant's and 
that the family had little income, few assets, a local residence, and, in the case of two-parent 
families, an unemployed principal earner witb a work history. The amount of payment 
depended on the family's size and its income, if any. 
MICHAEL WISEMAN. URBAN INST .• IN MIDST OF REFORM: WISCONSIN IN 1997, at4 (1999). 
61. Id. at 5. For the difference between administrative structure under AFDClJOBS and the 
current structure, see also DAVID DODENHOFF. WISCONSIN POLICY REsEARCH INST .• INC .• PRIVATIZING 
WELFARE IN WISCONSIN 4-10 (1988). 
62. RICHARD P. NATHAN & THOMAS L. GAlS. IMPLEMENTING THE PERSONAL REsPONSmILITY 
ACT OF 1996: A FIRST LOOK 21 (1999). 
63. Marcia K.. Meyers, Gaining Cooperation at the Front Lines of Service Delivery: Issues for 
the Implementation of Welfare Reform, Rockefeller Reports, at 
http://www.rockinst.org/reportslrr07.html(June 12, 1998). IronicalIy, at the same time, eligibility 
standards at food banks and other social service organizations have tightened dramatically in the face of 
overwhelming demand caused by a decline in government spending on food aid. Poor people in need of 
these services face "[s]eemingly arbitrary eligibility rules, inflexible limits on aid and impersonal 
requirements." Nina Bernstein, Charity Begins at the Rule Book, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 24, 2000, § 4, at 5. 
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Thus far TANF has shrunk the nation's welfare rolls;64 however, its 
effectiveness in lifting the poor out of poverty is still open to debate.65 It is 
also unclear whether the rolls have shrunk solely because welfare recipi-
ents are working, or whether some have been discouraged, disappeared, or 
have otherwise been churned off the rolls. What is clear, however, is that 
T ANF pushes decision making downward and increases discretion at the 
level of the front-line worker. And where local governments have con-
tracted out their welfare programs, that discretion rests in the hands of pri-
vate persons. 
II 
PRIVATIZATION IN CONTEXT: HISTORY AND MODERN TRENDS 
Privatization of social services is not new. Since the New Deal, the 
expansion of the federal government's role in providing welfare has been 
accompanied by a corresponding growth in the involvement of nonprofit 
providers to the point where "the United States relies more heavily on non-
profit organizations than on its own instrumentalities to deliver govern-
ment-funded human services, and ... human service nonprofits receive 
more of their income from government than from any other single 
source .... "66 This Part aims to put the private provision of welfare in per-
spective, especially to demonstrate the extent to which the PRA extends 
welfare privatization into uncharted waters. Accordingly, this Part de-
scribes the historical background of the public and private roles in welfare 
relief and the growing scope of current privatization initiatives. 
A. History of Public and Private Welfare Provision 
Throughout American history, the poor have relied on both public 
relief and private charity for assistance. While the respective contributions 
of the public and private spheres have ebbed and fiowed over the years, 
often in opposition to one another, public agencies and private charities 
have become increasingly intertwined since the 1960s. This Part briefiy 
64. Since 1994, welfare caseloads have been cut by 52%. KATHERINE ALLEN & MARIA KIRBy, 
BROOKINGS lNsr., UNFINISHED BUSINESS: WHY CmES MAlTER TO WELFARE REFORM (2000). 
65. See PAMELA LoPREST, URBAN INsr., FAMILIES WHO LEFT WELFARE: WHO ARE THEY AND 
How ARE THEY DOING? (1999) (finding in this comprehensive study that while most women who left 
welfare are wolking, they are working in low-wage jobs and are less likely to have health insurance 
than other low-income mothers; one-third to one-half report serious economic struggles providing food 
and 20% have problems paying rent); David Kocieniewski, Study Finds Mixed Results in Reducing 
Welfare Rolls, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 22, 1999, at B6 (noting that although a third of the people who left 
New Jersey's welfare rolls since 1997 found jobs, ''two-thirds of all those who were receiving welfare 
when the study began in 1997 remain below the Federal poverty level of $19,000 per year, and half 
have experienced serious housing problems and been evicted, forced to stay in homeless shelters or 
moved in with friends or family members''). 
66. LESTER M. SALAMON, PARTNERS IN PuBLIC SERVICE: GOVERNMENT-NoNPROFIT RELATIONS 
IN THE MODERN WELFARE STATE 15 (1995). 
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outlines the roles of, and connections between, public and private agencies 
in America's welfare history while simultaneously sketching major themes 
in social welfare history. 
1. Early American History 
As the population in early colonial America increased, destitution did 
as well, and neighborly kindness simply could not deal with the growing 
numbers of poor and infirm.67 In need of a more systemized response to 
poverty, the colonists looked to England as a model and adopted the tenets 
of Elizabethan Poor Law. The English Poor Law of 160 I made poor relief 
a matter of local responsibility and distinguished between the "unworthy" 
poor and the "worthy" poor, that is, those who were deemed culpable for 
their destitute state and those who were not.68 The colonies followed suit.69 
This localized system of poor relief gradually became strained by in-
creased migration of "strangers" into towns and cities due to immigration 
and job transience. As a result, by the early eighteenth century, some local 
governments began to call on colonial treasuries for monetary relief.70 Also 
around this time, private philanthropy for poor relief began in earnest, re-
flecting the growing accumulation of wealth by some citizens.71 In addi-
tion, private groups such as churches, fraternal societies, and benevolent 
organizations began providing charitable services.72 Thus, by the tum of 
the nineteenth century, poor relief was a mix of local, state, and private 
efforts, with the bulk of the relief still provided by local governments. 
2. The Nineteenth Century 
In the nineteenth century, social welfare policy took a new tum. Re-
formers began attacking outdoor relief (basic material assistance provided 
in the home), accusing it of encouraging idleness and pauperism, draining 
67. See WALTER 1. TRATTNER. FROM POOR LAW TO WELFARE STATE: A HISTORY OF SOCIAL 
WELFARE IN AMERICA 15-16 (6th ed. 1999). 
68. See id. at 10-12. The Poor Law. enacted in 1601 and effective for over 250 years, categorized 
the poor into three groups, each of which was assisted by different means: children were apprenticed, 
the able-bodied were put to work, and the helpless, or "worthy" poor were provided with either home 
relief or institutionalized. Id.; see also MICHAEL B. KATZ. IN THE SHADOW OF THE POORHOUSE 14 
(lOth ed. 1996). 
69. See JOEL F. HANDLER. THE POVERTY OF WELFARE REFORM 12-13 (1995). Handler cxplains 
that the colonies used four basic methods to relieve poverty: (I) auctioning the poor (selling them to 
the lowest bidder); (2) contracting the poor (paying local families to take them in at public 
expense); (3) indoor relief (placing the poor in poorhouses); and (4) outdoor relief (basic assistance 
outside the poorhouse). See also KATZ, supra note 68, at 14. This distinction between the worthy and 
unworthy poor is one that has continued to define American poor relief policies. As demonstrated by 
TANF, Americans have long had little sympathy for those deemed able to work, regardless of the 
actual availability of work. HANDLER, supra, at 30-31. 
70. TRATTNER, supra note 67, at 19-22. 
71. [d. at 33. 
72. [d. at 35-36, 42. 
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the public fisc, and reducing the labor supply.73 As a result, poorhouses 
began to dominate poor relief policy.74 Both states and private organiza-
tions built and administered these social welfare institutions. Indeed, states 
often relied on private charities to provide certain social services, and pri-
vate organizations often contributed money to states to start institutions.75 
Although poorhouses initially held promise of reform, it soon became clear 
that they had become warehouses of despair, and they were ultimately a 
failure.76 Not only did the poorhouses fail to relieve poverty, but they were 
plagued by corruption, filth, disorder, and disease, and they ended up 
costing more than outdoor relie£77 
During this time, private benevolent societies also played an increas-
ing role in poor relie£18 Because these societies viewed poverty as a result 
of poor morals, they believed that they could lift people out of poverty by 
improving their character. Accordingly, they embarked on campaigus to 
visit the homes of the poor and to provide them with moral uplift and ex-
hortation.79 
With the downfall of poorhouses, two other private alternatives to 
outdoor relief, both \vith roots in the earlier private benevolent societies, 
came to dominate welfare policy in the late nineteenth century: scientific 
charity and settlement houses. The scientific charity movement, which 
sought to apply the scientific principles of rationality and efficiency to wel-
fare work, consisted of organizations that served as clearinghouses to coor-
dinate relief among the many available public and private sources.so Like 
the earlier benevolent societies, they relied on "friendly visitors" to inves-
tigate the homes of the poor and to provide them with moral and religious 
73. KATZ, supra note 68, at 14,23. 
74. TRATINER, supra note 67, at 58-59. The rise of the poorhouse mirrored the rise of other 
specialized institutions for the needy, such as orphanages and mental institutions. ld. at 57, 62; 
HANDLER, supra note 69, at 13-14; KATZ, supra note 68, at 11. 
75. KATZ, supra note 68, at 10-11. Supporters claimed that poorhouses "would suppress 
intemperance, the primary cause of pauperism, and inculcate the habit of steady work," a habit that 
outdoor relief had supposedly eroded. ld. at 11, 18. 
76. ld. at 24-26. 
77. ld. at 26; HANDLER, supra note 69, at 16-17; TRATINER, supra note 67, at 59-60. 
78. TRATINER, supra note 67, at 67-68. 
79. ld. at 67, 70-71. The most prominent of these associations was the New York Association for 
Improving the Condition of the Poor (A.l.C.P.), founded in 1843. The A.LC.P. relied on male visitors 
to "lead the dependent to self-support through instruction in the basic virtues of religious observance, 
thrift, hard work, and temperance." ld. at 68. Walter Trattner has concluded that the A.LC.P. "was no 
more a charitable agency than an instrument for reducing relief costs and keeping society orderly, 
stable, and quiet." ld. at 69. However, he points out that A.l.C.P. members eventually began to 
understand the economic forces underlying poverty and to provide financial aid to the needy. ld. at 71. 
The association thus greatly impacted later charity organization movements. ld. For a discussion of the 
role of volunteerism and the wide variety of active private welfare organizations in the nineteenth 
century, see KATZ, supra note 68, at 61-68. 
80. TRATINER, supra note 67, at 91-92. 
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counselingY The settlement house movement, following on the heels of 
scientific charity, favored a preventative approach to poverty.82 Settlement 
house workers lived among the poor in inner-city neighborhoods and fo-
cused on strengthening communities through social and economic reforms. 
Central to both movements was their staunch opposition to outdoor relief83 
However, their failure to provide material aid and to recognize the under-
lying economic causes of poverty was one of the many reasons that scien-
tific charity and settlement houses ultimately withered away.84 
3. The Twentieth Century 
Unable to meet increasing need, private relief shrank in importance 
during the first two decades of the twentieth century, and governmental 
assistance to the poor ascended. Reformers quickly realized that volun-
teerism alone could not cope with the increasing poverty engendered by the 
social forces of industrialization, urbanization, and immigration.85 The 
plight of poor children, who were often taken from their homes and put in 
impersonal and expensive institutions, particularly mobilized reformers. 
They began to call for the care of children in their own homes.86 Accord-
ingly, following an influential White House conference on children's issues 
in 1909, mothers' pensions, a form of cash assistance to women with de-
pendent children, became the preferred form of welfare.87 The mothers' 
pension statutes formed the basis for the federal Aid to Dependent Children 
(ADC) program enacted in 1935 (later changed to Aid to Families With 
Dependent Children in the 1960s), the very program later abolished by the 
PRA. 
81. This approach was riddled with contradictions that hastened its demise. As Michael Katz 
explains, "Over and over again, charity organizations' sponsors claimed their overriding goal was to 
restore the very poor to independence. Dependence on private or public charity was their great enemy. 
Yet, their very method taught dependence, because only an outward show of deference merited relief. 
Any display of independence they translated into ingratitude, and gratitude was everything." KATZ, 
supra note 68, at 70. 
82. KATZ, supra note 68, at 163-68; JAMES T. PATTERSON, AMERICA'S STRUGGLE AGAINST 
POVERTY 1900-1994, at 24-25 (1994); TRATTNER, supra note 67, at 163. 
83. TRATTNER, supra note 67, at 91-92. As one reformer stated, "next to alcohol, and perhaps 
alongside it, the most pernieious fluid is indiscriminate soup." [d. at 92. 
84. However, these two movements left their mark by eventually merging into the soeial work 
profession. [d. at 182. 
85. [d. at 214. At the same time, cities began to centralize their power and provide increasing 
municipal services to their citizens, including welfare. KATZ, supra note 68, at 155-63. As a result, "by 
the late 1920s, most cities spent three times more money than private agencies on outdoor relief." [d. at 
159. 
86. TRATTNER, supra note 67, at 215-16. 
87. KATZ, supra note 68, at 215-16; TRATTNER, supra note 67, at 222-23. However, the statutes 
contained "suitable home" requirements, which restricted aid to "worthy" mothers and which gave 
local authorities great discretion in awarding benefits. As a result, most of the aid went to "deserving" 
white widows, while many poor women, including those who were divorced, deserted, unmarried, or of 
color, receivcd nothing. [d. at 225. 
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The 1929 stock market crash and the depression that followed left 
millions unemployed.88 Although private agencies and local governments 
attempted to aid the jobless, they were overwhelmed by the massive need. 89 
By 1932, one-third of the voluntary relief agencies had shuttered their 
doors.9o Still, President Hoover resisted a federal response to the crisis, pre-
ferring to rely on the little private charity that remained.91 By contrast, 
when Franklin D. Roosevelt entered the White House, he brought his sup-
port for public poor relief programs with him, and he was able to spur en-
actment of a series of work relief measures.92 Roosevelt got the federal 
government significantly involved in poor relief for the first time, a process 
that required the creation of massive administrative structures from whole 
c1oth.93 Yet Roosevelt's emergency measures were meant to be tempo-
rary.94 To provide long-term security for the needy, Roosevelt pushed for 
enactment ofthe Social Security Act. Passed on August 14, 1935, the Act 
provided social insurance, in the forms of old-age insurance and unem-
ployment assistance, as well as public assistance for the aged, dependent 
children in single-parent families, disabled children, and the blind.95 The 
federal government administered the old-age insurance portion of the Act 
(which we call Social Security), while the public assistance programs were 
88. KATZ, supra note 68, at 214-17, 220. "Between 1929 and the summer of 1933, official 
unemployment in America climbed from 3.2 percent to 24.9 percent." [d. at 214. 
89. [d. at 214; PATIERSON, supra note 82, at 56. 
90. KATZ, supra note 68, at 221-22; TRATINER, supra note 67, at 273. 
91. KATZ, supra note 68, at 222; TRATINER, supra note 67, at 276. For an in-depth analysis of 
Hoover's doomed attempt to use the private sector as a substitute for a welfare state, see Ellis W. 
Hawley, Herbert Hoover, Associationalism, and the Great Depression Relief Crisis of 1930-1933, in 
WITH Us ALWAYS, A HISTORY OF PRIVATE CHARITY AND PUBLIC WELFARE 161 (Donald T. Critchlow 
& Charles H. Parker eds., 1998). Hawley concludes that "[t]he Hooverian experience ... would seem 
to offer little encouragement to those who currently hope to supplant the welfare state with a private 
sector substitute." [d. at 175. In fact, the utter failure of voluntary relief likely paved the way for the 
expansive federal programs undertaken during the New Deal. [d. at 174-75. 
92. TRATTNER, supra note 67, at 282-83. One of these programs, the Federal Emergency Relief 
Act of 1933, made $500 million in grants-in-aid to the states for emergency unemployment relief. The 
administering agency, the Federal Emergency Relief Administration, had authority to determine the 
extent of the grants, but the funds were distributed by states and localities. [d. at 284-85. However, the 
head of the agency, Harry Hopkins, issued a directive requiring that all of the grant money be handled 
by public agencies, thus prohibiting states from giving federal funds to private agencies. [d. 
93. KATZ, supra note 68, at 224. The chosen measures included federal grants-in-aid to the 
states, as well as work relief programs. The former included the Federal Emergency Relief Act, and the 
latter included the Civilian Conscrvation Corps, the Civilian Works Administration, and later, the 
Works Progress Administration. See id. at 226-29; PATTERSON, supra note 82, at 234. 
94. KATZ, supra note 68, at 234. For instance, Roosevelt warned Congress that "continued 
dependence upon relief induces a spiritual and moral disintegration fundamentally destructive to the 
national fibre. To dole out relief in this way is to administer a narcotic, a subtle destroyer of the human 
spirit." [d. 
95. Pub. L. No. 74-271,49 Stat. 620 (1935) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 301-1397f 
(1994». The categorical nature of the Act derived from prior state and federal laws, and in keeping with 
history, it provided public assistance only to the "worthy" poor. See HANDLER, supra note 69, at 20. It 
also favored men over women. MThII ABRAMOVITZ, REGULATING THE LIVES OF WOMEN 235 (1996). 
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administered by states and localities through grants-in-aid from the federal 
government. As a result of local administration, ADC remained a small 
program until the 1960s, and it primarily aided white widows, as had the 
forerunner state laws.96 
Overall, the New Deal put in place the categorization of need that 
marks current welfare policy. It distinguished between social insurance (for 
the worthy masses, including the middle-classes) and public assistance (for 
the unworthy poor).97 It expanded the role of the federal government and 
forced the states to commit to poor relief and develop administrative 
structures for the distribution of that relief.98 It also "reinforced state and 
local variations in welfare benefits and froze into place the complex, mul-
tilayered, decentralized pattern that has distinguished relief and welfare in 
America since early in the nation's history."99 
After WWII, the country lost interest in poverty; the dominant ideol-
ogy was one of mass prosperity.IOO The prevalent belief among policymak-
ers was that a strong economy would eliminate poverty.lOl Nevertheless, 
the welfare rolls quietly increased, and by the mid-1950s most welfare 
funds went to ADC recipients rather than to the aged. l02 In response to this 
growth, the states implemented a variety of punitive policies designed to 
reduce the number of welfare recipients, including eligibility investigations 
of recipient households and "suitable home" requirements. l03 
During the 1960s, a growing awareness that the country's prosperity 
had not trickled down to all people replaced the optimism of the 1950s. 
Social and demographic shifts, including the flow of rural populations into 
the cities, the increasing number of persons on public assistance, and espe-
cially the civil rights movement, heightened public awareness of inequities 
in American society.l04 In his bid for the presidency, Kennedy expressly 
made poverty and hunger a campaigu theme. lOS Once elected, Kennedy, 
and then President Johnson, enacted significant welfare reform measures 
based on a "service strategy," which aimed to provide the poor with serv-
ices to gain employment, such as job training and placement, rather than 
96. ABRAMOVITZ, supra note 95, at 319. 
97. KATZ, supra note 68, at 242; PATTERSON, supra note 82, at 76. 
98. KATZ, supra note 68, at 255. 
99. Id. at 247. 
100. PATTERSON, supra note 82, at 78-79, 83; TRATTNER, supra note 67, at 308. Yet in the late 
1950s, poverty affected nearly 40 million people. Id. at 78. 
101. PATTERSON, supra note 82, at 79, 89. 
102. TRATTNER, supra note 67, at 309. Between the 1930s and 1960, the numbers of ADC 
recipients had grown from 701,000 to 3 million. PATTERSON, supra note 82, at 86. Still, only 1% of the 
gross national product was being spent on categorical or general assistance to the poor. Id. 
103. ABRAMOVITZ, supra note 95, at 323-26; KATZ, supra note 68, at 261; PATTERSON, supra note 
82, at 87-88. 
104. KATZ, supra note 68, at 260. James Patterson provides a detailed exploration of the 
"rediscovery" of poverty during this time period. See PATTERSON, supra note 82, at 99-114. 
105. PATTERSON, supra note 82, at 126-27. 
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with money.106 The strategy, set forth in the Economic Opportunity Act of 
1964 and administered by the Office of Economic Opportunity, was carried 
out by a vast network of private social service providers and community 
action agencies. Federal funds bypassed state and local governments and 
went directly to programs that federal law required be "administered with 
maximum feasible participation of the residents."lo7 Thus, "[t]he War on 
Poverty generated a number of concepts and undertook a number of inter-
ventions that reflected, either explicitly or implicitly, a vote of no confi-
dence in governmental services as then being delivered.»1OS Increased 
privatization, funded by federal dollars, was the result. Thus, both the fed-
eral government and private social services expanded greatly during this 
time period.109 
The community action program was intensely controversial, as local 
officials, threatened by the loss of funds and control, vehemently attacked 
the program. lIO Those attacks, coupled with budget cuts as a result of Viet-
nam War spending, eventually heralded the demise of the federal govern-
ment's War on PovertyYI Yet its legacy was far-reaching. It fostered 
grassroots social activism and created a generation of reformers, many of 
whom migrated into government service.112 It also spawned Head Start, 
legal services, and neighborhood service and health centers, and it mobi-
lized the poor to agitate for their rights. 1I3 It also started the interdependent 
relationship between government and private social welfare providers that 
continues to this day. 
The expansion of federal government welfare spending that began in 
the early 1960s continued into the mid-1970s, despite President Nixon's 
anti-welfare rhetoricY4 All told, the time period from the early 1960s to the 
106. KATZ, supra note 68, at 263; Alice O'Connor, Neither Charity Nor Relief" The War on 
Poverty and the Effort to Redefine the Basis of Social Provision, in WITH Us ALWAYS, supra note 91, 
at 191, 191-92. 
107. KATZ, supra note 68, at 267. 
lOS. Arnold Gurin, Governmental Responsibility and Privatization: Examples from Four Social 
Services, in PRIVATIZATION AND THE WELFARE STATE 179, 182 (Sheila B. Kamennan & Alfred J. 
Kahn eds., 1989). 
109. See id. at 183 ("The 1960s, thus, were a period of great expansion in the role of government, 
especially the federal government, but also a period of expansion in privatization of various kinds, both 
nonprofit and for-profit, fueled largely by government funds."). 
1l0. PATTERSON, supra note 82, at 146-47. 
Ill. See id. at 14S; O'Connor, supra note 106, at 207. Nixon finally closed the OEO in 1974, 
transferring its remaining programs to other government departments. KATZ, supra note 6S, at 268. 
112. KATZ, supra note 68, at 263. 
113. PATTERSON, supra note 82, at 126. As part of the backlash to the War on Poverty, Congress 
enacted two "work incentive" programs, in 1967 and 1971 respectively, designed to push AFDC 
recipients into the workplace. HANDLER, supra note 69, at 58; PATTERSON, supra note 82, at 175-76. 
Both programs failed. ld. 
114. KATZ, supra note 68, at 269-70. The poor benefitted from a variety of other legislative gains 
during Nixon's tenure, including increases in food stamp and Social Security spending and the 
federalization of supplemental security income, which set an income fioor for the less controversial 
588 CALIFORNIA LA W REVIEW [Vol. 89:569 
mid-1970s saw three significant trends. First, there was a massive increase 
in government spending on social welfare programs.115 As noted earlier, 
much of this spending went to private voluntary agencies, thus creating a 
"mixed" welfare state that "marked a creation unique to the United States, 
reflecting a deep-seated American tradition of associative enterprise that 
combines self-reliance and private voluntarism with communitarianism and 
government activity."116 Second, this massive social welfare spending dra-
matically reduced the numbers of poor.1l7 Third, and despite the second 
trend, the number of AFDC recipients grew dramatically.118 Several inter-
twined reasons explain this growth in the number of AFDC recipients, in-
cluding an increase in the number of eligible families that applied for aid as 
the welfare rights movement gathered steam; 119 an increase in eligible ap-
plicants who were actually assisted by the states (particularly northern 
states, which paid higher benefits and which liberalized eligibility require-
ments); and demographic changes, such as population growth and rising 
divorce and illegitimacy rates. 120 
The next major shift in welfare policy occurred in the 1980s. President 
Reagan advocated the work ethic, blamed the poor for their condition, and 
accordingly, promised to slash social welfare spending.121 In a throwback 
to Hoover, Reagan believed that welfare should be provided by private 
volunteer organizations. 122 While Congress defeated many of Reagan's 
more extreme proposals to eliminate social spending, significant cuts sur-
vived nonetheless, including cuts to food stamps, child nutrition, and un-
employment insurance. 123 In 1981, Reagan pushed legislation through 
Congress that cut back work incentives for those on AFDC and that 
adult eategories of public assistance: the aged, blind, and disabled. PAlTERSON, supra note 82, at 168, 
197. The proposed floor was higher than AFDC payments in eight southern states. Id. at 193; see also 
TRAlTNER, supra note 67, at 348-51. 
115. Expenditures rose at an annual rate of 7.2% for the years between 1965 and 1976, compared 
to 4.6% annually from 1950 to 1965. Social welfare spending went from 7.7% of the gross national 
product in 1960 to 16% in 1974, although the bulk of that money went for non-means-tested programs 
such as Social Security and Medicare. PAlTERSON, supra note 82, at 164. 
116. Donald T. Critchlow, Implementing Family Planning Policy: Philanthropic Foundations and 
the Modem Welfare State, in WITH Us ALWAYS, supra note 91, at 211,212. 
117. KATZ, supra note 68, at 278. According to flgures based on the official poverty line, "the 
number of poor Americans decreased from 39 million (22 percent of the population) in 1959, to 32 
million (17 percent) in 1965, to 25 million (13 percent) in 1968, to 23 million (II percent) in 1973." 
PAlTERSON, supra note 82, at 160. 
118. PAlTERSON, supra note 82, at 171 (increasing from "3.1 million in 1960 to 4.3 million in 
1965 to 6.1 million in 1969 to 10.8 miIlion by 1974"). 
119. TRAlTNER, supra note 67, at 343-44. 
120. ABRAMOVITZ, supra note 95, at 334-35; KATZ, supra note 68, at 275-76; PAlTERSON, supra 
note 82, at 178-84. 
121. PAlTERSON, supra note 82, at 213; TRAlTNER, supra note 67, at 370. 
122. KATZ, supra note 68, at 289. 
123. KATZ, supra note 68, at 296-97; PAlTERSON, supra note 82, at 212. 
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restricted AFDC eligibility.124 Reagan's cuts to social spending also dev-
astated the very private programs he was counting on to alleviate pov-
erty.l25 Not surprisingly, the poverty rate began growing again, and by 
1983, the poverty rate was the highest it had been since the mid 1960s.126 
Increasing poverty rates helped fuel an obsession with a perceived 
growing underclass.127 In 1984, Charles Murray, a conservative sociologist, 
fanned the flames by publishing an influential book called Losing Ground, 
in which he argued that welfare created dependency and prevented the poor 
from achieving self-sufficiency.128 He proposed that all public welfare pro-
grams be eliminated, with the possible exception of unemployment insur-
ance.129 Soon, the states began experimenting with workfare (that is, work 
requirements tied to the receipt of welfare benefits); by 1987, forty states 
had such programs.130 In 1988, the workfare concept became part offederal 
law when Reagan signed the Family Support Act, which enacted the Job 
Opportunities and Basic Skills (JOBS) program. l3l JOBS required single 
parents on welfare whose children were over three years old-or over one 
in some states-to work as a condition of receiving benefits, or, if they 
could not find a job, to enroll in education or job training courses.132 Like 
previous federal work programs, JOBS ultimately made little difference in 
the lives of the poor. The states, strapped for cash, failed to start or expand 
job training programs or to provide ample funds for child care or other 
124. ABRAMOVITZ, supra note 95, at 355-56 (as a result of this legislation, between 1981 and 
1983,400,000 working welfare mothers lost their grnnt); KATZ, supra note 68, at 306. 
125. See KATZ, supra note 68, at 296-97, 289; SALAMON, supra note 66, at 153-54, 166, 194-95. 
126. TRATINER, supra note 67, at 368 (by 1983, the poverty rate had risen to 15.3% of the 
population). At this time, the feminization of poverty continued. That is, two out of every three poor 
adults were women.ld. at 370; see also PATTERSON, supra note 82, at 219. 
127. PATTERSON, supra note 82, at 215-18. 
128. CHARLES MURRAY, LOSING GROUND: AMERICAN SOCIAL POLICY, 1950-1980 (1984). 
129. Id. at 227-33. "What Murray ignored was the fact that, between 1960 and 1972, precisely the 
years when welfare programs really proliferated, poverty in America was cut in half-and the greatest 
growth in poverty came during the early 1980s, when the Reagan administration curtailed and 
eliminated such programs." TRATINER, supra note 67, at 371 n.l3. Murray's position has been 
skillfully critiqued by, among others, CHRIsroPHER JENCKS, The Safety Net, in RimnNKING SOCIAL 
POLICY: RACE, POVERTY, AND THE UNDERCLASS 70, 70-91 (1992); Jeffrey Lehman & Sheldon 
Danzinger, Reflections on Welfare Reform, 37 U. MICH. L. QUANDRANGLE NOTES 34, 37-38 (1994); 
Lucy A. Williams, The Ideology of Division: Behavior Modification Welfare Reform Proposal, 102 
YALE L.j. 719 (1992); Sheldon Danzingcr & Peter Gottschalk, The Poverty of Losing Ground, 
CHALLENGE, May/June 1985, at 32; Robert Greenstein, Losing Faith in 'Losing Ground,' NEW 
REPUBLIC, Mar. 25, 1985, at 12. 
130. TRATINER, supra note 67, at 375. 
131. 42 U.S.C. §§ 681-687 (repealed 1996). 
132. JOBS was based on the dubious assumptions, disproven by many scholars, "that most 
recipients have been on welfare for long periods of time (even generations), by choice; that they are 
able to get, and to hold, jobs, or would be able to do so after receiving some basic education or job 
training, that paid employment was the ticket out of poverty for women on welfare; and that they will 
enter the labor force only when required by law or threatened with starvation." TRATINER, supra note 
67, at 377. 
590 CALIFORNIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 89:569 
supportive services,133 and, as a result, only a small percentage of welfare 
clients actually enrolled in work programs. 134 
President Bush replicated Reagan's approach to poverty; Bush's do· 
mestic welfare agenda focused on advocating for a "thousand points of 
light," or vo1unteerism. 135 Meanwhile, however, the poverty rate climbed 
and welfare applications soared. 136 In response, in the late 1980s, states 
began to freeze or reduce AFDC benefits.137 They requested waivers from 
the federal government to experiment with behavior modification welfare 
programs such as 1earnfare (sanctions for families whose teenage children 
missed school), family caps (denial of additional benefits to mothers who 
gave birth to additional children while on AFDC), hea1thfare (reduced 
benefits for families that failed to get children immunized), and wedfare 
(bonuses to welfare mothers who married).138 The states thus bccame the 
laboratories and agents of changes that were eventually passed into federal 
law in the PRA. 
After his election in 1992, President Clinton encouraged these state 
waivers.139 He had campaigned upon a promise to "end welfare as we know 
it." In 1993, his administration granted a waiver to Wisconsin to develop a 
workfare program with a two-year lifetime limit on benefits.140 With the 
Republican takeover of Congress in 1994, and the resulting Contract With 
America, the pressure increased on Clinton to pass substantial welfare re-
form 1egis1ation.141 After vetoing two Republican versions of welfare re-
form, Clinton signed the PRA into law in 1996.142 As enacted, the PRA 
reflects many of the themes of colonial poor law, including an emphasis on 
local responsibility, restrictions on aid to "strangers," or out-of-state resi-
dents (subsequently struck down by the Supreme Court),143 and a ''work or 
starve" mentality for the able bodied.144 At the same time, by encouraging 
states to use private entities as welfare providers, the PRA embodies 
133. Id. at 381; ABRAMOVITZ, supra note 95, at 357-61; KATZ, supra note 68, at 301, 309; 
PATTERSON, supra note 82, at 231-32. 
134. KATZ, supra note 68, at 301. 
135. TRATTNER, supra note 67, at 379, 383. 
136. Id. at 380. Between 1989 and 1992, the poverty rate rose sharply to 14.5% of the population, 
from 12.8%. PATTERSON, supra note 82, at 225. AFDC rolls jumped by 25% in this time period. Id. at 
229. 
137. TRATTNER, supra note 67, at 380. 
138. KATZ, supra note 68, at 310-11; PATTERSON, supra note 82, at 239. 
139. ABRAMOVITZ, supra note 95, at 362; PATTERSON, supra note 82, at 239; TRATTNER, supra 
note 67, at 396. 
140. PATTERSON, supra note 82, at 240. 
141. ABRAMOVITZ, supra note 95, at 363; KATZ, supra note 68, at 301. 
142. For a complete history of the legislation, see CONGRESSIONAL QUARTERLY ALMANAC 6-3 to 
6-24 (1996). 
143. Saenz v. Roe, 526 U.S. 489 (1999) (holding that TANF residency requirements violated the 
Privileges and Immunities Clause). 
144. TRATTNER, supra note 67, at 397. 
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strands of the War on Poverty and its emphasis on community-oriented 
service delivery as well as the government's general trend toward privati-
zation. Yet the PRA's privatization provision received scant notice in the 
legislative debates; it was overshadowed by the spotlight thrown on the 
Act's overtly punitive measures.145 This barely aclmowledged addition to 
the law has the potential to alter the rights of millions of welfare recipients. 
4. Conclusion 
This brief history reveals that the poor have relied on both public and 
private provision of welfare since the founding of this country. Contrary to 
the claims of some privatization proponents, there never was a mythic 
"golden age" during which private charity alone took care of the needs of 
the poor. Rather, government has always provided the majority of funding 
for poor relief. Left to their own devices, private entities would be unable 
to relieve poverty. At the same time, the government has always relied on 
private entities to carry out many of its social service objectives. So, calls 
for the government alone to carry the burden of poor relief are equally un-
realistic. At bottom, it appears that publicly funded, privately provided so-
cial service delivery is here to stay.146 However, the entry of for-profit 
entities and the devolution of eligibility and sanctioning functions to pri-
vate entities raises new and troubling questions. 
B. New Directions in Welfare Privatization 
The PRA has brought for-profit entities into the social service fold on 
a scale above and beyond their traditional involvement as contractors for 
information and data systems. 147 Unlike government and most nonprofit 
agencies, these for-profit providers are trying to make money, which may 
affect their accountability and the quality of service they provide to 
145. The only significant debate about Section 104 revolved around allowing religious 
organizations to provide welfare services. PRA allows states to contract with religious organizations to 
provide welfare services. Pub. L. No. 104-193, § 104(b), 110 Stat. 2105, 2162 (1996) (codified at 42 
U.S.C. § 604a). This obviously raises issues under the Establishment Clause. Thus, states cannot 
discriminate against religious organizations that apply to be contractors. ld. § 104(c). At the same time, 
beneficiaries who object to the religious character of a provider organization are entitled to assistance 
from an alternative providenvithin a reasonable period of time after objecting. ld. § 102(e)(I). Further, 
religious organizations cannot discriminate against individuals on the basis of religion. ld. § 102(g). 
Reliance on faith-based organizations to supply social welfare is controversial, and it is not clear how 
effective they would be in an expanded role. See Jacob S. Hacker, Faith Healers, NEW REpUBLIC, June 
28, 1999, at 16. For some of the legislative debates on the privatization provision see H.R. REp. No. 
104-651, at 1374-75 (1996), reprinted in 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2183, 2433-34; 142 CONGo REc. S8493 
(daily ed. July 3,1996); 141 CONGo REc. S13481 (dailyed. Sept. 13, 1995). 
146. Privatization may be appealing to governments who find internal reform too politically 
costly. See Jonas Prager, Contracting-Out: Theory and Policy, 25 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 73, 103 
(1992). 
147. See DEMETRA SMITH NIGIITINGALE & NANCY PINDUS, URBAN lNST., PRIVATIZATION OF 
PUBLIC SOCIAL SERVICES: A BACKGROUND PAPER 5 (1997). 
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beneficiaries. In many contracting schemes, which pay a set fee to the con-
tractor, the more money the provider saves, the more money the provider 
gets to keep.148 This raises incentives for profit-seeking organizations to cut 
staffs and to implement other cost-savings measures that can impact the 
quality of service provided. In other contracting schemes, where fees are 
paid based on services provided, there are incentives to help only those 
persons most easily placed in jobs. Thus, profit-making entities often have 
incentives inconsistent with the needs of welfare recipients. These changes 
heighten the importance of ascertaining whether welfare recipients have 
any enforceable rights against welfare providers.149 
Several states have jumped on the privatization bandwagon, and oth-
ers are beginning to move in that direction. 150 Wisconsin pioneered the pri-
vatization of welfare services, privatizing pursuant to a waiver from HHS 
even before the 1996 welfare reform statute. As of January 1998, private 
companies handled the entire welfare caseload in Milwaukee, where sev-
enty percent of the state's welfare caseload resides. 15.1 Arizona is another 
state leader in welfare privatization. In early 1999, it started a pilot pro-
gram called ARIZONA WORKS in a portion of Maricopa County, which 
covers metropolitan Phoenix. ls2 This privatized district is being run by 
Maximus, Inc., a for-profit corporation, and is expected to take in about 
thirteen percent of the state's $160 million welfare budget.153 Although 
Arizona has long contracted with private service providers for discrete 
services, the new pilot program was intensely controversial, largely be-
cause of the influx of for-profit providers and their authority to conduct 
eligibility functions. It thus faced vocal opposition from welfare advocates 
and public employee unions. l54 Arizona's plan envisions expansion of pri-
vatization; it calls for additional privatization projects and for study and 
consideration of further privatization initiatives. 155 Other jurisdictions that 
148. See. e.g., DODENHOFF, supra note 61, at 4. 
149. For one creative strategy, see Cheryl 1. Wade, For-Profit Corporations That Perform Public 
Functions: Politics. Profit, and Poverty, 51 RUTGERS 1. REv. 323, 327, 330 (1999). She explains that 
the shareholder primacy paradigm of private corporations leaves out any concern for the beneficiaries 
of the privatized social services programs. Accordingly, sbe argues for increased accountability of for-
profit social service providers through a revised notion of corporate law that would require that 
directors and officers of the corporations fulfill fiduciary obligations to the constituents of these 
programs (whom she calls Corporate Dependents) rather than solely to shareholders. 
150. In 1998, USA Today reported that more than thirty states had turned over parts of their 
welfare systems-ranging from job placement to eligibility determinations-to the private sector. 
Richard Wolf, Public Aid Going Private in Many States, USA TODAY, Aug. 3, 1998, at 3A. A summary 
of privatization initiatives on a state-by-state basis can be found at http://www.welfareinfo.org (last 
visited Nov. 1,2000). 
151. See DODENHOFF, supra note 61, at 3, 13-17. 
152. See John Stuart Hall & Gerald J. Kubiak, Arizona's Welfare Reform Experience, Rockefeller 
Reports, at http://rockinst.org.reportslrrI3.html(Nov. 2, 1999). 
153. See id. 
154. [d. 
155. See id.; ARIZ. REv. STAT. ANN. § 46-342 (West 2000). 
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also have significant welfare privatization initiatives underway include 
Texas;156 Florida;157 and Orange, San Diego, and Los Angeles Counties in 
California. ISS Notably, the most extensive privatization programs are occur-
ring in urban areas, such as Milwaukee and Phoenix. This coincides with 
the demographic trend that most of America's welfare families live in ur-
ban areas.159 Thus, privatization is poised to affect a significant number of 
welfare recipients. 
Currently, the big for-profit players in welfare privatization are Lock-
heed Martin and Maximus. Maximus bills itself as the "nation's largest 
private sector provider of job development and placement services to the 
disadvantaged."i60 Although the company was formed in 1975, its business 
increased dramatically in the wake of welfare reform and it went public in 
1997.161 lf it were a state, Maximus would have the country's 29th largest 
social services caseload in the country,162 and it holds a thirty percent share 
in the growing health and human services market. 163 Unlike Maximus, 
which has always focused on the human services field, Lockheed Martin's 
business has long centered on defense contracting. However, with declin-
ing defense spending, Lockheed has focused on developing new business 
areas, and now welfare reform services represent one of its two fastest-
growing business lines. l64 The company states that in the last four years it 
156. Merrill Goozner, Welfare's Gold Rush: Private Sector Mining Hard for Reform Effort'S 
Contracts, CHICAGO TRIBUNE, June 29, 1997, at lC; Welfare Infonnation Network, Privatization, 
available at http://www.welfareinfo.orglprivitization.htm (last visited February 21, 2001). 
157. See Deborah Hardin Wagner, Welfare's Forgotten Families: Training Not Included, ST. 
PETERSBURG TIMES, Nov. 7, 1999, at ID; Safety Net of Florida, WAGES Coalition Profiles, available 
at http://www.flimpaclorglwagesprofil.html(last visited Nov. 22, 2000) (descn"bing in detail on a 
regional basis the public-private coalitions that are charged with setting up contracting with private 
providers and developing jobs). 
158. See Karen Kucher, Lawsuit Targets Welfare Contracts; Group Claims Profit Motivated 
Awards, SAN DIEGO UNION-TRIB., Aug. 3, 1999, at Bl; Nicholas Riccardi, County Nears Private Bids 
on Welfare Reform, L.A. TIMES, Feb. 8, 2000, at Bl; Nicholas Riccardi, Supervisors Privatize Job-
Training Services, L.A. TIMES, July 12, 2000, at B3; Janet Wilson, County Planning to Contract Out 
Bulk of Welfare Reform Efforts, L.A. TIMES, Mar. 12, 1998, at Bl. 
159. ALLEN & KiRBY, supra note 64, at 1. The concentration of poverty in UIban areas poses grave 
challenges for policymakers who must contend with a population served by poor schools, weak job 
infonnation networks, and scarce employment opportunities. Id. at 4. These UIban areas contain a 
greater share ofhard-ro-serve welfare families, i.e., those facing multiple barriers to work. Id. 
160. This sales pitch is available at Maximus, Inc., Welfare to Work, 
http://www.maxinc.comlbroch4.html. 
161. Frederic J. Frommer, Strategies; Maximus Pulling in the Outsourcing Jobs, WASH. POST, 
Sepl20, 1999, at F13. 
162. Lorraine Woellert, Maximus, Inc.: Welfare Privatizer, Bus. WEEK, May 31, 1999, at 96. 
163. Id. 
164. Jonathan Walters, The Welfare Bonanza, GoVERNING, Jan. 2000, at 34.; see also Greg 
Schneider, Defense Industry Faces Consolidation, Transition; Mergers Also Likely to Continue, BALT. 
SUN, Jan. 18, 1998, at 13K. However, according to Lockheed's Website, sales to the Department of 
Defense still constitute 53% of its profits. See Lockheed Martin. About Us: At a Glance, at 
http://www.lockheedmartin.com/about/ataglance.htm (last visited Nov. 22, 2000). 
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has gone from zero to forty contracts in twenty-nine locations.165 Lockheed 
aggressively recruits former government welfare officials to bolster this 
growing line of work. 166 Along with these two corporate behemoths, many 
smaller nonprofit and for-profit organizations playa role in welfare reform 
on a local basis. 
C. The Broader Privatization Movement 
Beyond the welfare context, privatization is proliferating in spheres 
traditionally run by government. Privatization, "a fuzzy concept that 
evokes sharp political reactions,m67 generally entails the transfer of gov-
ernmental functions to the private sector. Privatization initiatives range 
from contracting, vouchers, subsidies, franchises, and tax credits, to more 
extreme forms such as load-shedding, in which the government eliminates 
its role in certain areas by selling its assets to the private sector or with-
drawing from providing a service altogether.168 The dominant form of pri-
vatization in this country, and the form endorsed by TANF, is contracting 
out, in which government funds services but contracts for their implemen-
tation with the private sector.169 In the United States, "more than half of all 
government spending on goods and services is publicly financed but pri-
vately produced.'mo The history of welfare in America, discussed above, 
reveals that T ANF's endorsement of privatization is the latest, and most 
far-reaching, extension of government's increasing reliance on private en-
tities to carry out its welfare objectives. It is also traceable to the increasing 
momentum of the broader privatization movement that took root during the 
Reagan Administration in the 1980s, as prominent American conservatives 
became influenced by Britain's Thatcher government, which had privatized 
165. See Lockhced Martin, About Us: At a Glance, at 
http://www.lockheedmartin.com!aboutlataglance.htm (last visited Nov. 22, 2000). 
166. See, e.g., Kery Murakami, Corporate Giants Eye the Welfare Rolls, SEATILE TIMES, Jan. 6, 
1997, at BI. 
167. Paul Starr, The Meaning 0/ Privatization, in PRIvATIZATION AND THE WELFARE STATE, 
supra note 108, at 15. 
168. See id. at 24; Adrian Moore & Wade Hudson, The Evolution 0/ Privatization Practices and 
Strategies, in LocAL GoVERNMENT INNOVATION 17, 18-20 (Robin A. Johnson & Norman Walzer eds., 
2000); Paul Seidenstat, Theory and Practice o/Contracting Out in the United States, in CONrRACTING 
Our GoVERNMENT SERVICES 3, 4-8 (paul Seidenstat ed., 1999). In other parts of the world, 
privatization is most often associated with selling off government assets. See JOHN D. DONAHUE, THE 
PRIvATIZATION DECISION 6 (1989). For instance, in the 19805, Britain sold off British Gas, British 
Telcom, Jaguar, British Airways, the Sealink Ferry Service, all or part of its stakes in British Sugar, 
British Aerospace, British Petroleum, and British Steel, among other things. Id. By contrast, the 
American government has simply never owned as many enterprises. Thus, "most of the activities that 
tend to work badly in the public seetor, as both industrialized and third-world countries learned to their 
sorrow in the post-war decades, America had kept private in the first place." Id. at 7. 
169. JOEL HANDLER, DOWN FROM BUREAUCRACY: THE AMBIGUITY OF PRIvATIZATION AND 
EMPOWERMENT 78 (1996); Seidenstat, supra note 168, at 8, 8-10 ("[p]racticaIly all privatization in 
education, health, mental health, soeial services, and transportation relies ... on contracting out j. 
170. HANDLER, supra note 169,at7. 
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and sold off major government programs throughout the 1980s.l7I 
Soon, local governments increased contracting for municipal services 
from trash collection to highway maintenance, and, as a result, privatiza-
tion became less of a novelty and more of a standard option for govern-
ance. Moreover, privatization was securely placed on the public agenda 
and became part of a conservative intellectual and philosophical movement 
that continues to this day and that underlies the TANF privatization op-
tion. I72 Its appeal has become bipartisan, as exemplified by President 
Clinton's initiative for Reinventing Government, yet another attempt to 
downsize the federal government and to make up the shortfall through pri-
vate contracting.173 Currently, various privatization initiatives are domi-
nating public discourse in other social service areas including charter 
schools, child welfare, child support enforcement, and Social Security. 174 
III 
PRIVATIZATION AND ACCOUNTABILITY 
Government plans to privatize typically engender heated and acrimo-
nious debate, and the privatization of welfare is no exception. Privatization 
raises accountability issues for all whom it affects: government employ-
ees, program beneficiaries, and the tax-paying public. Each of these groups 
has conflicting goals and desires, and vast disagreements over the costs and 
benefits of privatization can exist within each group. Accordingly, Part A 
traces the arguments for and against privatization as a means of under-
standing the values at stake. Part B then examines what the empirical evi-
dence reveals about social service privatization. The purpose of this 
analysis is not to take a stand in the privatization debate. Rather, the em-
pirical analysis is important to better understand how privatization is likely 
to impact the rights of beneficiaries. In brief, due to a lack of vigorous 
competition, privatization in the social services field rarely delivers on the 
supposed benefits of privatization. At the same time, the very institutional 
structure that results from privatization appears to decrease accountability 
171. See DONAHUE, supra note 168, at 4-5; Norman Walzer & Robin A Johnson, Introduction 
and Overview, in locAL GoVERNMENT INNOVATION, supra note 168 at 1, 5. In fact, the word 
"privatization" only began to appear in dictionaries around this time. See Seidenstat, supra note 168, at 
4. 
172. Although much of President Reagan's rhetoric was never transformed into action, "the 
rhetoric itself changed the way in which the public viewed government. People believed more than ever 
that not only was government wasteful and interfering but government itself was the problem." Ruth 
Hoogland Dehoog & Lana Stein, Municipal Contracting in the 1980s: Tinkering or Reinventing 
Government, in CONrRACTING Our GoVERNMENT SERVICES, supra note 168, at 26. Emblematic of the 
conservative privatization movement are the books by Emanuel Savas including, PRIvATIZING TIlE 
PUBuc SECTOR: How TO SHRINK GoVERNMENT (1982). 
173. Dehoog & Stein, supra note 172, at 27. 
174. For a discussion of privatization in the context of foster care, see Susan Vivian Mangold, 
Protection, Privatization, and Profit in the Foster Care System, 60 OHIO ST. L. J. 1295 (1999). 
596 CALIFORNIA LA W REVIEW [Vol. 89:569 
to program beneficiaries. This, in turn, increases the importance of legal 
remedies as a bulwark against the unfettered discretion of private entities, a 
subject dealt with in the remainder of this Article. 
A. The Arguments for and Against Privatization 
Privatization advocates, relying largely on market force economic 
theories, contend that private companies can deliver services with greater 
efficiency and innovation than government at a lower cost. Cost savings 
are said to derive from a variety of sources: 
competition among firms that may create pressure for efficiency 
not present in a monopoly municipal department; a relative 
freedom from "red tape" and other procedural constraints; and the 
ability of private firms to hire, fire, compensate, and therefore 
motivate and utilize workers with greater fiexibility than can 
government departments constrained both by civil service rules and 
strong unions.175 
Yet another strand of the privatization movement sees privatization as a 
democratizing force that returns power from the government to local com-
munities and their mediating institutions, such as churches, neighborhoods, 
and voluntary organizations, which are better situated to address a commu-
nity's needs.176 This argument gains support not only from conservatives, 
but also from some liberals who advocate a communitarian, grassroots vi-
sion of social service delivery.177 Thus, privatization of welfare converges 
"the free market ideology of the right and the citizen participa-
tion/empowerment objectives of the left.'>l78 
Opponents of privatization generally share the contrary ideological 
view that government should play a strong social role in addressing the 
needs of the unfortunate and that government can better provide services in 
a uniform, nondiscriminatory manner. They argue that privatization lessens 
governmental accountability and thus leaves private entities susceptible to 
fraud, corruption, and conflicts of interest.179 Along these lines, they con-
tend that a democratic government should not delegate functions that affect 
175. Marc Bendick, Jr., Privatizating the Delivery of Social Welfare Services: An Idea to be Taken 
Seriously, in PRIvATIZATION AND THE WELFARE STATE, supra note 108, at 97, 107. The Reason 
Foundation has been especially prominent in advocating for privatization and providing teclmica1 
assistance to jurisdictions considering privatization. See REAsoN PuBLIC POLICY lNsr., PRIvATIZATION 
1999: THE 13TH ANNuAL REPORT ON PRIVATIZATION (1999). 
176. Starr, supra note 167, at 26. 
177. This view is associated with Peter Berger and Richard Neuhaus and is well-summarized in 
Starr, supra note 167, at 34; see also HANDLER, supra note 169, at 68. 
178. Neil Gilbert, Welfare Reform: Implications and Alternatives, 7 liAsnNGS WOMEN'S L.J. 323, 
328 (1996). 
179. See STEVEN RATHGEB SMITH & MICHAEL LIPSKY, NONPROFITS FOR HIRE: THE WELFARE 
STATE IN THE AGE OF CONrRACTING 98-99 (1993). 
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disenfranchised and marginalized persons. ISO Especially in the welfare 
context, opponents fear that private entities have incentives to reduce the 
quality of services and to "cream" off those most likely to succeed in a 
program while denying services to those with the most intractable prob-
lems. These concerns arguably are heightened for programs in which pay-
ment to the private provider is based on a fixed cost per client served. 
Critics also challenge the supposed benefits and underlying assump-
tions of privatization. As for cost, critics contend that both the expense of 
soliciting and monitoring contracts and the cost of the contractor's profit 
actually can make privatization more expensive than publicly provided 
services.ISI As for efficiency, critics point to large private entities whose 
bureaucratic structures often mirror those of large governmental agencies. 
They downplay the effects of marketplace competition, arguing that once 
contracts are awarded, they are often renewed automatically and become 
self-perpetuating, thus minimizing innovation and creating an intractable 
private bureaucracy. Moreover, they question whether the market metaphor 
is appropriate in the context of social services because a third party (the 
government) is purchasing the service for the consumer (the beneficiary).182 
Where the consumers are needy and vulnerable, it is unlikely that they can 
bargain for quality services. As for the supposed democratizing effects of 
privatization, opponents claim that privatization reduces citizen participa-
tion in government and can cause nonprofit agencies to become co-opted 
by their governmental overseers.183 Another frequently raised argument 
against privatization is the disruption in services that occurs when a com-
pany declares bankruptcy or goes out of business. 184 Finally, some oppo-
nents fear the loss of good public sector jobs to lower-paying private jobs 
\vith fewer benefits, and accordingly, public employee unions are often the 
most vocal privatization criticS. IS5 Indeed, much of the cost savings of pri-
vatization derives from the ability to pay lower wages to nonunionized 
and/or nongovernment employees. 
180. See Sheila B. Kamennan & Alfred J. Kahn, Continuing the Discussion and Taking a Stand, 
in PRIVATIZATION AND THE WELFARE STATE, supra note 108, at 261, 264. 
181. See Terry Peters, Public Services and the Private Sector, in PRIVATIZATION: THE PROVISION 
OF PUBLIC SERVICES BY THE PRIVATE SECTOR 53, 58-59 (Roger L. Kemp ed., 1991); HATRY, supra 
note 168, at 25; Gurin, supra note 108, at 200-01. 
182. See Gilbert, supra note 178, at 328-29. 
183. See, e.g., HANDLER, supra note 169, at 85. 
184. See Peters, supra note 181, at 58-59. 
185. See, e.g., Nicholas Riccardi, County Nears Private Bids on Welfare Refonn, L.A. TIMES, Feb. 
8,2000, at Bl (noting that the union representing welfare office employees has objected to Los Angeles 
County's move toward welfare privatization). This is a concern even where the government contracts 
with nonprofit groups. "Ironically, efforts to revitalize civil society through support of geographically-
based mediating institutions are being promoted at the cost of functionally-based communities of 
organized labor, which also constitute powerful mediating institutions." Gilbert, supra note 178, at 331. 
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B. The Empirical Evidence: The Necessity of Competition 
Clearly, much of the debate over privatization is political and centers 
,on opposing views of government's role in the modern welfare state. 186 
There is little empirical evidence to test these competing political views, 
but that which exists provides some valuable lessons for the welfare realm. 
In a wide-ranging examination of empirical studies across many types of 
privatized services, John Donahue found that privatization can offer in-
creased efficiency without a corresponding loss in accountability only 
when certain conditions are met.187 After assessing privatization initiatives 
in garbage collection, military support services, office cleaning, fire-
fighting services, transportation, and utilities, he concluded that the single 
most important factor for producing efficiency is competition. 188 Thus, 
government agencies competing for contracts against private entities can 
maximize efficiency in a competitive market, while private entities can be 
as wasteful as the most inefficient government bureaucracy in a noncom-
Pt1titive market. The "fundamental distinction ... is between competitive, 
0l\tput-based relationships and noncompetitive, input-based relationships 
rather than between profit-seekers and civil servants per se. "189 The neces-
sity of competition makes strong intuitive sense; indeed, the entire notion 
of privatization hinges on the benefits created by market forces. 
According to Donahue, competition is fostered where tasks can be 
specified in advance and performance evaluated after the fact, where dis-
appointing contractors can be replaced or penalized, and where government 
cares more about ends than means.190 Such circumstances present the 
strongest case for turning to profit-seekers rather than civil servants. He 
found that privatization worked well for certain discrete municipal services 
such as asphalt laying and janitorial services, but was less effective where 
complex social welfare initiatives were involved.191 In the latter programs, 
it is far more difficult to craft meaningful standards for evaluation, and it 
can be misleading to look solely at output as a measurement of value. l92 
186. However, it should be noted that when state and local governments decide to privatize, their 
decisions are made less for ideological reasons than for practical ones, i.e., for budgetary reasons or a 
desire to improve efficiency. See DeHoog & Stein, supra note 172, at 32. 
187. DONAHUE, supra note 168, at 217-18. 
188. Id. at 80; see also Prager, supra note 146, at 107. 
189. DONAHUE, supra note 168, at 97-98. 
190. Id. at 79-80,97-98. 
191. DONAHUE, supra note 168, at 217. Other scholars have found similar results. For instance, 
Marc Bendick, Jr. reviewed several studies and found that private contractors work well for 
straightforward or specialized services such as refuse collection, processing payments, and data 
processing. However, where the project involves "more complex, undefinable, long-range, and 
'subjective' services characteristic of the social welfare field, the record of successful experience 
rapidly thins." Bendick, supra note 175, at 107. 
192. As a cautionary tale, Donahue points to the Job Partnership Training Program (JPTP), which 
was enacted in 1982 (and which has been subsequently extinguished) with the goal of increasing job 
opportunities for low-income persons by giving the private sector responsibility for designing and 
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This analysis raises serious questions for welfare privatization. As Dona-
hue explains, competition can be hard to arrange or maintain for at least 
three reasons: (l) entrenchment, (2) difficulties in defIning tasks and 
measuring performance, and (3) corruption. Welfare privatization impli-
cates all of these threats to competition. 
1. Entrenchment 
Private contractors often get entrenched as they gain specific expertise 
and develop close relationships with government officials.193 This en-
trenchment is heightened where social services are involved because of 
"the lack of a large number of social service providers with sufficiently 
skilled labor, the high cost of entry into the social services field, and the 
need for continuity of care."194 In the opening rounds of welfare privatiza-
tion, there has been intense competition in the bidding for welfare con-
tracts, but it has been concentrated between only a few large for-profit 
entities such as Lockheed Martin and Maximus. 195 Moreover, once con-
tracts are granted, history demonstrates that even this limited competition 
is likely to dissipate. In addition, these companies do not provide commu-
nity-oriented perspective and roots that are a supposed benefit of privatiza-
tion. To the contrary, these large private entities are powerful lobbying 
forces, wielding inordinate influence over social welfare policy for corpo-
rate gain.196 
running job training programs for disadvantaged persons. DONAHUE, supra note 168, at 179-211. 
Eligibility criteria were loosely defined to include the bottom one-fifth of the national income 
distribution, and local programs were vaguely directed to serve those who could benefit from training 
opportunities. ld. at 183. JPTP focused on oUlput based measures of performance, namely, job 
placement. As a result, because the private trainers could select participants from a large and ill-defined 
eligible population, they creamed off those persons most likely to succeed and iguored the more 
diffieult persons. ld. at 199. This, in tum, meant that JPTP was unlikely to create value; that is, it was 
unlikely to make "much difference for the employment, earnings, and productive capacity of American 
workers." ld. at 211. 
193. DONAHUE, supra note 168, at 78. The phenomenon has been repeatedly documented in the 
human services field. HANDLER, supra note 169, at 88-90 (summarizing findings). Handler points to 
one study of the Massachusetts Department of Mental Health's contracting process that fonnd a lack of 
competition in bidding, largely because the '''goal of maintaining continuity of care,' economies of 
scale, and the difficulties associated with evaluating providers without 'track record' ... led to an 
increaSing concentration of contracts with large organizations." ld. at 89. Handler concludes that in 
time "private suppliers, whether profit or nonprofit, come to resemble public monopolies." ld. at 217. 
194. U.S. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, SOCIAL SERVICE PRrvATIZATION: EXPANSION POSES 
CHALLENGES IN ENSURING ACCOUNTABILITY FOR PROGRAM REsULTS 12 (1997). 
195. The immense value of these contracts has resulted in litigation between bidders. See Bruce 
Rubenstein, Privatization Wave Sparks Battle Over Virginia Contract, CORP. LEGAL TIMES, Mar. 1999, 
at 33. 
196. See Richard W. Roper, A Shifting Landscape: Contracting for Welfare Services in New 
Jersey, RockefeIler Reports, at http://rockinst.orglreports/rrl0.html(Dec.23,1998).InFlorida,private 
child welfare contractors lobbied the legislature to create a special immunity from litigation for 
themselves as a condition of agreeing to enter contracts with the state. Elizabeth Bettendorf, 
Communities Prepare to Manage Foster Care, TAMPA TRIB., Mar. 2, 1999, at 1; Limit the Riskfor 
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The presence of these behemoths is also likely to discourage smaller 
nonprofit providers from bidding for contracts, further reducing competi-
tion.197 This result is inconsistent with privatization's goal of returning 
control over welfare policies to communities. While smaller organizations, 
including nonprofits, still playa role in TANF, they are more likely to pro-
vide discrete services rather than to run entire welfare programs. Thus, they 
are playing essentially the same role they played before TANF. Yet as 
between for-profit and nonprofit providers, "[r]esearch indicates that non-
profit service deliverers have a distinctly better record than for-profit firms 
in providing services in the interest of clients beyond what is precisely 
specifiable in contracts."198 
2. Difficulties in Defining Tasks and Measuring Performance 
Difficulties in defining tasks in advance and measuring performance 
can hinder competition by making it impossible to compare competitors. It 
is particularly hard in the area of welfare contracting to specify the desired 
tasks in advance. Putting people to work requires a complex assessment of 
the applicant's skills and family situation combined with available support 
services, such as child care and transportation, as well as opportunities in 
the local job market. These assessments, "because they involve direct con-
tact with clients, ... are at least partially unpredictable, largely unobserv-
able and difficult to evaluate."199 
Further, government officials have bemoaned the difficulty of "writ-
ing clear contracts with specific goals against which contractors can be 
held accountable."zoo At the same time, under the PRA, performance is 
evaluated on outcomes, such as number of TANF recipients placed into 
jobs, rather than on process. Such performance-based contracting often 
pushes private entities to resort to "creaming" off those candidates most 
likely to succeed or "churning" off low-skilled candidates by making the 
Child Services, ST. PETERSBURG TIMES, Mar. 25, 1999, at 22A; John D. McKinnon, Question 0/ 
Liability Limit Clouds Future a/Privatized Child Welfare, WALL ST.]., Mar. 17, 1999, at Fl. 
197. For instance, in New York, where over $500 million in welfare-to-work contracts were at 
stake, huge contracts with Maximus pushed out smaller job training and placement programs. Nina 
Bernstein, New Problems with Welfare-to-Work, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 14,2000, at B6. Maximul> contracts 
were subsequently cancelled due to corruption in the bidding process. See infra notes 206-209 and 
accompanying text. 
A study of welfare privatization in New Jersey likewise found that larger entities are pushing out 
smaller ones in part due to the data-rich accountability that accompanies performance based 
contracting; the smaller entities lack the experience and capacity to collect and report such complicated 
data. See Roper, supra note 196, at 10-11. 
198. Bendick, supra note 175, at 113. However, as between nonprofit and government delivery of 
services, the evidence is scarce. Id. at 114. Some studies have found that program quality does not 
differ much between the two types of provision, but that nonprofits may be able to implement programs 
more rapidly and may be able to reach clients more easily than government agencies. Id. at 114-15. 
199. Meyers, supra note 63. 
200. U.S. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, SIIpra note 194, at 14. 
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process so difficult to navigate that applicants give up.2°1 Such tactics may 
result in a cheery bottomline, such as low numbers of T ANF recipients, but 
it will be one that does not serve the claimed purpose of the program to 
reduce welfare dependency.202 It also gives no insights into the quality of 
the service provided.203 
3. Corruption 
Corruption or incompetence among government officials and/or pri-
vate contractors may obliterate competition even where it is otherwise fea-
sible.2M While there is little empirical evidence about welfare contracting 
under T ANF, widespread anecdotal evidence of corruption exists in almost 
every jurisdiction that has experimented with privatization. For instance, 
Wisconsin is auditing Maximus Inc. for incorrectly billing the state for 
work and trips taken in pursuit of contracts in other jurisdictions.2os In New 
York, where $500 million in welfare contracts is at stake, a State Supreme 
Court judge deemed the bidding process on welfare-to-work contracts to be 
corrupt and set aside more than $ I 00 million in contracts awarded to 
Maximus InC.206 The judge concluded that the city did not use a competi-
tive bidding process in awarding the contracts and that extensive meetings 
between city officials and Maximus executives prior to the formal con-
tracting process gave the company an unfair advantage.207 Subsequently, 
201. It appears these phenomena already occur. See Sheryll D. Cashin, Federalism, Welfare 
Refonn and the Minority Poor: Accounting for the Tyranny of State Majorities, 99 COLUM. L. REv. 
552,565, 602-08 (1999) (describing "stringent work requirements and sanctions" that are resulting in 
high error rates and unexplained caseload declines unrelated to increased employment). In an article 
setting forth various criteria for governments to consider in weighing privatization, John O'Looney 
states, "Only outsource services for which providers can be held strictly accountable for both delivery 
and equitable provision. Services in which 'creaming' or 'cherry picking' of clients or tasks takes place 
should be avoided as this leads to inequality." John A. O'Looney, Selecting Services for Outsourcing, 
in LOCAL GOVERNMENI' INNOVATION, supra note 168 at 60,62. 
202. See supra note 192, describing the JPTP. This type of creaming was documented in a report 
of Pennsylvania's welfare privatization program, called Community Solutions, in which private 
contractors provide a broad range of pre-and post-employment services to TANF recipients referred by 
state social welfare offices. DIANE PAULSELL & ROBERT G. WOOD, MATHEMAtiCA POLICY RESEARCH, 
INc., THE COMMUNITY SOLUTIONS INlTIATIVE: EARLy IMPLEMENI'ATION EXPERIENCES (1999) (on file 
with author). The program uses performance-based contracts in which payments are tied to the 
achievement of specific performance goals with individual clients. ld. at 24. The report found evidence 
that this sort of contracting prompted some contractors to implement selective admissions policies. ld. 
at 25. In addition, monitoring performance goals has proven extremely complicated, increasing costs 
and delaying payments to contractors. ld. at 24-25. 
203. U.S. GENERAL ACCOUNI'lNG OFFICE, supra note 194, at 15. 
204. DONAHUE, supra note 168, at 78. 
205. Christopher Drew, Wisconsin to Audit Welfare Contractor, N.Y. TIMES, May 11, 2000, at 
B 14. The state is also investigating a not-for-profit organization for similar violations. See Steve 
Schultze, State Gets Tabfor W-2 Finn's Outside Work, MILWAUKEE]. SENI'., Aug. 28, 2000, at lAo 
206. Christopher Drew & Eric Lipton, 2 With Ties to Chief of Welfare Got Jobs with Major 
Contractor, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 21, 2000, at AI. 
207. A Judicial Rebuke for the City, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 17,2000, at A18; Eric Lipton, Judge's 
Ruling Bars Contracts ill Welfare Plan, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 14,2000, at AI. 
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Maximus acknowledged that it hired the father-in-law and family friend of 
the city's welfare commissioner as it was trying to secure the contracts.20S 
Both the United States Attorney and the district attorney are investigating 
the bidding process.209 
The potential lack of competition in welfare contracting, coupled with 
the difficulty in articulating performance objectives and means, raises seri-
ous questions whether privatization is appropriate in the welfare or social 
services context. Given the reality of the growing privatization of social 
services/Io legal avenues for enforcing accountability become more im-
portant. Yet the legal dimensions of privatization are usually ignored in the 
raging and highly politicized debates over privatization.2II 
C. Legal Aspects of Privatization 
The legal implications of privatization can impact the assessment of 
benefits and costs of privatizing. For instance, as noted above, it is often 
assumed that government can save money by privatizing. One aspect of 
cost savings is said to come from government's ability to shift risk and li-
ability to the private sector. Legally, this mayor may not be true depending 
on the type of liability involved, the actors implicated, relevant statutes, 
and the terms of the contract, if any, between the government and the pri-
vate provider. Furthermore, the ability of government or private agencies to 
avoid liability can impact the accountability of these institutions to taxpay-
ers and beneficiaries. Cost savings can also be negated when opponents, 
partICularly public employee unions, as well as public administrators or 
taxpayers, file lawsuits to prevent the privatization.212 
In addition, privatization raises a host of other legal issues ranging 
from government contracting strategies2I3 to legal barriers to privatiza-
tion2I4 to freedom of information protections.215 Finally, there may be 
208. Mayor Defends Welfare Hirings, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 23, 2000, § I, at 30. 
209. See Eric Lipton & Christopher Drew, Company Says City Forsook Welfare Deal, N.Y. TIMES, 
May 11,2000, at BI; Eric Lipton & Christopher Drew, A Contractor for Workfare Faces Inquiry, N.Y. 
TIMES, Apr. 22, 2000, at B 1. 
210. U.S. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, supra note 194, at 9-10. 
211. The exception is in the context of the privatization of prisons. See Ira P. Robbins, The Legal 
Dimensions of Private Incarceration, 38 AM. U. L. REV. 531 (1989). 
212. See Nicholas Morgan, Legal Barriers to Local Privatization, in CONTRACTING Our 
GOVERNMENT SERVICES, supra note 168, at 194; Caitlin Rother, Judge Orders Privatized Welfare 
Contracts Ended, SAN DIEGO UNION-TRIB., Sept. 9, 2000, at B-5 (reporting how judge tenninated $17 
miIlion worth of annual welfare-to-work contracts in lawsuit brought by public employees union). 
2 I 3. State government officials who participated in a study by the U.S. General Accounting Office 
study stated that the most important and most difficult task in privatizing is writing specific work 
statements for privatization contracts. U.s. GENERAL ACCOUNTING Office, PRIVATIZATION: LESSONS 
LEARNED BY STATE AND LOCAL GOVERNMENTS 17 (1997); see also JOHN A. a 'LOONEY, 
OurSOURCING STATE AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT SERVICES 121-55 (1998); Ronald A. Cass, 
Privatization: Politics, Law, and Theory, 71 MARQ. L. REV. 449, 518-22 (1988). 
214. Sec Morgan, supra note 212, at 194-210. 
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constitutional limitations on the extent of delegation of welfare programs 
from the government to the private sector.216 While this Article focuses 
primarily on how privatization affects legal accountability for process vio-
lations in the context of welfare, any policy discussion or assessment of 
welfare privatization needs to take into account all of these legal dimen-
sions. 
IV 
ENFORCING DUE PROCESS IN A PRIVATIZED WELFARE SYSTEM 
Under AFDC, using the legal system to enforce accountability from 
welfare providers was straightforward. AFDC benefits were entitlements to 
which constitutional protections attached,217 and the persons delivering and 
administering the benefits were government employees. Thus, account-
ability was enforced through constitutional and statutory litigation, often 
resulting in wide-ranging and comprehensive structural remedies similar to 
those imposed in the recent Reynolds v. Giuliani case.218 
By contrast, legal accountability under TANF rests on much shakier 
terrain. The first question is whether T ANF benefits are entitlements. Even 
if this question is answered in the affirmative, the state action doctrine 
poses a potential barrier to enforcement in privatized jurisdictions. Because 
the state action doctrine is founded on the principle of distinct public and 
private spheres,219 it is not amenable to the modern reality of public and 
private interdependence in social services. As a result, welfare advocates 
will likely have to enforce accountability of private welfare providers 
through a creative blend of other legal theories, each of which has serious 
shortcomings.22o 
215. See, e.g., Craig D. Feiser, Protecting the Public's Right to Know: The Debate Over 
Privatization and Access to Government Information Under State Law, 27 FLA. ST. U. L. REv. 825 
(2000). 
216. See Clayton P. Gillette & Paul B. Stephan III, Constitutional Limitations on Privatization, 46 
AM. J. CO~fP. L. 481, 493-96 (1998). They conclude that the federal Constitution as well as state 
constitutions pose few limits to contracting out. Id. at 501 ("Even in those areas where government may 
be required to play some role, there appears to be room for contracting out, so long as the contractual 
arrangements limit the discretion of the private firm."); see also Jody Freeman, The Private Role in 
Public Governance, 75 N.Y.U. L. REv. 543, 580-88 (2000); Robbins, supra note 211, at 544-77; Cass, 
supra note 213, at 497-502. 
217. Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970). 
218. See supra note 42 and accompanying text. 
219. Although commentators disagree vehemently on the legitimacy of the public/private 
distinction, as well as where the line between public and private can be drawn (if at all), they agree that 
the distinction is what underlies the state action doctrine. See, e.g., Richard S. Kay, The State Action 
Doctrine, the Public-Private Distinction, and the Independence of Constitutional Law, 10 CONST. 
COMMENT. 329, 330 (1993); Louis Michael Seidman, Public Principle and Private Choice: One 
Uneasy Case for a Maintenance Theory of Constitutional Law, 96 YALE L.J. 1006, 1011 n.l8 (1987); 
Henry C. Strickland, The State Action Doctrine and the Rehnquist Court, 18 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 
587,594-97 (1991). 
220. See infra Part V (describing alternatives in detail). 
604 CALIFORNIA LA W REVIEW [Vol. 89:569 
A. Due Process After TANF 
Prior to the enactment ofTANF, it was well settled that AFDC bene-
fits were an entitlement to which constitutional due process protections 
attached.221 Although the Court has refused to recognize a substantive con-
stitutional right to welfare,222 in 1970, the landmark case of Goldberg v. 
Kellj123 established that welfare benefits were a form of property and thus 
could not be terminated without the due process protections of prior notice 
and a hearing. Significantly, the Goldberg Court rejected the argument that 
welfare benefits were a "privilege," rather than a "right," and held that 
"[s]uch benefits are a matter of statutory entitlement for persons qualified 
to receive them."224 
The concept of an entitlement was further defmed in Board of Regents 
v. Roth,225 in which the Court explained that it is the nature, rather than the 
weight of the interest at stake, that determines whether due process protec-
tions apply. The Court stated, "[t]o have a property interest in a benefit, a 
person clearly must have more than' an abstract need or desire for it. He 
must have more than a unilateral expectation of it. He must, instead, have a 
legitimate claim of entitlement to it."226 Legitimate claims of entitlement 
"are created and ... defined by existing rules or understandings that stem 
from an independent source such as state law ... .'>227 Rules create reason-
able expectations of entitlements, while discretionary systems cannot.228 
221. See supra note 217. Under the Fifth Amendment, the federal government may not deprive 
any person "of life, liherty, or property, without due process oflaw." U.S. CONST. amend. V. The states 
are similarly bound under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. U.S. CONST. amend. 
XIV. 
222. Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471, 487 (1970). This rnle results from the Supreme Court's 
reading of the Constitution as providing negative rather than positive liberties. See DeShaney v. 
Winnebago County Dep't of Soc. Servs., 489 U.S. 189, 196 (1989) (holding that the Fourteenth 
Amendment does not afford any "affirmative right to governmental aid, even where such aid may be 
necessary to secure life, liberty, or property interests of which the government itself may not deprive 
the individual"). By contrast, state constitutions may provide a basis for claiming an affirmative 
constitutional right to public assistance. See Helen Hershkoff, Welfare Devolution and State 
Constitutions, 67 FORDHAM L. REv. 1403 (1999). Hershkoff points to the New York Constitution, 
which requires the State to provide for '''[t]he aid, care and support of the needy.'" ld. at 1410. 
However, state courts have generally deferred to legislative decisions on how to effectuate such 
constitutional requirements and have not imposed higher standards even where the statutory program 
fails to provide adequate subsistence to the poor.ld. at 1408-09. 
223. 397 U.S. 254 (1970). 
224. ld. at 262. 
225. 408 U.S. 564 (1972). In Roth, the Court held that an assistant professor teaching under a one-
year contact did not have a property interest in continued employment. 
226. ld. at 577. 
227. ld. ("Thus, the welfare recipients in Goldberg v. Kelly . .. had a claim of entitlement to 
welfare payments that was grounded in the statute defining eligibility for them."). 
228. See Cynthia R. Farina, On Misusing "Revolution" and "Reform ": Procedural Due Process 
and the New Welfare Act, 50 ADMIN. L. REv. 591, 613 (1998) ("Roth entitlement analysis channeled 
the constitutional inquiry into scrutinizing the representations that regulatory government chooses to 
make to its citizens."); Nancy Morawetz, A Due Process Primer: Litigating Government Benefit Cases 
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Thus, where courts conclude that the decision-maker has unfettered discre-
tion in awarding the public benefit, they will not find an entitlement.229 As 
a result, the search for entitlement status requires a careful parsing of the 
statute creating the benefit in a search for substantive standards that con-
strain the discretion of the official decision-maker.230 
One consequence of this positive law conception of due process is that 
it allows applicants for benefits, as well as recipients, to claim a legitimate 
expectation of entitlement.23I Where the law sets forth objective criteria for 
the receipt of benefits, an applicant who meets the criteria has a "reason-
able expectation" of their receipt.232 However, the Roth test also creates the 
perverse outcome that the more discretion a decision-maker has in admin-
istering a government benefit, the less likely that benefit is to obtain enti-
tlement status.233 Moreover, the positivist approach gives the legislature 
control over whether an entitlement is created, thereby leaving the poor 
entirely at the mercy of the political process.234 
in the Block Grant Era, 30 CLEARINGHOUSE REv. 97, 104 (1996) ("Under Roth a critical inquiry in 
detennining the applicability of due process guarantees will be whether the state program is rule based 
or discretionary."). 
229. Compare Eidson v. Pierce, 745 F.2d 453 (7th Cir. 1984) with Ressler v. Pierce, 692 F.2d 
1212 (9th Cir. 1982). Both courts were deciding whether plaintiffs eligible for federally subsidized 
housing had an entitlement to the housing. The Eidson court concluded that there was no entitlement 
because the private landlords had discretion to select tenants from among a broad class of eligible 
applicants. Because "[t]he law does not tell the owner how to choose between two eligible individuals," 
a hearing officer would be unable to offer any remedy. 745 F.2d at 460-61. By contrast, the Ressler 
court found that an entitlement existed under the same program because "the regulations and guidelines 
promulgated pursuant to the statute closely circumscribe an owner's discretion." 692 F.2d at 1215. 
Despite their contrary outcomes, both courts agreed that discretion was the key factor. 
230. See, e.g., Hewitt v. Helms, 459 U.S. 460, 470-72 (1983). The Court did not have to establish 
this positivist conception of entitlements, i.e., a conception under which non-constitutional "rules or 
understandings" define entitlements. Rather, the Court could have established a substantive Fourteenth 
Amendment right to welfare. The reasons why the Court did not choose this approach are well 
documented in ELIZABETH BUSSIERE, (Dls)ENTITLING THE POOR: THE WARREN COURT, WELFARE 
RIGHTS, AND THE AMERICAN POLITICAL TRADITION (1997). 
231. The Supreme Court has never squarely addressed this issue. See Am. Mfrs. Mut. Ins. Co. v. 
Sullivan, 526 U.S. 40, 61 n.13 (1999) (stating that since the plaintiffs did not contend they had a 
property interest in their claims, as distinct from their benefits, the Court would not reach the issue). 
Nonetheless, the logic of Roth compels such a result aud the lower federal courts have so held. See 
LAURENCE H. TRIBE, N.IER1CAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 690 & n.37 (2d ed. 1988); Morawetz, supra 
note 228, at 99 n.11. Applicants, however, may be entitled to less process than recipients. See id. at 
105-06. 
232. See, e.g., Daniels v. Woodbury County, 742 F.2d 1128, 1132 (8th Cir. 1984) (holding that 
applicants for general assistance have a right to due process); Griffeth v. Detrich, 603 F.2d 118, 121 
(9th Cir. 1979) (same); Holbrook v. Pitt, 643 F.2d 1261, 1278 & n.35 (7th Cir. 1981) (collecting eases). 
233. The opposite should be true given that due process serves as a restraint on arbitrary and unfair 
governmental action. See, e.g., Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67, 97 (1972) (due process is meant to 
minimize "unfair and mistaken deprivations"); Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371, 374 (1971) 
("Perhaps no characteristic of an organized and cohesive society is more fundamental than its erection 
and enforcement of a system of rules defining the various rights and duties of its members, enabling 
them to govern their affairs and definitively settle their differences in an orderly, predictable manner."). 
234. BUSSIERE, supra note 230, at 156 ("The principle established by the Warren Court that 
welfare is a statutory and not constitutional entitlement produced some important benefits for the poor, 
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1. TANF's Entitlement Status 
The political process was not kind to welfare recipients in the PRA. 
Congress states unequivocally in the statute that benefits are not entitle-
ments, and that the law "shall not be interpreted to entitle any individual or 
family to assistance under any State program funded under [the Act]."235 
Several states enacted statutes with similar language,236 although some 
states used contrary language expressly preserving the entitlement status of 
welfare benefits.237 As soon as the PRA was passed, the "no entitlement" 
language attracted intense scholarly attention because of its implications 
for TANF claimants' due process rights. Most scholars who have consid-
ered the issue,238 as well as the only two courts to address it,239 have con-
cluded that T ANF benefits are still entitlements. Their reasoning is simple: 
the existence of an entitlement depends on the substantive standards set 
forth in the statute, not on the legislature'S characterization of those stan-
but is has also meant that AFDC mothers' legal claims to subsistence have ultimately been dependent 
on the sustained sympathy of the electorate and elected officials."). 
235. Pub. L. No. 104-193, § 401, 110 Stat. 2105, 2113 (1996) (amending 42 U.S.C. § 601(b». 
This statement is not surprising given that, throughout American history, opponents have attacked 
public outdoor relief (or direct money payments) for giving the poor too much of a sense of entitlement 
and thereby encouraging them to agitate for their rights. See supra Part II.A. 
236. See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 46-291 (West 2000) ("Notwithstanding the fulfillment of 
the eligibility requirements for any component of temporary assistance for needy families, an individual 
is not entitled to services or benefits under temporary assistance for needy families."); FLA. STAT. ANN. 
§ 414.025(5) (West 1998) ("This chapter does not entitle any individual or family to assistance under 
the WAGES Program or Title IV-A of the Social Security Act, as amended."); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 
49.141(4) (West 2000) ("Notwithstanding fulfillment of the eligibility requirements for any component 
of Wisconsin works, an individual is not entitled to services or benefits under Wisconsin works."). 
237. See, e.g., MD. ANN. CODE of 1957 art. 88A, § 50(c) (2000) (" Entitlement. -All recipients 
meeting the requirements of the [Family Investment Program] shall be entitled to cash assistance 
benefits."). 
238. See Farina, supra note 228, at 622-23 (finding that the Roth entitlement is now located in 
implementing state law rather than in federal statutory provisions); Melissa Kwaterski Scanlan, The 
End of Welfare and COl/stitutional Protections for the Poor: A Case Study of the Wisconsin Works 
Program and Due Process Rights, 13 BERKELEY WOMEN'S L.]. 153, 175-76 (1998) (concluding that 
Wisconsin law creates an entitlement to TANF benefits); Laura C. Conway, Student Research, Will 
Procedural Due Process Survive After Aid to Families with Dependent Children is Gone?, 4 GEO. ]. ON 
FIGHTING POVERTY 209, 213-16 (1996) (holding that state laws may provide reasonable expectation of 
benefits, thus creating an entitlement); Kennedy, supra note 6, at 280-86 (Goldberg still governs receipt 
of benefits). But see Michelle L. VanWiggeren, Experimenting with Block Grants and Temporary 
Assistance: The Attempt to Transform Welfare by Altering Federal-State Relations and Recipients' Due 
Process Rights, 46 EMORY LJ. 1327, 1357-61 (1997) (concluding that "no entitlement" language 
destroys any reasonable expectation to a legitimate claim of entitlement); Richard J. Pierce, Jr., The 
Due Process Counterrevolution of the 1990s?, 96 COLUM. L. REv. 1973 (1996) (concluding that 
welfare benefits are not entitlements under federal law, but ignoring claims based on state laws). 
239. Reynolds v. Giuliani, 35 F. Supp. 2d 331 (S.D.N.Y. 1999) (finding implicitly that New York 
State T ANF benefits are entitlements by ruling that their deprivation violated the due process clause). 
11/ Weston v. Hammons, a Colorado state eourt judge issued a bench ruling on May 28, 1999 that 
Colorado TANF benefits are a proteeted property interest to which due process requirements apply, 
despite "no entitlement" language in the Colorado TANF statute. See Welfare News, Colorado Court 
Rilles That Due Process Applies to TANF Benefits Despite "No Entitlement" Language (June 1999), 
available at http://www.welfarelaw.orgicoloradocourt.htm. 
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dards.240 T ANF requires that states "set forth objective criteria for the de-
livery of benefits and the determination of eligibility and for fair and equi-
table treatment."241 In turn, these objective criteria create a legitimate 
expectation of receipt of T ANF funds for those meeting the criteria, and 
thus constitute an entitlement. 
Moreover, it is not clear that Congress intended the "no entitlement" 
language to extinguish due process rights. The House Report accompany-
ing the PRA stated that, "[r]emoving the individual entitlement to cash 
benefits, which is a critical aspect of the block grant approach to social 
policy, sends a clear message to recipients that benefits are temporary and 
are not intended to keep families dependent on public benefits year after 
year."242 This behavior modification purpose is in no way contravened by 
providing fair process rights to recipients during the time they are eligible 
for the program; rather, given the time limits on receipt of benefits, the 
need for accuracy in their distribution is all the greater. 
In the context ofTANF benefits, the eligibility standards in state wel-
fare laws appear to constrain sufficiently the discretion of the decision-
makers such that the benefits are an entitlement. The state statutes set forth, 
in detail, the various eligibility criteria for their programs, including in-
come, family composition, family size, citizenship status, total years on 
welfare, and participation in work.243 The statutes do not permit front-line 
workers to award limited benefits by choosing at will among a class of eli-
gible applicants, a form of discretion that has defeated the creation of an 
entitlement in other types of public benefits cases.244 Nor do the statutes 
240. See Farina, supra note 238, at 620 ("[T]he question whether a statute, once enacted, has 
created a constitutionally protected interest is surely for the judiciary."); see also Washington Legal 
Clinic for the Homeless v. Barry, 107 F.3d 32, 38 (D.C. Cir. 1996) ("[W]e doubt that blanket 'no-
entitlement' disclaimers can by themselves strip entitlements from individuals in the face of statutes or 
regulations unequivocally conferring them .... "). 
Similarly, once it has created an entitlement, a legislature cannot authorize the deprivation of that 
entitlement through constitutionally inadequate procedures. Cleveland Bd. ofEduc. v. Loudermill, 470 
U.S. 532, 541 (1985). Accordingly, beneficiaries need not take '''the bitter \vith the sweet.'" [d.; cf 
Lebron v. Nat'l R.R. Passenger Corp., 513 U.S. 374, 392 (1995) ("If Amtrak is, by its very nature, what 
the Constitution regards as the Government, congressional pronouncement that it is not such can no 
more relieve it of its First Amendment restrictions than a similar pronouncement could exempt the 
Federal Bureau of Investigation from the Fourth Amendment."). 
241. Pub. L. No. 104-193, § 402(a)(I)(B)(iii), 110 Stat. 2105, 2114 (1996)(codified at 42 U.S.C. § 
602) (emphasis added). 
242. H.R. REp. No. 104-651, at 1328 (1996), reprinted in 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2183, 2387. 
243. See, e.g., ARIz. REv. STAT. ANN. §§ 46-292 (eligibility for assistance); 46-294 (duration of 
assistance); 46-296 (eligibility for assistance; unwed minor parents); 46-299 (jobs program; definition) 
(\Vest 2000). 
244. See, e.g., Eidson v. Pierce, 745 F.2d 453 (7th Cir. 1984), discussed supra note 229. The 
Eidson court carefully limited the scope of its ruling: 
We do not mean to suggest that any element of discretionary judgment in determining the 
receipt of public benefits would defeat an asserted property interest. Elements of discretion or 
judgment are often involved in the application of legal criteria, and a hearing or judicial 
review might ensure that the discretion was exercised in accordance \vith the relevant criteria. 
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permit a front-line worker arbitrarily to cut off a recipient, another poten-
tially lethal blow to the creation of an entitlement. At a minimum, state 
laws require that sanctions and terminations be imposed only for "good 
cause.,,245 While this gives substantial discretion to a front-line worker, that 
discretion can be reviewed for abuse or arbitrariness.246 
Thus, it appears that Congress has chosen a system like that envi-
sioned by scholars Jerry L. Mashaw and Dylan S. Calsyn: 
We can imagine a Congress that wants to assist persons with below 
poverty level incomes, but that is uncertain how best to do so. And 
we can imagine such a Congress partially funding all state efforts 
directed at the relevant population. But even in this very loosely 
defmed 'poverty block grant,' we cannot imagine how the national 
purposes could be consistent with indifference about whether some 
persons are arbitrarily excluded from whatever programs the states 
devise. To that extent those beneficiaries should have an 
entitlement, that is, a legal right secured by appropriate legal 
remedies.247 
That the PRA creates such an entitlement is supported by Congress' con-
tinued commitment to providing recipients with fair procedures, as ex-
pressed in Section 402 of the PRA.248 
2. State Practices Under TANF 
The search for an entitlement under T ANF is not merely an academic 
concern. Rather, it appears that several state statutes enacted after TANF 
fail to provide the level of due process contemplated by Goldberg. For in-
stance, in Wisconsin, benefits can be denied, reduced, or terminated with-
out prior notice or a hearing.249 As a result, a beneficiary contesting an 
erroneous decision can go for sixty-eight days, if not longer, without bene-
fits as his or her appeal winds through the system.250 Furthermore, depart-
mental level review is only required when front-line workers deny an 
Id. at 462. 
245. The PRA requires that if an individual refuses to work, the state shall reduce or terminate 
assistance "subject to such good cause and other exceptions as the State may establish." § 407(e)(1)(B), 
110 Stat. at 2129 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 607(e)). 
246. Even if TANF benefits are entitlements, the question remains what level of process is due. 
Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976). Under Mathews, a court must balance the interests of the 
plaintiffs with the government interests at stake and the value of any added procedures. For further 
analysis of the process that may be due to T ANF beneficiaries, see Morawetz, supra note 228, at 106; 
Conway, supra note 238, at 219-21. 
247. Jerry L. Mashaw & Dylan S. Calsyn, Block Grants, Entitlements, and Federalism: A 
Conceptual Map a/Contested Terrain, 14 YALEJ. ON REG. 297, 323 (1996). 
248. See § 402(a)(1 )(B)(iii), 110 Stat. at 2114 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 602). 
249. See Scanlan, supra note 238, at 191-94 (describing constitutional flaws in Wisconsin's 
welfare reform statute); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 49.152 (West 2000) (stating that review of adverse action 
occurs after the action is taken). 
250. See Scanlan, supra note 238, at 191. 
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application for failure to meet financial eligibility requirements.251 Even in 
those cases, the administering agency need not provide an opportunity for 
the parties to be heard or for cross-examination.252 Meanwhile, in Arizona, 
private welfare agencies are authorized to draft their own rules for hearing 
procedures, which opens the door to a complete lack of accountability to 
claimants and the public at large.253 
Even in those states with fairly comprehensive notice and hearing 
procedures, there is mounting evidence that the agencies carrying out those 
statutes, both public and private, are not complying with the law.254 One 
welfare rights organization reports that "programs [are] being operated 
without clear and understandable eligibility standards," that there has been 
"a general decline in the adequacy and timeliness of notices," and that "too 
many states are operating their T ANF programs with insufficient standards 
and inadequate oversight of the work of the staff charged with implement-
ing welfare reform."255 As discussed earlier, a class of New York welfare 
recipients successfully challenged these sorts of deficiencies.256 But could 
such a suit be brought in a privatized jurisdiction such as Milwaukee, 
Phoenix, or Los Angeles? 
B. The State Action Dilemma 
Despite the intense and immediate attention given to the entitlement 
issue, scholars have ignored the fact that many T ANF benefits are, or soon 
will be, distributed by private entities.257 Since constitutional protections 
251. WIS. STAT. ANN. § 49.152(2)(c) (West 2000). However, the statute does pennit agency level 
fact-finding hearings for all timely petitions. [d. § 49.152(2)(a). 
252. Scanlan, supra note 238, at 192-93. 
253. ARIZ. REv. STAT. ANN. § 46-3490 (West 2000). 
254. See Welfare News, Due Process and Fundamental Fairness in the Aftermath of Welfare 
Reform (Sept. 1998), available at http://www.welfarelaw.orgfDueProcess.htm. 
255. [d.; see also FAMILY lNvEsThfENf PROGRAM LEGAL CLINIC, TIME OUT! A STATUS REPORT 
ON WELFARE REPORM IN BALTIMORE CITY AT THE THREE YEAR MARK, As EXPERIENCED BY THOSE IT 
WAS INfENDED TO HELP AND THEIR LEGAL ADVOCATES (1999). This report details bureaucratic 
barriers to the receipt of benefits imposed at Maryland's local social services offices, including needless 
and frequent re-detenninations of eligibility, long waits in waiting rooms, and discouragement of filing 
appeals, among other things. 
256. See supra notes 1643 and accompanying text. 
257. By contrast, there is a substantial body of literature discussing the state action doctrine with 
regard to other privatization efforts. See, e.g., Richard C. Reuben, Public Justice: Toward a State 
Action 17leory of Alternative Dispute Resolution, 85 CALIF. L. REv. 577 (1997); David A. Sklansky, 
17le Private Police, 46 UCLA L. REv. 1165 (1999); Richard L. Stone & Michael A. Perino, Not Just a 
Private Club: Self-Regulatory Organizations As State Actors When Enforcing Federal Law, 1995 
COLUM. Bus. L. REv. 453 (1995). Although David Kennedy provides an infonnative discussion of the 
technological changes wrought by welfare refonn, including the use of electronic benefit transfer to 
give monetary benefits to recipients, and although he still sees a role for Goldberg in providing due 
process protections, he ignores the issue of whether the private providers (whom he eschews) are state 
actors. See generally Kennedy, supra note 6. 
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only apply to state actors,258 welfare beneficiaries seeking to enforce due 
process protections in a privatized system must overcome the hurdle of 
establishing that their private welfare providers are state actors.259 Like-
wise, Section 1983,260 which provides the statutory vehicle for remedying 
constitutional and federal statutory violations committed by state actors, 
reaches only those deprivations of federal rights that occur "under color of 
law," and excludes "merely private conduct no matter how discriminatory 
or wrongful."261 
State action is clearly present when a state employee acting in her 
official capacity pursuant to state law deprives a person of constitutional 
rights. However, when government officials carry out their programs with 
the assistance or participation of private persons, as is increasingly the case 
in the provision of social services, the state action issue becomes more 
difficult. Privatization poses a challenge to the state action doctrine 
because it blurs the line, upon which much of our constitutional 
258. See The Civil Rights Cases, 10 U.S. 3,10-14 (1883); Ronald J. Krotoszynski, Jr., Back to the 
Briarpatch: An Argument in Favor of Constitutional Meta-Analysis in State Action Determinations, 94 
MICH. 1. REv. 302, 303 (1995) ("Since at least 1879, the Court has consistently held that the 
guarantees of both the Fourteenth Amendment and the Bill of Rights protect citizens only from acts 
committed by the government, and has required plaintiffs asserting claims under these provisions to 
establish the presence of 'state action' before undertaking an analysis of the merits of a particular 
claim."). 
259. One of the few comprehensive attempts to address the implications of social service 
privatization on the state action doctrine can be found in Daphne Barak-Erez, A State Action Doctrine 
for an Age of Privatization, supra note 6. Barak-Erez recommends that state action be found 
where (I) the function is public in nature according to current understandings, and (2) the service is 
supplied by a private monopoly. [d. at 1192. Although she accurately points out the weaknesses 
inherent in the state action doctrine, her approach is flawed for at least three reasons. First, there is little 
consensus on what actions are public in nature given that historically most social services have been 
provided by both private and public entities. Second, her approach would freeze the public function 
doctrine based upon the current conception of government's role. But as TANF demonstrates, 
conceptions of the government's role change quickly. Finally, looking at the monopolistic status of the 
privately provided public service ignores the reality that most social services are provided by a 
complicated mix of public and private entities. 
260. Rev. Stat. § 1979,42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1996). 
261. Blum v. Yaretsky, 457 U.S. 991,1002 (1982). Section 1983 provides a damages remedy only 
for unlawful acts of governmental policy makers or acts taken pursuant to official governmental 
policies. See City of St. Louis v. Praprotnik, 485 U.S. 112 (1988). Section 1983 generally does not 
reach conduct committed by individual local government officials because it does not provide for 
respondeat superior liability. See Monell v. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 694 (1978). However, 
where individual wrongful incidents are widespread, the conduct may be attributable to the 
governmental entity. See, e.g., Samuels v. District of Columbia, 770 F.2d 184 (D.C. Cir. 1985), 
remanded to 669 F. Supp. 1133, 1137-40 (D.D.C. 1987) (public housing authority's failure to 
implement grievance procedure was so widespread that housing authority could not claim that delays 
were isolated incidents of lower level employees failing to follow official policy). Moreover, those 
courts to consider the issue have determined that the Monell "official policy or custom" requirement 
does not apply where plaintiffs are seeking prospective injunctive relief. See Reynolds v. Giuliani, 2000 
WL 1013952, *7-8 (S.D.N.Y. 2000) (describing caselaw). 
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jurisprudence is based, between private and governmental action.262 At 
least in the area of social services, the government cannot deliver services 
without the use of private providers, and the providers cannot operate 
without governmental funding. In addition to this interdependency, the 
public and private actors often share responsibility for canying out these 
public functions. Thus, while T ANF applicants and recipients are likely 
entitled to due process protections when interacting with government 
welfare agencies, the question remains whether those same protections 
apply when a private entity administers federal entitlements. More 
pointedly, can private parties distribute public entitlements under contract 
with state and local governments free from constitutional restraints? And 
can state and local governments insulate themselves from liability by 
contracting out their welfare programs? 
1. The State Action Tests 
The answers to these questions are neither simple nor encouraging. In 
Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co., the Court set forth a two-part test for ana-
lyzing when private conduct is "fairly attributable" to the State such that 
constitutional protections apply?63 First, the Court asks whether the alleged 
constitutional deprivation was "caused by the exercise of some right or 
privilege created by the State or by a rule of conduct imposed by the State 
or by a person for whom the State is responsible."264 Satisfying this part of 
the test is easy in the context of privatized welfare. Private welfare offices 
operate solely by virtue of a "right or privilege created by the State," 
namely, the state statute establishing and regulating the welfare program as 
well as the contract between the State and private provider. 
Second, the Court asks whether "the party charged with the depriva-
tion [is] a person who may fairly be said to be a state actor.'>265 This prong 
essentially reiterates the state action requirement and does not itself pro-
vide content to the inquiry. Rather, as the Court has acknowledged, "[o]n1y 
by sifting facts and weighing circumstances can the nonobvious involve-
ment of the State in private conduct be attributed its true significance."266 
To guide this fact-specific analysis, the Court looks primarily at two 
262. Although the pUblic/private distinction is central to our constitutional scheme, numerous 
scholars have pointed out that it is analytically impossible to isolate private from public action, given 
the government's role in nearly every aspect of private life. See, e.g., G. Sidney Buchanan, A 
Conceptual History of the State Action Doctrine: The Search for Governmental Responsibility (pts. I & 
2), 34 Hous. L. REv. 333 (1997), 34 Hous. L. REv. 665, 724 (1997) ("[E]very action engaged in by a 
private person is either compelled, prohibited, or permitted, i.e., authorized, by the legal system within 
which that person lives."); Cass, supra note 213, at 503-04; Freeman, supra note 216, at 565, 564-71 
("There is neither a purely public nor purely private realm. There is only interdependence."). 
263. 457 U.S. 922 (1982). 
264. [d. at 937. 
265. [d. 
266. Burton v. Wilmington Parking Auth., 365 U.S. 715,722 (1961). 
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factors: (1) the degree of state involvement with the challenged private 
action (the "nexus" analysis);267 and (2) whether the private actor is car-
rying out a public function (the "public function" analysis). Under the 
nexus test, state action exists where the state "has exercised coercive power 
or has provided such significant encouragement, either overt or covert, that 
the choice must in law be deemed to be that of the State.''268 Under the 
public function test, state action will be found where a private entity is car-
rying out a function traditionally and exclusively performed by the state.269 
These tests are designed to police the boundary between public and pri-
vate.270 While the law on state action is far from a model of clarity,271 the 
Court has made quite clear that state action will be found under only lim-
ited circumstances.272 
The most relevant Supreme Court state action cases for the welfare 
privatization context are Blum v. Yaretso/73 and Rendell-Baker v. Kohn.274 
Both of these cases, handed down the same day in 1982, involved private 
entities funded by the government, which provided public services to 
needy, dependent populations pursuant to state law. In neither case did the 
court find state action. In Blum, a class of Medicaid recipients challenged 
their private nursing homes' decisions to discharge or transfer them to a 
267. Variations of this inquiry have been alternatively referred to as the symbiotic relationship 
test, the governmental involvement test, the nexus test, and the joint participation test. See generally 
Sheldon H. Nahmod, CIVIL RIGl-ITS AND CIVIL LIBERTIES LITIGATION: THE LAW OF SECTION 1983 §§ 
2:6-2:10 (4th ed. 1999). 
268. Am. Mfrs. Mut. Ins. Co. v. Sullivan, 526 V.S. 40, 52 (citing Blum v. Yaretsky, 457 V.S. 991, 
1004 (1982». The nexus test is applied in Blum and in Rendell-Baker v. Kohn, 457 V.S. 830 (1982), 
both of which are discussed in detail infra. 
269. American Manufacturers, 526 V.S. at 55. The classic public function case is Marsh v. 
Alabama, 326 V.S. 501 (\946), discussed infra note 284. 
270. Professor Chemerinsky has argued that this boundary is unjustified and that the Constitution 
should protect against certain abuses of private power. 
[T]he concentmtion of wealth and power in private hands, for example, in large corpomtions, 
makes the effect of private actions in certain cases virtuaIly indistinguishable from the impact 
of governmental conduct. Just as people may need protection from government because its 
power can inflict great injuiries, so must there be some shield against infringements of basic 
rights by private power. 
Erwin Chemerinsky, Rethinking State Action, 80 N.W.V.L. REv. 503, 510-11 (1985) (footnote 
omitted). 
271. Commentators have heaped scorn on the Court's state action doctrine. See, e.g., 
Krotoszynski, supra note 258, at 303 & n. I3 ("The state action doctrine, with its intricate mantms and 
talismanic phrases, has been and remains a dark thicket of constitutional law."). 
272. Some scholars have argued for the abolition of the current state action doctrine and have 
urged instead that courts balance the interests of the aIleged violator and the violatee. See generally 
Chemerinsky, supra note 270; Robert J. Glennon Jr. & John E. Nowak, A Functional Analysis of the 
Fourteenth Amendment "State Action" Requirement, 1976 SUP. CT. REv. 22 I, 231-32, 259 (stating that 
courts should balance "value of a chaIlenged nongovernmental pmctice against the harm it does to a 
given right and the value of that asserted right"); Jerre S. Williams, The Twilight of State Action, 41 
TEX. L. REv. 347, 373 (1963). 
273. 457 V.S. 991 (1982). 
274. 457 V.S. 830 (1982). 
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lower level of care without notice or an opportunity for a hearing.275 Al-
though the state subsidized the costs of the nursing homes, extensively 
regulated the operation of the homes, required the homes to periodically 
assess the appropriate level of care for residents, paid the medical expenses 
of more than ninety percent of the patients, and licensed the facilities, the 
Court held that these contacts were insufficient to make the nursing homes 
state actors.276 The Court's decision hinged on the fact that the challenged 
decisions turned on "medical judgments made by private parties according 
to professional standards that are not established by the State."277 The Court 
also made short shrift of the assertion that the nursing homes performed a 
public function, stating that neither the state constitution nor the Medicaid 
statute required New York to provide skilled nursing services.278 
Similarly, the Court's focus on the private actor's discretion in deci-
sion making and its rejection of extensive regulation as a source of state 
action were determinative in Rendell-Baker. There, former employees of a 
private, nonprofit school that served special needs students sued the school 
for firing them, allegedly in violation of their free speech rights and with-
out adequate procedural protections.279 Public funds accounted for 90% of 
the school's funding, state and local school districts regulated the school, 
and the school operated pursuant to a written contract with the local school 
system and state agencies.280 Nevertheless, the Court held that these con-
tacts did not amount to "coercive power" or "significant encouragement" 
sufficient to constitute state action.281 
The Court also rejected the teachers' public function argument. Al-
though it agreed that education of maladjusted high school students is liter-
ally a public function, the Court held the fact "[t]hat a private entity 
performs a function which serves the public does not make its acts state 
action."232 Rather, "the question is whether the function performed has 
been 'traditionally the exclusive prerogative of the State. "'283 Since the 
275. Blum, 457 U.S. at 991. 
276. [d. at 1006-09. 
277. [d. at 1008. 
278. [d. at 10 II. Moreover, the Court reasoned that even if the State had an obligation to provide 
those services, the nursing home's day-to-day decisions were not the type of decisions ''traditionally 
and exclusively made by the sovereign for and on behalf of the public." [d. at 1012. 
279. Rendell-Baker, 457 U.S. at 834-35. 
280. [d. at 831-34. 
281. In a particularly poor analogy, the Court compared the school to other "private corporations 
whose business depends primarily on contracts to build roads, bridges, dams, ships, or submarines," 
none of whom become state actors by reason of their performance of public contracts. [d. at 840-41. 
Yet as the dissent pointed out, ship and bridge builders do not perform public duties pursuant to statute, 
nor do they implicate constitutional values. [d. at 851. 
282. [d. at 842. 
283. [d. (citation omitted). The exclusivity test was first announced in Jackson v. Metro. Edison 
Co., 419 U.S. 345 (1974), in which the Court held that a private utility operating under a publicly 
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legislature gave school districts the choice of either providing those serv-
ices themselves or paying private schools to do so, the provision of those 
services was not the exclusive province of the state. Of course, under this 
reasoning, the public function exception to the state action doctrine threat-
ens to swallow itself. If a legislature gives the executive branch the choice 
of providing a service publicly or privately, then the service at issue cannot 
be deemed to be an "exclusive" function of the state.284 By its terms, then, 
it is hard to see how a privatized service can ever satisfy this interpretation 
of the public function test. 
2. A Critique of the State Action Tests 
The Court has devised various state action tests, such as those applied 
in Blum and Rendell-Baker, to sift through the complicated web of private 
and public interrelationships and to identify those actions properly subject 
to constitutional constraints. Gradually, these tests have taken on a life of 
their own,285 such that the Court now assumes that running the facts of a 
given case through the gauntlet of state action tests will produce a result in 
keeping with the underlying purposes of the state action doctrine. 
In Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co., the Court identified the dual purposes 
of the state action doctrine: to preserve a sphere of individual freedom and 
to avoid holding states liable for conduct "for which they cannot fairly be 
blamed."286 With regard to the former purpose, the Court has stated: "One 
granted monopoly was not a state actor, and thus did not have to provide due process to a customer 
before terminating her electric service. 
284. The paradigmatic public function case is Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501 (1946), in which 
the Court held that a town wholly owned by a corporation was a state actor and thus could not prohibit 
a Jehovah's Witness from passing out religious literature in the town. During the early 1990s, the 
Supreme Court appeared to back away from the requirement of exclusivity in the public function test in 
two cases in which the court held that the exercise of peremptory challenges by private litigants 
constituted state action. See Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co., 500 U.S. 614 (199 I) (holding that the 
exercise of peremptory challenges constitutes state action in civil cases); Georgia v. McCollum, 505 
U.S. 42 (1992) (same holding for criminal cases). However, the Court's recent decision in American 
Manufacturers Mutual Ins. Co. v. Sullivan, 526 U.S. 40, 55 (1999), seems to have revived and 
reinforced the exclusivity requirement. The few functions that may fall within the Court's exclusivity 
test include holding elections, empaneIling juries, and operating jails and prisons. See Krotoszynski, 
supra note 258, at 318; see also Street v. Corrs. Corp. of America, 102 F.3d 810, 814 (6th Cir. 1996) 
(finding private prison guard to be a state actor); Blumel V. Mylander, 919 F. Supp. 423, 426-27 (M.D. 
Fla. 1996)(same). 
285. Acknowledging the plethora of state action tests (including the "public function" test, the 
"state compulsion" test, the "nexus" test, and the 'joint action" test), the Court in Lugar commented, 
"[w]hether these different tests are actually different in operation or simply different ways of 
characterizing the necessarily fact-bound inquiry that confronts the Court in such a situation need not 
be resolved here." 457 U.S. 922, 939 (1982). One insightful jurist commented that the vocabulary of 
state action "is composed entirely of malleable concepts, contractable and expandable depending on 
how the judge feels. These 'tests' are all pigeonholes and labels; they lack clarity. In application, they 
provide the illusion of precision." Adams V. Vandemark, 855 F.2d 312,320 (6th Cir. 1988) (Merritt, J., 
dissenting). 
286. Lugar, 457 U.S. at 936. 
2001] PRIVATIZED WELFARE 615 
great object of the Constitution is to pennit citizens to structure their pri-
vate relations as they choose subject only to the constraints of statutory or 
decisional law."287 At the same time, the second purpose helps preserve 
federalism interests by allowing the states to govern free of unwarranted 
federal court influence. Together, these two purposes "require the courts to 
respect the limits of their own power as directed against state governments 
and private interests."288 
Assuming the validity of these purposes,289 Blum and Rendell-Baker 
demonstrate the discrepancy between the state action tests and their sup-
posed purposes,290 In Blum, the patients sued state officials over the fair-
ness of procedures established by state regulations. As the court 
recognized, a finding of state action would have required the state to 
change its regulations to provide for notice and a hearing before transfer-
ring patients to lower levels of care. Such a result would be entirely in 
keeping with the purposes of the state action doctrine. It would mean that 
the state actors were liable for issuing unconstitutional regulations, matters 
precisely within their control. Moreover, a change in the state regulations 
would not have interfered with the "individual freedom" of the doctors to 
make medical assessments based on their independent judgment.291 Rather, 
such a change would have constrained what state officials could do based 
on those assessments. In other words, notice and hearing requirements 
would simply give the nursing home residents an opportunity to present 
evidence contrary to the independent medical assessments of the doctors. 
Thus, Blum allows a state to farm out certain decisions to private parties 
and then use and enforce those decisions for its own benefit. 
287. Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co., 500 U.S. 614, 619 (1991). As Professor Tribe has 
explained, individual freedom "is basic under any conception of liberty, but it would be lost if 
individuals had to conform their conduct to to the Constitution's demands." TRIBE, supra note 229, at 
1691. 
288. Lugar, 457 U.S. at 936-37. 
289. "Whether this is good or bad policy, it is a fundamental fact of our political order." Lugar, 
457 U.S. at 937. Erwin Chemerinsky has argued that the state action doctrine does not serve these 
claimed purposes. He notes that the preservation of one person's right to violate a constitutional right 
comes at the expense of the victim's own individual liberty. Chemerinsky, supra note 270, at 536-42. 
Further, he argues that "[s]tate sovereignty is not sacrificed by federal protection ofliberty." Id. at 545. 
290. For a discussion of the purpose of the state action requirement in the structure of the 
Constitution, see Strickland, supra note 217, at 594-96. For discussions of the value of preserving a 
distinction between public and private action, see generally Kay, supra note 217; Barbara Rook Snyder, 
Private Motivation, State Action and the Allocation of Responsibility for Fourteenth Amendment 
Violations, 75 CORNELL L. REv. 1053, 1060-63 (1990); Martha Minow, Partners, Not 
Rivals?: Redrawing the Lines Between Public and Private, Non-Profit and Profit, and Secular and 
Religious, 80 B.U. L. REv. 1061, 1081 (2000) ("Commitment to some form of distinction between the 
public and private realm is also vital to a vibrant pluralist society."). 
291. The actual individual freedom of the doctors is questionable in any event. As the dissent in 
Blum pointed out, the doctors were making formulaic assessments based on regulatory checklists 
provided by the state. 457 U.S. 991,1019-28 (1982) (Brennan, J., dissenting). 
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In Rendell-Baker, a finding of state action would have required the 
school to change its personnel procedures to comply with due process. Al-
though such a change might interfere with the individual freedom of the 
school officials to do as they pleased, the school officials' right to hide be-
hind the mantle of "individual freedom" is questionable. When the school 
officials decided to contract with state and local governmental employees 
to run the school, and when they accepted almost 95% of their funding 
from governmental sources, they gave up some of their "individual free-
dom" in exchange for valuable resources.292 Indeed, the Court hinted that it 
would likely deem the school to be a state actor with regard to heavily 
regulated student (as opposed to personnel) matters, thus implicitly con-
ceding that the need to preserve individual freedom lessens once a private 
entity decides to administer a publicly funded program. 293 
Moreover, a finding of state action in Rendell-Baker would not have 
resulted in the state being held accountable for matters outside of its con-
trol. As a practical matter, no government officials were sued in the case, 
and the state thus faced no liability. To the degree that the case involved 
allegedly unconstitutional regulations, it would have been entirely fair to 
hold the state and its officials accountable. Furthermore, the Court's con-
cern over limiting state liability, while valid, is lessened in a contracting 
regime, in which the state may require indemnification from private actors 
whose conduct results in state liability. In any event, given the lack of dis-
cretion-constraining standards governing employee relations in the laws at 
issue in Rendell-Baker, it was unlikely that the teachers had a due process 
right to a hearing even if the state action question had been answered in 
their favor.294 Thus, the better choice for the Court would have been to hold 
the school officials to be state actors, but to find that no constitutional vio-
lations had occurred. Such a ruling would have fully comported with the 
purposes of the state action doctrine. 
Ironically, the Court's mechanical reliance on the state action tests 
results in a subversion of the doctrine's purposes even in those cases where 
the Court has found a private actor to be engaged in state action. In 1982, 
on the same day that the Court decided Blum and Rendell-Baker, the Court 
found in Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co. that state action existed where pri-
vate party debt claimants used state prejudgment attachment procedures 
that violated due process.295 Lugar was the very decision in which the 
292. Some lower federal courts have cited the monetary benefits obtained by government 
contractors as one factor satisfYing the nexus test See, e.g., Swann v. Gastonia Hous. Auth., 675 F.2d 
1342,1346 (4th Cir. 1982); Anast v. Commonwealth Apts., 956 F. Supp. 792, 798-99 (N.D. Ill. 1997). 
293. Rendell-Baker v. Kohn, 457 U.S. 830, 841-42 (1982). 
294. In addition, the plaintiff probably had not alleged a sufficient First Amendment claim. See 
TRIBE, supra note 231, at 1717 n.15. 
295. The Court is generally more comfortable in finding state action where private parties make 
use of garnishment and prejudgment attachment procedures. In addition to Lugar, see, e.g., Sniadach 
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Court explained the foundations of the state action doctrine. Yet the finding 
of state action in Lugar, based largely on application of the "joint partici-
pation" test,296 contravened the purposes of the doctrine set forth therein. 
The debtor in Lugar sued only the private debt claimant. He did not sue 
any of the state officials who sequestered his property after the creditor 
filed for and received prejudgment attachment. The Court's decision to 
hold the private creditor liable for doing no more than invoking a pre-
sumptively valid state attachment process undermined its supposed desire 
to uphold "individual freedom." As a result, the Court imposed liability on 
a private party for following an unconstitutional state law, while simulta-
neously allowing that law to stand. The properly liable parties were the 
state officials who enforced the unconstitutional state law, but they were 
not named as defendants in the case. Thus, in Lugar, hollow application of 
the state action "tests" resulted in a decision bearing no relationship to the 
actual violation-an unconstitutional state law-and placing the "blame" 
for the violation on the wrong party. 
3. Disentangling Liability 
The Court's dogmatic application of the state action tests has allowed 
it to skirt the question of who should be liable for what. The Court asks 
whether private conduct is "fairly attributable to the State," but never de-
lineates whether liability follows from attribution.297 In Lugar, the Court 
and N. Ga. Finishing, Inc. v. Di-Chem, Inc., 419 U.S. 601 (1975) (petitioner's due process rights were 
violated by state statutoI)' garnishment procedure that allowed for garnishment based on affidavit 
,vithout opportunity for notice or a hearing); Mitchell v. \V.T. Grant Co., 416 U.S. 600 (1974) (court 
assumes that constitutional principles apply to sequestration of debtor's property by claimant pursuant 
to state law); Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67 (1972) (state prejudgment replevin statutes violated due 
process because they authorized seizure of property before notice and hearing to determine validity of a 
creditor's claim); Sniadach v. Family Fin. Corp., 395 U.S. 377 (1969) (prejudgment garnishment 
proceeding violated due process). It seems that where solid, tangible property is involved, the Court can 
more readily "see" the due process violation than where state-created entitlements are involved. Thus, 
despite the Court's acknowledgment of new forms of property (such as welfare benefits, state 
employment, licenses, and other intangibles), the Old PropertylNew Property distinction still seems to 
influence judicial thinking. 
296. Under the 'joint participation" test, "a private party's joint participation ,vith state officials in 
the seizure of disputed property is sufficient to characterize that party as a 'state actor' for purposes of 
the Fourteenth Amendment." Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co., 457 U.S. 922, 941 (1982). 
297. One attempt to sort through the liability question can be found in Barbara Rook Snyder, 
Private Motivation, State Action and the Allocation of Responsibility for Fourteenth Amendment 
Violations, 75 CORNELL L. REv. 1053 (1990). She proposes that state action should be deemed 
violative of the Constitution in two categories of cases: 
first, when the acts of state actors provide the impetus for private conduct that would be 
unconstitutional if done directly by the state actors, and second, when the impetus for the 
alleged harm comes from the private party, but the state action would be unconstitutional had 
no private initiative been involved. 
ld. at 1056. 
This approach would hold the state liable for enacting unconstitutional statutes that are then relied 
upon by private parties. However, in the absence of encouragement or compulsion, it would provide no 
relief in cases where a government contractor violates the law in a manner that would be 
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suggested that private parties who make use of seemingly valid state laws 
subsequently held to be unconstitutional might have an affirmative, or 
good faith, defense. But this result would still make the private party bear 
the costs of litigation, as well as leave the offending statute in operation. At 
the same time, the state would face no liability for enacting the offending 
statute. A better solution would be to hold the state and its officials ac-
countable for promulgating unconstitutional laws as well as for private 
conduct attributable to them, and to hold private parties who meet the state 
action test liable only for their own conduct. Although there may be no 
single test that can pinpoint those private actors whose conduct is appropri-
ately attributable to the state, a private actor who contracts with the gov-
ernment to distribute a public entitlement has a sufficient nexus with the 
state to warrant the imposition of constitutional requirements on the private 
actor. 
The Court recently exacerbated the confusion about who should be 
held liable for Section 1983 violations in its most recent state action 
decision, American Manufacturers Mutual Insurance Co. v. Sullivan.298 
That case involved a challenge to Pennsylvania's workers' compensation 
statute, which permitted insurers to withhold payment of medical benefits 
while an independent review committee determined whether the medical 
treatment sought was "reasonable and necessary."299 The plaintiffs, a class 
of employees receiving benefits under the statute, alleged that the statutory 
scheme permitted the withholding of their benefits without prior notice and 
an opportunity to be heard. They sued various state officials who 
administered the Act, the director of the State Workers' Insurance Fund, 
the School District of Philadelphia (which self-insures its employees), and 
a number of private insurance companies providing workers' compensation 
coverage.300 The Court held that the private insurance companies that 
withheld the benefits pending the review committee's decision were not 
state actors.301 
American Manufacturers is not strictly a privatization case, as it in-
volves a heavily regulated private enterprise rather than the contracting out 
or transfer of governmental functions to a private entity. Nevertheless, the 
Court's heavy reliance on Blum and its continued narrow reading of the 
state action doctrine are relevant to the privatization issue. The Court reaf-
firmed that "'[t]he mere fact that a business is subject to state regulation 
unconstitutional if undertaken by state actors. Yet the receipt of government funds is what gives the 
private party the authority to undertake the challenged action in the first place. This transfer of power 
from the public to the private entity should result in some liability, and it should be placed upon the 
pri vate party. 
298. 526 U.S. 40 (1999). 
299. Id. at43. 
300. Id. at 47-48. 
30 I. Id. at 43-44. 
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does not by itself convert its action into that of the State. ",302 The Court 
then undertook an analysis of the nexus test, which asks "whether the State 
'has exercised coercive power or has provided such significant encourage-
ment, either overt or covert, that the choice must in law be deemed to be 
that of the State. "'303 The Court found no such nexus, reasoning that while 
the State statute authorized private insurers to withhold payment pending 
the determination of necessity and reasonableness, it did not mandate it. 
The Court noted that the private nursing facilities in Blum were just as ex-
tensively regulated as the private insurers in American Manufacturers, but 
that in both cases, "the state statutory and regulatory scheme leaves the 
challenged decisions to the judgment of insurers. "304 
American Manufacturers further exposes the Court's failure to distin-
guish between challenges to state procedures and challenges to private ac-
tion.30s In American Manufacturers, the employees alleged that the state-
created procedures for resolving their worker's compensation claims were 
unfair. Rather than examine the state statute for procedural fairness, the 
Court examined the conduct of the private insurers. Yet the conduct of the 
private insurers was not at issue and certainly could not be considered 
wrongful-they were merely following state law. It is not surprising then, 
that the Court refused to find them liable. Rather, the Court's error was 
cutting off the workers' characterization of their claim as a facial challenge 
to the utilization review procedures contained in the Act. While the private 
insurers were clearly the wrong target for such a challenge, the state actors, 
all of whom were named in the initial lawsuit, were not. Yet the Court 
granted certiorari only to the private insurers and not the state defendants, 
even though a ruling against the private insurers would have required the 
state actors to take remedial measures. Where a state has authorized the 
unconstitutional deprivation of an entitlement, a finding of state action 
does not subvert the purposes of the state action doctrine. The Court's on-
going refusal to focus on which entity is responsible for the alleged con-
stitutional deprivation leads to the unfortunate result that, at least in some 
302. [d. at 52 (quoting Jackson v. Metro. Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345, 350 (1974)). 
303. [d. 
304. [d. at 58. The public function argument was also dismissed. The Court rejected the argument 
that the State had delegated powers traditionally reserved to the State to the private insurers, pointing 
out that the State was not obligated to provide either medical treatment or workers' compensation 
benefits to injured workers. [d. at 54-56. Moreover, the Court noted that prior to the enactment of the 
workmen's compensation statute, Pennsylvania common law allowed insurers to \vithhold payment for 
any reason at all. [d. at 56-57. The State simply never had a traditionally exclusive function of deciding 
whether to suspend payment for disputed medical treatment. [d. 
305. For a detailed discussion of the Court's history of revie\ving Section 1983 challenges to 
conduct authorized by state law, see Buchanan, supra note 262, at 356-64,696-733. Buchanan frames 
this issue by asking "to what extent may government authorize, i.e., permit, one person or entity to 
harm another person or entity \vith legal impunity?" [d. at 696. He concludes that ''the Supreme Court 
has failed to confront the state authorization issue openly and directly, and, in relation to that issue, may 
fairly be said to have adopted a stance of 'deliberate obfuscation.'" [d. 
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circumstances, government can avoid the strictures of due process by giv-
ing private parties the power to deprive individuals of entitlements. 
4. State Action Limits on Contracting 
One may well wonder whether the Court sees any limits on a govern-
ment's ability to delegate away responsibility over a public entitlement to 
avoid accountability. In Rendell-Baker, the Court justified its holding by 
noting that "[t]here is no evidence that the State has attempted to avoid its 
constitutional duties by a sham arrangement which attempts to disguise 
provision of public services as acts of private parties."306 Presumably then, 
with such evidence, the Court may have decided the state action question 
differently.307 Yet in the absence of evil intent, the Court apparently has 
little concern about a lack of due process when the government undertakes 
privatization for reasons of convenience, such as cost savings or increased 
efficiency. 
Of course, from the beneficiaries' perspective, a denial of due process 
impacts them the same way whether the government privatizes for "evil" 
reasons or benign ones. Similarly, from the perspective of private contrac-
tors, their legal status should not hinge on the motives underlying the gov-
ernment's decision to privatize, even assuming those motives could be 
located in the complicated calculus and competing forces that go into such 
a decision. In fact, it is this mishmash of motives for privatizing that makes 
it difficult, if not impossible, to demonstrate that the state intended to in-
sulate itself from liability as opposed to save costs, increase efficiency, or 
shrink the size of government. 
One form of evidence that the Court has indicated it will accept as an 
indication of unlawful purpose is where the government creates a corpora-
tion and then seeks to avoid liability for the corporation's activities. InLe-
bron v. National Railroad Passenger Corp. ,308 the Court considered 
whether Amtrak, which was being sued for its advertising policies, was 
subject to the constitutional constraints of the First Amendment. The Court 
held that Amtrak was not merely a state actor, but rather an arm of gov-
ernment itself. In holding that government-created corporations are part of 
306. 457 U.S. 830, 842 n.7 (1982). Likewise, in Flagg Bros., Inc. v. Brooks, 436 U.S. 149 (1978), 
holding that a private warehouseman executing a lien pursuant to state law was not a state actor, the 
Court stated that ''we express no view as to the extent, if any, to which a city or State might be free to 
delegate to private parties the performance of such functions and thereby avoid the strictures of the 
Fourteenth Amendment." Id. at 163-64. 
307. Cf Gillette & Stephan, supra note 216, at 481. The authors assert that the government could 
not evade the Goldberg restrictions by converting welfare agencies into private contractors. They cite 
cases in which the Supreme Court disregarded the private status of schools that Southern states had 
converted to "private" in the 1960s to avoid desegregation. However, converting offices into private 
entities, as in the Lebron case, is different from contracting out and thus may not be subject to the same 
limits. 
308. 513 U.S. 374 (1995). 
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the government, the Court stated that "[i]t surely cannot be that govern-
ment, state or federal, is able to evade the most solemn obligations imposed 
in the Constitution by simply resorting to the corporate form."309 
Likewise, it could be argued that government should not be able to 
avoid constitutional obligations by contracting out. Nevertheless, the Court 
has never viewed contracting out to preexisting private corporate entities as 
raising the same types of risks as creation of a corporate entity by the gov-
ernment, perhaps because of its longstanding view that the abuse of public 
power raises more of a threat than the abus~ of private power.310 However, 
the decision to contract may itself constitute abuse of governmental power, 
as may governmental abdication of any duty to oversee the performance of 
the contract. Moreover, in contracting cases, the private power is being 
exercised only because of a governmental grant of authority. In sum, while 
the Court has acknowledged that there may be limits on the government's, 
ability to contract away liability, the Court is unlikely to recognize those 
limits in the welfare privatization context. 
5. The Lower Courts' Approach 
Despite Blum and Rendell-Baker, the lower federal courts have occa-
sionally found state action to exist in public benefits schemes that rely on 
private actors to carry out their functions, such as Medicaid and Medicare, 
as well as the Section 8 housing program, in which the federal government 
pays a portion of the rent of qualifying low-income tenants to private 
landlords. These courts have, understandably, virtually ignored the public 
function test.311 As for the nexus test, the lower courts have distinguished 
Blum and Rendell-Baker by focusing on the level of discretion afforded the 
private decision-maker by the legislature. Where the discretion of the pri-
vate decision-maker is constrained by substantive statutory or regulatory 
standards, the lower courts have generally found state action. This door 
was implicitly left open in Blum by its emphasis on the role of the inde-
pendent judgment of the nursing home physicians,312 and expressly left 
open in Rendell-Baker, where the Court indicated that if the local 
309. ld. at 397. 
310. This assumption has been questioned. See Chemerinsky, supra note 270, at 510-11. 
311. Even under an expansive view of the public function doctrine, it is unlikely that the provision 
of welfare benefits would be considered a public function given this country's long history of mixed 
public and private poor relief efforts. See supra Part ll.A. Of course, part of the problem with the public 
function test is a definitional one, i.e, how narrowly or broadly one defines the function at issue. 
Arguably, the provision of government-funded public assistance has been, and is, undertaken only by 
the government. Yet such a narrow definition is unlikely to sway the Court. Rather, the Court refuses to 
acknowledge a public function unless it is one required by federal or state law or constitution. See, e.g., 
Am. Mfrs. Mut. Ins. Co. v. Sullivan, 526 U.S. 40, 55-57 (1999) (discussed supra in Part lV.B.3). 
312. See supra note 277 and accompanying text. 
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regulations governing school personnel were more specific, state action 
might have been found.313 
Grijalva v. Shalala represents this approach.314 There, the plaintiffs, a 
class of Medicare beneficiaries enrolled in HMOs, sued the Secretary of 
Health and Human Services eHHS) for failing to monitor denials of medi-
cal services by HMOs and for failing to enforce due process protections. 
Specifically, the plaintiffs asserted that the HMOs denied them medical 
services with inadequate notice of the basis for the denials, in violation of 
the Medicare Act's procedural protections. HHS countered that the deci-
sions by the HMOs did not constitute state action and, thus, could not be 
attributed to HHS. The court disagreed, holding that the HMOs were state 
actors.315 
The court reasoned that HMOs and the federal government "are es-
sentially engaged as joint participants to provide Medicare services such 
that the actions of HMOs in denying medical services to Medicare benefi-
ciaries ... may fairly be attributed to the federal government."316 The court 
pointed to the government's extensive regulation of the HMOs and the fact 
that the "federal government has created the legal framework - the stan-
dards and enforcement mechanisms - within which HMOs make adverse 
determinations, issue notices, and guarantee appeal rightS."317 Moreover, 
the statute provided that Medicare beneficiaries enrolled in HMOs could 
appeal adverse decisions to the Secretary of HHS who had the power to 
reverse the HMOs decision. The court expressly distinguished Blum, ex-
plaining that the decisions at issue in that case hinged on the independent 
medical judgments of private doctors and could not be approved or disap-
proved by state officials.318 Rather, the state officials could only alter the 
level of Medicaid benefits in response to the doctors' assessments. By 
contrast, in Grijalva, the court determined that the HMOs were making 
decisions as a governmental proxy pursuant to congressional and adminis-
trative mandates.319 Thus, the HMO decisions in Grijvala were more akin 
to coverage decisions or interpretations of the Medicare statute, rather than 
purely medical judgments. The court admonished that the government 
could not "avoid the due process requirements of the Constitution merely 
by delegating its duty to determine Medicare coverage to private enti-
ties."320 
313. 457 u.s. 830, 841-42 (1982). 
314. 152 F.3d II 15 (9th CiT. 1998), vacated by 526 U.S. 1096 (1999), remanded to 185 F.3d 1075 






320. Id. at 1121 (citations omitted). 
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Grijalva gets the state action analysis right. To begin with, the gov-
ernment was not held liable for actions outside of its control; indeed, HHS 
had direct responsibility for ensuring that HMOs followed the law. Moreo-
ver, concern over the individual freedom of the HMOs was misplaced; 
once they agreed to accept Medicare payments, they subjected themselves 
to strict regulatory controls as part of the deal. They thus voluntarily gave 
up any claim to individual freedom. Grijalva also properly placed liability 
on a culpable party, HHS. Importantly, Grijalva merged the standard for 
finding state action with the standard for establishing an entitlement; both 
emphasize the constraints on the discretion of decision-makers. The logical 
extension of this emphasis on discretion is that where an entitlement is at 
stake, a [mding of state action should follow. In other words, because an 
entitlement is created by a rule-based legal scheme, it is hard to see how a 
private person can strip that entitlement away without becoming a state 
actor. After all, that actor is constrained by the same rules. The incongru-
ous result of the Supreme Court's approach is a decision like Blum, in 
which an acknowledged entitlement (Medicaid) was stripped away by a 
private actor, who, as the dissent pointed out, was bound by detailed regu-
latory provisions.321 Grijalva suggests that it is entirely reasonable that the 
nexus inquiry include consideration of the type of interest at stake. That is, 
where an entitlement is at issue, the presumption should be that anyone 
affecting the status of that entitlement is a state actor. As Grijalva demon-
strates, such a result is consistent with the underlying purposes of the state 
action doctrine. 
Despite the logic and consistency of the Grijalva approach, it is ques-
tionable whether it will carry the day. Indeed, Blum implicitly rejected such 
an approach by holding that an entitlement can be lawfully stripped away 
by the discretionary decision of a private entity. As a result, and much to 
the surprise of many lawyers and laypersons alike, the entitlement status of 
a piece of property does not necessarily travel with the property. Notably, 
the Supreme Court reversed and remanded the Ninth Circuit's decision in 
Grijalva for review in light of American Manufacturers and certain statu-
tory changes.322 Thus, the search for accountability over private welfare 
providers may well have to continue elsewhere. 
6. The Problem of Qualified Immunity for State Actors 
Even if a welfare beneficiary can establish that T ANF benefits retain 
their entitlement status and that the private provider is a state actor, there 
321. Blum v. Yaretsky, 457 U.S. 991, 1019-28 (1982) (Brennan, J., dissenting). This is not to say 
that the private doctor should have been personally liable for his decision. Rather, as noted supra, it 
was the state-created procedures which were unfair, and liabli1ity should thus have fallen on the state. 
322. 526 U.S. 1096 (1999). The Ninth Circuit remanded the case to the district court on September 
I, 1999. 185 F.3d 1075 (9th Cir. 1999). 
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remains the issue whether the private provider can claim qualified immu-
nity from suit. In Section 1983 cases, qualified immunity protects govern-
ment officials against liability from damages "insofar as their conduct does 
not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a 
reasonable person would have known."323 Because the immunity issue is 
implicated only in damages cases, it does not pose a barrier to suits for 
structural and injunctive relief;324 thus, qualified immunity may have lim-
ited bearing on most constitutional litigation under the PRA. 
Qualified immunity was designed to protect individuals from 
constitutional violations while ensuring that fear of damage liability does 
not deter government officials from performing their duties.325 For 
example, in a due process welfare case, a challenged official might base a 
claim of immunity on the uncertain entitlement status of T ANF benefits. 
The official could argue that, as a result of this uncertainty, a failure to 
provide Goldberg-level process does not violate clearly settled law.326 
However, current Supreme Court doctrine makes it unlikely that private 
welfare providers will be able to claim qualified immunity for any 
constitutional or statutory violations. 
In Richardson v. McKnight,327 the Court held that prison guards em-
ployed by a private prison contractor are not entitled to qualified immunity 
in prisoner Section 1983 suits. The Court rejected a functional approach, 
and instead looked primarily to history and policy to gnide its analysis. 
After finding no historical tradition of immunity for private prison 
guards,328 the Court concluded that qualified immunity was not needed to 
deter timid decision making because marketplace pressures would ensure 
that private guards perform their job vigorously.329 The Court thus looked 
at the underlying purposes of the immunity and found that granting immu-
nity to private prison guards did not further those purposes. The Court lim-
ited its holding in Richardson to cases "in which a private firm, 
systematically organized to assume a major lengthy administrative task 
323. Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 8 I 8 (1982). 
324. See, e.g., Am. Fire, Theft & Collision Managers, Inc. v. Gillespie, 932 F.2d 8 I 6, 8 I 8 (9th Cir. 
1991). 
325. Wyatt v. Cole, 504 U.S. 158, 167 (1992). 
326. Of course, one possible rejoinder to this argument would be that the flawed process violates 
the clear tenns of the federal statute, which mandates that State plans "set forth objective criteria for the 
delivery of benefits and the detennination of eligibility and for fair and equitable treatment, including 
an explanation of how the State will provide opportunities for recipients who have been adversely 
affected to be heard in a State administrative or appeal process." Pub. L. No. 104-193, § 
402(a)(I)(B)(iii), 110 Stat. 2105, 21 14 (1996) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 602(a)(I)(B)(iii». 
327. 521 U.S. 399 (1997). 
328. Id. at 405-07. 
329. Id. at 409. By contrast, the dissent contended that immunity should be detennined on the 
basis of the public function being perfonned. Id. at 416 (Scalia, J., dissenting). However, Justice Scalia 
would likely reject a public function analysis on the threshold state action question, making his 
immunity analysis irrelevant in most cases. 
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(managing an institution) with limited direct supervision by the govern-
ment, undertakes that task for profit and potentially in competition with 
other firms."330 The Court's limited holding appears to encompass most 
welfare contracting schemes because the private welfare providers assume 
the major administrative task of putting the poor to work, and they do so 
for profit and with only overall monitoring by their government contracting 
partners. Even nonprofit organizations might be included in the Court's 
holding because they compete for contracts with other nongovernmental 
welfare providers.33I Accordingly, once a welfare beneficiary jumps over 
the difficult due process and state action hurdles, the immunity issue will 
present little cause for concern.332 
V 
ALTERNATIVES TO CONSTITUTIONAL LITIGATION 
Given the Court's current narrow reading of the state action doctrine, 
the need for alternatives to constitutional litigation to enforce accountabil-
ity in privatized welfare jurisdictions is apparent. 333 These potential alter-
natives include statutory, contractual, and equitable claims. In fact, the 
latter two types of claims are available only in privatized jurisdictions; they. 
have only a limited role in enforcing accountability against governmental 
entities. Yet, as explained below, each of these alternatives retains signifi-
cant limitations. At present, in a privatized welfare jurisdiction, there is 
simply no reliable, unified theory for enforcing procedural norms. Just as 
the welfare system has been decentralized and devolved, so will be the law 
that governs it. 
A. Statutory Causes of Action 
The federal and state statutes governing T ANF programs are potential 
sources of procedural rights for welfare beneficiaries. These statutes gener-
ally provide some notice and hearing requirements, even though some of 
those requirements arguably fall short of constitutional due process norms. 
However, these statutory requirements are not necessarily enforceable. 
Where statutes do not expressly provide for private enforcement, the Su-
preme Court and the state courts have placed tight limits on their 
330. [d. at 413. By contrast, the court excluded from its holding cases that "involve a private 
individual briefly associated with a government body, serving as an adjunct to government in an 
essential governmental activity, or acting under close official supervision." [d. None of these situations 
appear to apply to the welfare contracting context. 
331. E.g., Halvorsen v. Baird, 146 F.3d 680, 686 (9th Cir. 1998). 
332. The Court in Richardson left open the issue whether the private prison guards could assert 
some sort of "good faith" defense. 521 U.S. at 414. Thus, this type of defense could arise in future 
Section 1983 privatization lawsuits. 
333. Exploration of these alternatives may also prove essential in any jurisdiction which denies 
entitlement status to T ANF benefits and where the state action question is thus irrelevant. 
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enforceability. Moreover, courts are more likely to limit enforceability of 
rights asserted against private, rather than governmental, parties. 
At the state level, other mechanisms for enforcing procedural rights 
include claims under state administrative procedure acts and statutory 
mandamus claims (which are sometimes alternatively founded in common 
law). Both of these types of claims are used to force government officials 
to comply with statutory duties. Yet it is not clear that they would be ef-
fective against private entities. This Part discusses how privatization affects 
the availability of various statutory theories for enforcing due process 
norms. 
1. Federal Enforcement Mechanisms 
a. The TANF Enforcement Scheme 
Congress did not completely ignore the procedural rights of T ANF 
recipients. To be eligible for TANF funds, each state must submit a plan to 
HHS outlining its family assistance program.334 As part of its plan, a state 
must "set forth objective criteria for the delivery of benefits and the deter-
mination of eligibility and for fair and equitable treatment, including an 
explanation of how the State will provide opportunities for recipients who 
have been adversely affected to be heard in a State administrative or appeal 
process.'>335 However, TANF does not provide any express private right to 
enforce this provision. 
Federal government enforcement of T ANF rights is also extremely 
limited. The statute provides that the federal government can enforce the 
statute only where expressly permitted.336 The federal government's sole 
enforcement mechanism is to reduce grants to states that fail to comply 
with certain, defined statutory requirements.337 However, failure to adhere 
334. The Personal Responsibility Act of 1996, Pub. 1. No. 104-193, § 402, 101 Stat. 2105, 2113 
(codified at 42 U.S.C. § 602(a», sets forth the criteria that must be addressed in the state plan. 
335. See § 402(a)(I)(B)(iii) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 602(a)(I)(B)(iii». In the legislative history, 
the House reported that while it was 
granting flexibility to States to operate block grant programs, it is determined that the 
delivery of benefits for needy families is provided for in a fair and equitable manner. 
Consequently, States must establish as part of their State plan that determinations of 
eligibility, and the provision of benefits, will be conducted according to these standards. 
H.R. REP. No. 104-651, at 1330 (1996), reprinted in 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2183,2389. 
336. § 417 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 617) ("No officer or employee of the Federal Government may 
regulate the conduct of States under this part or enforce any provision of this part, except to the extent 
expressly provided in this part."). This limits the scope of HHS' regulatory authority. See MARK 
GREENBERG & STEVE SAVNER, CTR. FOR LAW AND Soc. POLICY, A DETAILED SUMMARY OF KEy 
PROVISIONS OF THE TEMPORARY ASSISTANCE FOR NEEDY FAMILIES BLOCK GRANT OF H.R. 3734, at 46 
(1996) ("Section 417 does not prevent HHS from saying what the agency thinks the law means, but 
HHS' interpretation will not be binding on a State except where expressly authorized, and it is unclear 
how much a court would defer to HHS' interpretation."). 
337. Section 409, codified at 42 U.S.C. § 609, sets forth fourteen instances in which a State's grant 
may be reduced, ranging from misexpenditure ofTANF funds to fuilure to comply with the five-year 
limit on assistance. No grant can be reduced by more than twenty-five percent. [d. § 409(d). The Act 
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to Section 402 does not expressly trigger a penalty.338 At most, under cur-
rent HHS interpretations of the statute, a state that denies due process be-
fore sanctioning T ANF recipients for failure to work could face a reduction 
in the amount of its grant, and presumably the states would be held ac-
countable for violations committed by private welfare agencies. 
But this penalty structure provides no remedy to individual T ANF 
recipients who are improperly sanctioned. Nor does it ensure fair proce-
dures for individuals facing adverse action by a welfare provider outside of 
the sanction-for-failure-to-work context, such as denials of eligibility. 
h. Section 1983 Statutory Enforcement 
Accordingly, the lack of express private remedies in the Act and the 
limited scope of federal enforcement raise the issue whether Section 402 of 
the Act creates any implied remedies, either through the statute itself or 
through Section 1983. When plaintiffs seek to enforce federal statutes 
against state actors, Section 1983 is available as a vehicle for enforce-
ment.339 In Section 1983 cases, it is presumed that Congress intends to al-
low private enforcement of federal statutes. Accordingly, to defeat a 
Section 1983 statutory cause of action, the defendant bears the burden of 
showing that Congress affirmatively intended to foreclose Section 1983 
enforcement. 340 
The Court requires the presence of three factors to show that a par-
ticular statutory provision gives rise to a federal right enforceable under 
Section 1983:341 (1) Congress has intended that the provision in question 
also provides bonuses for certain state achievements such as reducing out-of-wedlock births and "high 
performance." [d. § 403 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 603). 
338. The statute allows for penalties to be assessed against states who fail to sanction non-working 
adults. [d. § 409(a)(14) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 609(a)(14». In turn, HHS has interpreted this penalty 
provision to "appl[y] both to a State's failure to sanction when it should have and to its imposition of a 
sanction when it should not have imposed one." 64 Fed. Reg. 17,793 (Apr. 12, 1999). In determining 
the extent of a penalty, HHS has stated that it will look at whether the state has established a control 
mechanism to ensure that grants are appropriately reduced. This control mechanism "should ensure that 
recipients are informed of their rights to fair hearings and advised of the process for invoking that 
right." 64 Fed. Reg. 17,794 (Apr. 12, 1999). 
339. Maine v. Thiboutot, 448 U.S. 1,4 (1980) (holding that a Section 1983 remedy is available to 
vindicate rights secured by federal laws). As noted supra note 260, Section 1983 provides for 
vindication of"right[s] ... secured by the Constitution and laws." Rev. Stat. § 1979,42 U.S.C. § 1983 
(1996). 
340. Golden State Transit Corp. v. City of Los Angeles, 493 U.S. 103, 107 (1989). 
341. Even if the statute creates enforceable remedies, Section 1983 is not available if the statute 
contains a comprehensive enforcement scheme evidencing congressional intent to preclude Section 
1983 enforcement. Middlesex County Sewerage Auth. v. Nat'l Sea Clammers Ass'n, 453 U.S. 1,20 
(1981). This exception is not a concern in the context of the PRA because the PRA provides for no 
enforcement by private parties and for only limited enforcement by the federal government. See supra 
text accompanying notes 332-336. The Court has only found remedial schemes sufficient to displace 
Section 1983 twice. In Sea Clammers, the Court held that the "unusually elaborate enforcement 
provisions" of the Federal Water Pollution Control Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1251, evidenced congressional 
intent to foreclose Section 1983 because the statute granted the Environmental Protection Agency 
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benefit the plaintiff; (2) the right is not so vague and amorphous that its 
enforcement would strain judicial competence; and (3) the statute unam-
biguously imposes a binding obligation on the states by using mandatory 
rather than precatory language.342 Valid arguments can be made that Sec-
tion 402 satisfies these prongs; however, because the procedural protec-
tions in T ANF are far less specific and detailed than those in other federal 
public welfare statutes, success under such a theory may be elusive.343 
As to the first factor, the courts have long held that procedural protec-
tions in public welfare statutes are intended to benefit the beneficiaries of 
those statutes.344 Indeed, it is difficult to see any other reason for such re-
quirements. As to the second factor, the rights enumerated in Section 
402(a)(I)(B)(iii) of the PRA are not further defined in either the statute or 
the regulations (and HHS likely lacks the authority to delineate these 
rights). Nevertheless, the right to notice and a fair hearing is not so vague 
and amorphous that its enforcement would "strain judicial competence." 
To the contrary, the judiciary has special competence in defining the con-
tent of due process mechanisms as it is largely responsible for the devel-
opment and enforcement of those norms. 
The third prong of the test poses the greatest challenge. The PRA 
speaks in mandatory terms: the state "shall set forth objective criteria for 
the delivery of benefits and the determination of eligibility and for fair and 
equitable treatment .... "345 Arguably, however, this language merely re-
quires states to write "objective criteria" into their plans, and not necessar-
ily to implement those criteria. After the Court's decision in Suter v. Artist 
M., in which the Court held that a private plaintiff could not enforce a state 
plan requirement,346 it has been hotly contested whether State plan 
enforcement power through the use of noncompliance orders, civil suits, and criminal penalties and 
included two citizen-suit provisions. [d. at 13. Likewise, in Smith v. Robinson, 468 U.S. 992, 1010-11 
(1984), the Court held that the Education ofthe Handicapped Act, 20 U.S.C. § 1400 et seq., precluded a 
Section 1983 remedy bccause it contained a "earefully tailored administrative and judicial mechanism," 
that included local administrative review that culminated in a right to judicial review. [d. at 1009, 1009-
II. The Court reasoned that allowing parents to skip the administrative procedures by going straight to 
court would have "render[ ed] superfluous most of the detailed procedural protections outlined in the 
statute." [d. at 1011. 
342. See Blessing v. Freestone, 520 U.S. 329, 340-41 (1997). 
343. Compare Pub. L. No. 104-193, § 402, 110 Stat. 2105, 2113 (1"996) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 
601), with Food Stamp Act, 7 U.S.C. § 2011 and the regulations promulgated thereunder at 7 C.F.R. § 
273; and Medicaid program, 42 U.S.C. § 1396 and the regulations promulgated thereunder at 42 C.F.R. 
§ 431. 
344. See. e.g., Meacham v. Wing, 77 F. Supp. 2d 431,438-40 (S.D.N.Y. 1999) (analyzing Food 
Stamp Act and Medicaid Act). 
345. § 402(a)(I)(B)(iii) (codificd at 42 U.S.C. § 602(a)(I)(8)(iii» (emphasis added). 
346. 503 U.S. 347 (1992). In Suter, the Court held that the Adoption Assistance and Child Welfare 
Act of 1980's requirement that "reasonable efforts" be made to prevent removal of children from their 
homes was unenforceable. [d. at 363. The Court reasoned, in part, that the state had a plan providing 
that "reasonable efforts" would be made, and that there was no concommitant duty to actually exercise 
those reasonable efforts. [d. at 358-62. The Court also held that the "reasonable efforts" language gave 
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requirements entitle beneficiaries to the actual rights enumerated in the 
state plan. Courts have split on this issue.347 Accordingly, Section 1983 
challenges to violations under state plans that contain unfair or inadequate 
procedural protections may fare better than challenges to procedural viola-
tions committed under otherwise conforming plans.348 
c. Implied Right of Action 
Where a case does not involve state action, plaintiffs cannot rely on 
Section 1983 and they must establish that the statute creates an implied 
right of action.349 To establish an implied right of action, the plaintiff bears 
the burden of showing that Congress intended to create an enforceable pri-
vate right when it enacted the relevant statute.350 The opposite presump-
tions for section 1983 statutory actions and implied rights of action 
generally make it easier to establish a Section 1983 cause of action than an 
implied right of action.351 One legal effect of privatization, then, is that be-
cause of the restrictive nature of the Court's current state action doctrine, 
beneficiaries of social welfare programs in privatized jurisdictions may 
have a harder time enforcing federal statutes than those in public jurisdic-
tions. 
A TANF beneficiary pursuing an implied right of action is likely to 
fail. Under the Court's current implied right of action analysis, the "most 
important inquiry ... is whether Congress intended to create the private 
states discretion to determine how they would comply with the language such that the clause did not 
create enforceable rights. Id. at 360. 
347. The subsequent debate among the circuit courts over whether plaintiffs can challenge actions 
in violation of otherwise valid state plans in these types of circumstances is discussed in Harris v. 
James, 127 F.3d 993, 1002-03 (lIth Cir. 1997) (holding that there is no federal right enforceable 
through Section 1983 for transportation to and from Medicaid providers). Some courts have decided 
that the substance of a state plan requirement is enforceable if it is specific. Id. Under this approach, a 
requirement that a state plan include provision for fair hearings would be more enforceable than a 
requirement (such as in Suter) that a state plan include ''reasonable efforts" to meet a goal. This is 
beeause the former is less open to the exercise of discretion than the latter. 
348. Assuming the three prongs of the Section 1983 statutory enforcement test are satisfied, a 
plaintiff could easily surmount the exception to enforcement for statutes that indicate affirmative 
congressional intent to preclude Section 1983 enforcement. The lack of a comprehensive enforcement 
scheme in the PRA, see supra notes 336-338 and accompanying text, means that individual 
enforcement is not incompatible with the statute. But it also suggests that Congress did not contemplate 
private enforcement. 
349. If a statute expressly provides for private enforcement, then the plaintiff can bring a suit 
directly under the statute without relying on either Section 1983 or the implied right of action doctrine. 
PRA does not provide for private enforcement. 
350. See Susan J. Stabile, The Role of Congressional Intent in Determining the Existence of 
Implied Rights of Action, 81 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 861, 872 (1996). The leading case explaining this 
difference is Samuels v. District of Columbia, 770 F.2d 184 (D.C. Cir. 1985); see also Chan v. City of 
New York, 1 F.3d 96,103 (2d Cir. 1993). 
351. Section 1983 was regularly used as a vehicle to enforce various AFDC provisions. E.g., 
Albiston v. Me. Comm'r of Human Servs., 7 F.3d 258 (1st Cir. 1999); Howe v. Ellenbecker, 8 F.3d 
1258 (8th Cir. 1993). 
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remedy sought by the plaintiffs."352 Intent can be divined through statutory 
language, legislative history, and statutory structure.353 Here, courts are 
unlikely to conclude that Congress "intended" the statute to be enforced at 
all, except perhaps to penalize states that give benefits to undeserving indi-
viduals.354 First, Congress attempted to strip away the entitlement status of 
welfare benefits.355 Second, Congress gave no significant enforcement 
mechanisms in any portion of the statute.356 Not surprisingly, the implied 
right of action theory has been of little assistance in recent years to benefi-
ciaries of public prograrns.357 Simply put, it is hard to divine intent from 
congressional silence.358 
352. Suter v. Artist M., 503 U.S. 347, 364 (1992). This analysis is derived from the four-part test 
of Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66 (1975), which has never been overruled, but which has essentially been 
boiled down to an intent inquiry. The Cort factors ask (1) whether plaintiff is within the class for 
whose benefit the statute was enacted; (2) whether the legislative intent shows a desire to either create 
or deny a remedy; (3) whether implying a remedy is consistent with the statute's purposes; 
and (4) whether the cause of action is one traditionally relegated to state law such that it would be 
inappropriate to infer a federal cause of action. Id. at 78. For the development of the legislative intent 
test, see generally H. Miles Foy, Ill, Some Reflections on Legislation, Adjudication, and Implied 
Private Actions in the State and Federal Courts, 71 CORNELL L. REv. 501, 562-66 (1986); Stabile, 
supra note 350. 
353. Specific factors that courts have considered include: whether the statute grants exclusive 
enforeement jurisdiction to a regulatory agency; whether the statute contains an elaborate and 
comprehensive remedial scheme; whether the legislative history indicates that Congress expected 
federal courts to be active in creating federal common law under the statute; whether Congress 
explicitly created or denied a cause of action or remedy in a related context; whether the statute 
explicitly confers a right directly upon a particular class of persons, whether a private right of action 
effectuates Congress's goals in enacting the statute; and whether the private right of action is consistent 
with Congress's purpose. See generally Stabile, supra note 346. 
354. The implied right of action doctrine has narrowed dramatically since Rosado v. Wyman, 397 
U.S. 397 (1970), in which the Court held that New York welfare recipients could challenge the validity 
of a New York welfare statute that conflicted with AFDC requirements. The Court reasoned that 
We are most reluctant to assume Congress has closed the avenue of effective judicial review 
to those individuals most directly affected by the administration of its program .... It 
is ... peculiarly part of the duty of this tribunal, no less in the welfare field than in other 
areas of the law, to resolve disputes as to whether federal funds allocated to the States are 
being expended in consonance with the conditions that Congress has attached to their use. 
Id. at420-23. 
355. See supra note 235 and accompanying text. 
356. The only penalties facing non-complying states are found in Pub. L. No. 104-193, § 409, 110 
Stat. 2105, 2142 (1996) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 609), and none of those penalties are triggered by 
failure to enforee due process norms. See supra Part V.A.l.a-b. 
357. See generally Pauline E. Calande, State Incorporation of Federal Law: A Response to the 
Demise of Implied Federal Rights of Action, 94 YALE L.J. 1144, 1145 (1985); Foy, supra note 352; 
Stephen E. Ronfeldt, Implying Rights of Action for Minorities and the Poor Through Presumptions of 
Legislative Intent, 34 HASTINGS L.]. 969 (1983). Foy explains how, in the twentieth century, courts 
shifted from implying a remedy for every legal wrong to a view that ''the adjudicatory consequences of 
legislation depended upon demonstrable legislative purposes and intentions." Foy, supra note 352, at 
548. 
358. See Calande, supra note 357, at 1145. As H. Miles Foy explains: 
If the controlling consideration was whether Congress had affirmatively intended to create a 
private remedy, then the implied remedy ceased to be a remedy that was implied in law. It 
became, instcad, a remedy that was implied in the legislative facts. It rested upon affirmative 
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d. Conclusion 
In brief, while it is conceptually easier to argue for Section 1983 en-
forcement of Section 402 than for an implied right of action under the stat-
ute, the PRA's unique structure makes either argument tenuous at best. If 
anything can be said of Congress's intent, it is that the states have discre-
tion in fashioning their own procedural protections. Thus, we can again see 
how the grant of discretion in the administration of public benefits pro-
grams lessens beneficiaries' procedural rights, particularly in privatized 
jurisdictions. An increase in discretion lessens the likelihood that a benefit 
will obtain entitlement status; lessens the likelihood that a private actor 
administering the benefit will be deemed a state actor; and lessens the abil-
ity of plaintiffs to enforce underlying statutes through either Section 1983 
or an implied right of action theory. Unfortunately then, an increase in dis-
cretion results in fewer protections for beneficiaries precisely when more 
are needed. Accordingly, under the PRA, plaintiffs will likely need to turn 
to state-granted procedural protections. 
2. State Enforcement Mechanisms 
As a result of the block grant approach, a better source of procedural 
protections for TANF beneficiaries may lie in state law. Congress ex-
pressly requested that states devise their own due process schemes for 
T ANF benefits. Although most states have retained the same generous no-
tice and hearing procedures that were available under AFDC, there is evi-
dence from several jurisdictions that welfare agencies are not complying 
with those procedures.359 Thus, in many cases, relief outside the scope of 
the administrative review process is required. However, enforcing these 
state provisions may prove to be as frustrating as enforcing the federal re-
quirement. Thus,just as TANF devolved discretion downward to the states, 
it also is likely to herald the growth of state court welfare litigation based 
on state laws, and the result will be a patchwork of procedural protections 
among the states. 
a. State Implied Rights of Action 
There is no analog to Section 1983 in the state courts. Therefore, ab-
sent any express statutory causes of action, plaintiffs must argue that they 
have an implied private right of action to enforce favorable state procedural 
protections?60 Unlike the federal courts, the states historically developed 
legislative intentions that Congress had somehow failed to express in the legislative text. 
Absent affirmative intentions, express or implied, the private remedy simply did not exist. 
Foy, supra note 352, at 565. 
359. See supra notes 254-256 and accompanying tell.1:. 
360. For instance, in Wisconsin, there is an express right of action to enforce the 
nondiscrimination provisions of the state's welfare contracting program with religious entities. WIS. 
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the implied right of action theory in the context of tort law. That is, the 
states have long held that the violation of legislative rules, particularly pe-
nal ones, can constitute negligence per se?61 Theoretically, under this ap-
proach, a welfare recipient who is wrongly sanctioned or cut off from 
T ANF benefits could sue their welfare provider under a negligence theory 
for any resulting personal injuries. As the Giuliani litigation makes clear, 
the injuries that flow from unfair procedures can be severe, including emo-
tional distress, hunger, loss of housing, injuries sustained from lack of 
medical attention, and the like. 
Yet states have difficulty applying a negligence per se theory in cases 
that do not fit the mold of a traditional personal injury action.362 In addi-
tion, several states appear to be drifting toward the Supreme Court's view 
of implied rights of action. That is, state courts are increasingly focusing on 
legislative intent, which they divine through an analysis of language, leg-
islative history, statutory purpose, and alternative remedies.363 The exact 
balance of these factors varies from state to state, and state law in this area 
is extremely hard to characterize. However, a focus on legislative intent is 
likely to have the same impact as the federal doctrine, where implied rights 
of action are few and far between. 
b. State AP A Enforcement 
Typically in public benefits litigation, the shortcomings of the implied 
right of action doctrine have been compensated for by the availability of 
STAT. ANN. § 49.114(8) (West 2000). But there is no comparable provision with regard to the other 
aspects of the Wisconsin Works program. 
361. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 285 (1965) provides: 
The standard of conduct of a reasonable man may be (a) established by a legislative 
enactment or administrative regulation which so provides, or (b) adopted by the court from a 
legislative enactment or an administrative regulation which does not so provide, 
or (c) established by judicial decision, or (d) applied to the facts of the case by the trial 
judge or the jury, if there is no such enactment, regulation, or decision. 
362. Foy, supra note 352, at 567-68. For instance, in Guibault v. Pima County, 778 P.2d 1342, 
1344 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1989), the court held that an indigent person had no private right of action against 
a county agency for damages resulting from the alleged wrongful denial of the patient's application for 
medical assistance. The court reasoned that "when the state creates rights against itself that were 
unknown at common law, it is free to define not only the extent of the obligation undertaken but also 
the remedy, if any, for its enforcement." Thus, the patient was limited by the statute to the recovery of 
benefits wrongfully withheld. [d. at 1346. 
363. See, e.g., Murthy v. N. Sinha Corp., 644 So.2d 983, 985 (Fla. 1994) ("[L]egislative 
intent ... should be the primary factor considered by a court in determining whether a cause of action 
exists when a statute does not expressly provide for one."). Simiilarly, the court in Kranzush v. Badger 
State Mut. Cas. Co., 307 N.W.2d 256, 266 (Wis. 1981) stated 
'The legislative intent to grant or withhold a private right of action for the violation of a 
statute ... is determined primarily from the form or language of the statute. The nature of the 
evil sought to be remedied, and the purpose it was intended to accomplish, may also be taken 
into consideration. In this respect, the general rule is that a statute which does not purport to 
establish a civil liability, but merely makes provision to secure the safety or welfare of the 
public as an entity, is not subject to a construction establishing a civil liability.' (citations 
omitted). 
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judicial review under federal and state Administrative Procedure Acts. 
These acts provide standing to statutory beneficiaries to enforce agency 
accountability.364 Although the federal APA does not lIave much of a po-
tential role in T ANF litigation because federal agencies have very little to 
do witlI T ANF implementation, state AP As may provide valuable support 
for enforcing procedural norms in many public jurisdictions. For instance, 
the 1981 Revised Model State AP A provides for public participation in 
state agency rulemaking and for private rights of action to enforce adher-
ence to state rules and regulations. It also requires that agencies formulate 
regulatory standards.365 Along these lines, tlIe states recognize the admin-
istrative law principle that an agency must adhere to its own regulations.366 
However, this principle may play little role in privatized jurisdictions 
because AP As operate as constraints on governmental, rather than private, 
action.367 The case law is replete with examples of quasi-governmental and 
private organizations who were deemed to fall outside of Administrative 
Procedure Act requirements because they were not "agencies."368 
Moreover, local and municipal governments generally do not have coun-
terparts to state APAs.369 Thus, where private entities have contracted with 
local governments, neither entity is likely to be subject to APA-type re-
quirements. Accordingly, beneficiaries in privatized welfare jurisdictions 
may be denied this avenue of relief otherwise available to their counter-
parts in public welfare jurisdictions.370 
364. For federal law, see 5 U.S.C. § 702 ("A person suffering legal wrong because of agency 
action ... is entitled to judiCial review thereof."); see also Japan Whaling Ass'n. v. Am. Cetacean 
Soc'y, 478 U.S. 221 & n.4 (1986) (including cases cited therein). For model state law, see MODEL 
STATE AD:-'IINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE ACT §§ 5-101 to 5-118,15 U.L.A. 118-166 (2000). 
365. MODEL STATE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE ACT §§ 2-104, 3-104, 3-108, 5-106,15 U.L.A. 
29, 37, 43, 125 (2000). 
366. In federal law, this is \mown as the Accardi doctrine from the case United States ex reI. 
Accardi v. Shaughnessy, 347 U.S. 260 (1954). 
367. See Diller, supra note 59, at 1190. 
368. See, e.g., Dorris v. Mo. Substance Abuse Counselors' Cert. Bd., Inc., 10 S.W.3d 557, 560-61 
(Mo. Ct. App. 1999) (holding that a private substance abuse counselors' certification organization was 
not an agency under state APA); Ins. Premium Fin. Ass'n of N.Y. v. N.Y. State Dep't of Ins., 668 
N.E.2d 399, 402-03 (N.Y. 1996) (finding that New York Automobile Insurance Plan, which consisted 
of private insurers who provided liability insurance for drivers otherwise unable to obtain it, was not an 
agency); League Gen. Ins. Co. v. Catastrophic Claims Ass'n, 458 N.W.2d 632, 635 (Mich. 1990) 
(holding that an unincorporated, nonprofit association of private insurers was not an agency under 
state's APA); Graham v. Baker, 447 N.W.2d 397, 399 (Iowa 1989) (holding that a nonprofit 
organization which contracted with state to perform farm mediation services was not an agency). But cf. 
Bruggeman v. S.D. Chern. Dependency Counselor Cert. Bd., 571 N.W.2d 851, 853 (S.D. 1997) 
(holding that a nonprofit certification board was agency where state AP A defined "agency"as including 
an "agent of the state vested with the authority to exercise any portion of the state's sovereigntj'); 
Meri-Weather, Inc. v. Freedom of Info. Comm'n, 2000 \VL 351351 (Conn. Super. Ct. 2000) (holding 
that a nonprofit community economic development corporation was an agency because it was the alter 
ego of a public agency). 
369. See CHARLES H. KOCH, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW & PRACTICE § 2.32 (1987). 
370. Accordingly, welfare advocates in privatized jurisdictions should look closely at whether 
govemmental officials have played a role in any procedural wrongdoing, such as by failing to monitor 
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c. State Mandamus Claims 
Mandamus is another doctrine often used at the state level to compel 
government officials to comply with governing laws. It is used to "compel 
performance of statutory duties,"371 and it has been used successfully to 
force state officials to provide due process before taking adverse action.372 
For instance, one court held that mandamus could be used to force a uni-
versity to provide a due process hearing to a tenured professor before dis-
charging him for cause.373 
Unfortunately, TANF beneficiaries will mostly find the mandamus 
option unfruitful for several reasons. Mandamus is considered an "extraor-
dinary" remedy, available only to enforce specific legal rights, and courts 
will not issue it where other adequate relief is available to the complaining 
party.374 Moreover, because it is used to enforce existing rights, it is not 
available to control the exercise of official discretion,375 and discretion is 
the cornerstone of the PRA. In addition, it is generally available only 
against government officials, although some courts will apply it against 
private entities where public interests are involved.376 Thus, while manda-
mus could potentially playa role in forcing private (and public) welfare 
officials to provide specific due process rights, it is a limited remedy that 
must satisfy many hurdles before it is imposed. 
d. Conclusion 
In sum, because TANF devolves authority over welfare to the 
states, advocates will need to focus on state laws to enforce procedural 
protections. However, state remedies traditionally used to constrain official 
discretion may prove ill-fitted for privatized schemes. Moreover, implying 
rights of action under the state T ANF laws appears to be an uphill battle. 
Thus, while statutory remedies should be examined, they may prove elu-
sive in many cases. 
private providers. Moreover, where due process failures occur higher in the administrative appeals 
process, government officials are likely to be involved. 
371. 52 AM. jUR. 2D Mandamus § 4 (1970). 
372. See, e.g., Plymel v. Moore, 770 So.2d 242 (Fla. Dis!. Ct. App. 2000) (granting mandamus to 
force Department of Corrections to provide due process protections to inmate accused of drug 
trafficking); Haas v. County of San Bernardino, 8 I Cal Rptr. 2d 900 (I999) (granting writ of 
mandamus to force county officials to provide due process hearing before revoking license to operate 
massage clinic). 
373. Garnerv. Mich. State Univ., 462 N.W.2d 832,838 (Mich. Ct. App. 1990). 
374. 52 AM. jUR. 2D Mandamus § 3 I (1970). 
375. [d. § 76. However, mandamus can be used to force an official to exercise discretion. [d. § 77. 
376. See, e.g., State v. County Comm'n of Boone County, 452 S.E.2d 906, 919 (W. Va. 1994) 
(private nonprofit corporation was subject to mandamus because it elected to participate in state 
program and to reap the benefits of the program); Graham v. Baker, 447 N.W.2d 397, 400 (Iowa 1989); 
Mobile Cmty. Action v. Hanke, 4 I I So.2d 783, 785 (Ala. 1982) ("A corporation may be compelled by 
mandamus to perform a specific duty imposed on it by law, because the corporation is the recipient of a 
franchise from the state .... "). 
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B. Contractual Claims 
Contract law provides a potentially more fertile avenue for relief, and, 
notably, one not available in government-run welfare programs. Welfare 
beneficiaries may be able to sue private providers under a third-party bene-
ficiary theory to force compliance with the terms of the contract between 
the private welfare provider and the government entity. Of course, the de-
sirability of suing for breach of contract hinges upon whether the terms of 
the contract are favorable for beneficiaries. To the degree that the terms are 
favorable, for example, by expressly requiring the private contractor to ad-
here to specified due process norms, beneficiaries in privatized jurisdic-
tions may have an additional avenue to enforce their procedural rights.377 
States have several incentives to include favorable terms in their con-
tracts with private welfare providers. It makes sense for local governments 
to enter into contracts that permit private enforcement of T ANF because 
they can reduce their own enforcement burden. Moreover, local govern-
ments can structure contracts so that the costs of noncompliance fallon the 
private contractors, either by requiring indemnification or by allowing di-
rect suits against noncomplying private contractors. Yet whether local gov-
ernments will seek such terms and be able to negotiate them will depend on 
a variety of factors, such as bargaining power, the political process, and 
procurement strategies, most of which are outside the control of benefici-
aries. 
The Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 302 envisions two classes of 
third-party beneficiaries: intended and incidental. The fonner may enforce 
contracts; the latter may not. The distinction between the two hinges on the 
key question whether the contracting parties intended to benefit the alleged 
beneficiaries.378 Intent can be derived from "the circumstances surrounding 
the transaction as well as the actual language of the contract.»379 
In cases involving government contractors, the Restatement puts an 
additional gloss on the analysis. Given the potentially large size of the class 
of beneficiaries to a government contract, the Restatement (Second) of 
377. See, e.g., DODENHOFF, supra note 61, at 21 (explaining that the welfare contracts in 
Milwaukee with private providers include sanctions for private agencies that fail to provide procedural 
due process); OFFICE OF CONTRACTING AND PROCUREMENT. DISTRICT OF COLUJ\ffiIA. JOB PLACEMENT 
AND RETENTION SERVICES FOR WELFARE REFORM REQUEST FOR PROPOSAL (RFP). Solicitation No. JA-
SC-CS-70090-01 (Jun. 28,1999) (requiring the contractor, as part of the special contract requirements, 
to adhere to the Department of Human Services' grievance procedures). 
378. A beneficiary is intended "if recognition of a right to performance ... is appropriate to 
effectuate the intention of the parties .... " REsTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 302(1) (1981). 
In addition, an intended beneficiary must establish either that performance of the promise \vill satisfY a 
debt to the beneficiary or that the circumstances indicate that the promisee intends to benefit the 
beneficiary. [d. Despite the Restatement's emphasis on the intent of the promisee, courts have insisted 
on looking at the intent of both parties to the contract. See, e.g., Holbrook v. Pitt, 643 F.2d 1261, 1270 
n.17 (7th Cir. 1981 ) (discussed infra this Part). 
379. REsTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 302 cmt. a (1981). 
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Contracts § 313(2) presumes that a government contractor is not subject to 
consequential damages to a member of the public unless "the terms of the 
promise provide for such liability."380 As a result, those seeking damages 
for violation of public contracts must establish not only that the contracting 
parties intended to benefit them, but also that they intended to grant the 
beneficiaries the right to enforce the benefit. However, because this section 
expressly addresses only actions for consequential damages, it leaves the 
more general intent test of section 302 in place for third-party beneficiaries 
seeking injunctive or structural relief-far more common remedies in cases 
involving public programs.381 
The third-party beneficiary theory has had some success in public 
housing cases, which also involve an interplay between government agen-
cies, private contractors, and benefit recipients.382 For instance, in the 
leading case of Holbrook v. Pitt,383 Section 8 tenants alleged that they were 
denied benefits for several months without notice or hearings while their 
landlord delayed in sending in their Section 8 certification forms. The ten-
ants claimed that they were third-party beneficiaries of the contracts exe-
cuted between HUD and the private owners, and sought prompt 
implementation of the contracts and the receipt of retroactive benefits.384 
The contracts provided that the owner was "responsible for determination 
of eligibility of applicants [for housing subsidies] ... and computation of 
the amount of housing assistance payments on behalf of each selected 
Family .... "385 
380. A contractor could also be liable if "(b) the promisee is subject to liability to the member of 
the public for the damages and a direct action against the promisor is consistent with the terms of the 
contract and with the policy of the law authorizing the contract and prescribing remedies for its 
breach." Id. § 313(2). In drafting these rules for government contractors, the Restatement recognized 
the rise in cases involving social service contracts, stating "recent cases have involved rights of poor 
people in federal-state social services agreements .... " Id. § 313 cmt. a, note. 
381. See Anthony Jon Waters, The Property in the Promise: A Study of the Third Party 
Beneficiary Rule, 98 HARv. L. REV. 1109, 1204 (1985). Waters argues that equitable restitutionary 
principles are much more appropriate for analyzing cases involving public programs. Id. at 1206-08. By 
contrast, all of the examples used in this section of the Restatement involve commercial transactions, 
such as contracts to carry mail, to maintain a certain water pressure at fire hydrants, to build a subway, 
and the like. See REsTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 313 cmt. a (1981). 
382. See e.g., Ayala v. Boston Hous. Auth., 536 N.E.2d 1082 (Mass. 1989) (Section 8 tenants 
wcre third-party beneficiaries of contracts between HUD and Boston Housing Authority as well as 
contracts between the Housing Authority and private landlords and could therefore recover damages 
flowing from housing authority'S breach of obligations under contract to inspect for lead paint hazards); 
Holbrook v. Pitt, 643 F.2d 1261 (7th Cir. 1981); Hurt v. Phila. Hous. Auth., 806 F. Supp. 515 (E.D. Pa. 
1992); Henry Homer Mothers Guild v. Chicago Hous. Auth., 780 F. Supp. 511 (N.D. lll. 1991); 
McNeiIl v. New York City Hous. Auth., 719 F. Supp. 233 (S.D.N.Y. 1989); Gonzalez v. St. Margaret's 
House Hous. Dev. Fund Corp., 620 F. Supp. 806 (S.D.N.Y. 1985). But see Reiner V. West Village 
Assocs., 768 F.2d 31 (2d Cir. 1985); Perry v. Hous. Auth. of Charleston, 664 F.2d 1210 (4th Cir. 1981). 
383. 643 F.2d 1261 (7th Cir. 1981). 
384. Id. at 1265-67. 
385. Id. at 1268 n.13 
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After consideration of both the statutory and regulatory provisions 
governing Section 8, as well as the terms of the contract, the court held that 
the tenants were third-party beneficiaries of this contract, reasoning that 
"[i]f the tenants are not the primary beneficiaries of a program designed to 
provide housing assistance payments to low income families, the 
legitimacy of the multi-billion dollar Section 8 program is placed in grave 
doubt."386 The court went on to imply terms in the contract that required 
owners to certify tenants within a reasonable time after execution of 
contracts and that required HUD to pay the tenants retroactive benefits.387 
Holbrook demonstrates how, in cases involving government contracts, 
the terms of the underlying statute playa role in interpreting the contract.388 
Thus, the PRA's language requiring states to provide some procedural 
protections to claimants can potentially be quite helpful in these cases. The 
statute can be read as an overlay to the contract; that is, its terms are incor-
porated by the contract. 
It should be noted that actual tenants, such as those in Holbrook, have 
had far greater success in pursuing a third-party beneficiary theory than 
applicants for housing.389 This applicant/recipient divide likely reflects a 
concern with extending third-party beneficiary rights to a potentially vast 
386. ld. at 1271. 
387. ld. at 1273-76. However, a Holbrook type theory is useless where the contractual language 
expressly prohibits third-party claims. See, e.g., Cobos v. Dona Ana County Hous. Auth., 908 P.2d 250, 
255 (N.M. Ct. App. 1995) ("[T]he intent of the clause is clear, and our duty is to enforce the contract as 
written."). 
388. See H. Miles Foy, III, Legislation and Pedagogy in Contracts !OJ, 44 ST. LOUIS U. 1.J. 
1273, 1280-81 (2000). Foy explains that 
In cases involving government contracts, various courts have suggested that the answer [to 
the 'intended beneficiary' question] may turn on the interpretation of the legislation that 
creates the contracting authority. If the legislation itself contains evidence of a legislative 
intention to benefit a certain class of people, then such people may be the 'intended 
beneficiaries' of contracts made pursuant to that legislation, and they may therefore be able to 
sue to enforce them. 
389. Compare Holbrook v. Pitt, 643 F.2d 1261 (7th Cir. 1981) (finding that tenants are third-party 
beneficiaries of contracts between HUD and landlords holding HUD insured mortgages), with Price v. 
Pierce, 823 F.2d 1114, 1121 (7th Cir. 1987) (finding that prospective tenants were not third-party 
beneficiaries of contracts because "to give each applicant for subsidized housing the status of a party to 
the contract would make almost every lower-income person in the United States a potential 
plaintiff .•. "). But see Gomez v. Hous. Auth. of El Paso, 805 F. Supp. 1363 (W.O. Tex. 1992) 
(applicants can sue under third-party beneficiary theory). 
Another distinction has arisen in the caselaw between tenants of Section 8 property and tenants 
living in properties with federally insured mortgages who then sue on the basis of the agreement 
between HUD and the property owner. The leading cases rejecting a third-party beneficiary theory are 
of the latter sort. See Reiner v. West Village Assocs., 768 F.2d 31 (2d Cir. 1985); Perry v. Hous. Auth. 
of Charleston, 664 F.2d 1210 (4th Cir. 1981); Angleton v. Pierce, 574 F. Supp. 719 (D.N.J. 1983). In 
these cases, the contracts between HUD and the developer are primarily loan documents that do not 
spell out rights for tenants. Accordingly, there are no terms within the contracts that benefit the tenants, 
and they do not provide a source for relief. As stated earlier, a contractual claim is only useful if there 
are beneficial contractual terms. 
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number of persons.390 As one court cautioned in a public housing case, "so 
wide a net of liability could make developers reluctant to participate in the 
program."39I This concern seems overblown in cases involving public 
benefits programs because the underlying statutes define an identifiable 
class of beneficiaries. Moreover, these courts are confiating actual appli-
cants with potential applicants, who would likely lack standing to bring 
suit in the first place. 
This concern over vast numbers of plaintiffs in government contract 
cases is more appropriate in disputes involving commercial contracts, 
which are not so narrowly circumscribed. For instance, in the paradigm 
case of H.R. Moch Co. v. Rensselaer Water CO.,392 a company providing 
fire hydrant services by contract with the city was sued by a private ware-
house owner after the hydrant did not provide adequate water during a fire. 
Judge Cardozo held that the plaintiff was not an intended beneficiary of the 
contract, stating that "[a] promisor will not be deemed to have had in mind 
the assumption of a risk so overwhelming for any trivial reward."393 By 
contrast, the PRA identifies a specific class of persons-far smaller than 
the general pUblic-as potential recipients of T ANF benefits, that is, needy 
families with children. Moreover, the policies articulated in the PRA em-
body a congressional desire to make objective standards, fair hearings, and 
appeal procedures available to welfare recipients (even if Congress argua-
bly did not want those procedures to rise to a constitutionally protected 
status). This public policy, along with the defined class of beneficiaries, 
cuts in favor of allowing welfare applicants to enforce contractual terms 
that embody or enact those policies.394 
The third-party beneficiary theory holds great promise for T ANF re-
cipients in privatized jurisdictions. It makes sense that a contract theory 
should play a large role for enforcing accountability in a contracting 
scheme. Unfortunately, the usefulness of this theory lies outside the control 
of TANF claimants. To begin with, this approach only makes sense if the 
underlying contractual terms are beneficial to claimants. But since T ANF 
claimants are not at the negotiating table, they are left at the mercy of the 
negotiating process.395 The problem becomes particularly acute when 
390. See Melvin Aron Eisenberg, Third-Party Beneficiaries, 92 COLUM. L. REv. 1358, 1407 
(1992). 
391. Price v. Pierce, 823 F.2d 1114, 1121 (7th Cir. 1987). 
392. 159 N.E. 896 (1928). 
393. [d. at 898. This is the first case cited in the second illustration of the REsrATEMENT (SECOND) 
OF CONTRACTS § 313 (1981). 
394. Although the PRA is quite punitive in many respects, it clearly establishes a public policy of 
assisting the poor to become self-sustaining. Accordingly, any contractual breaches that undermine this 
policy should be fair game for legal attack. 
395. Notably, state and local procurement laws are directed at preserving fairness in the bidding 
process and protecting the rights of bidders. They make scant provision for including contract 
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powerful corporations such as Lockheed and Maximus are involved be-
cause they may be able to demand concessions from local governments 
that accrue to their own benefit.396 For example, a simple declaration in the 
contract that it is unenforceable by third-parties will render the contractual 
approach moot. It is unclear who, if anyone, wi11look out for the interests 
of the poor populations who rely on T ANF. Thus, just as T ANF recipients 
are largely at the mercy of the political process to grant them entitlements 
and due process rights, they are at the mercy of contracting parties to de-
fme and/or grant them contractual rights. 
C. Equitable Claims 
One component of due process is the right to accurate information. As 
the Giuliani litigation demonstrates, severe harms can flow from misinfor-
mation. Thus, when welfare beneficiaries rely on a welfare provider's 
misinformation to their detriment, either by failing to receive benefits to 
which they are entitled, or by obtaining benefits to which they are not law-
fully entitled (and are then asked to repay), they may be able to assert a 
claim of equitable estoppel. Although estoppel claims are unlikely to be 
used to affirmatively seek structural, injunctive relief, an estoppel claim 
"creates a personal, situation-specific bar to an assertion of the truth, or to a 
claim or defense that is generally applicable and meritorious."397 As a re-
sult, it has the potential to serve as a constraining mechanism on welfare 
officials. 
Normally, the government and its agents are granted substantial im-
munity from estoppel claims. For instance, in Schweiker v. Hansen,398 a 
front-line worker at a Social Security office erroneously told a claimant 
that she was ineligible for insurance benefits. When the claimant later dis-
covered that she could apply for benefits, she sought benefits retroactive to 
the date of the misinformation. However, the Supreme Court held that the 
agency was not bound by the employee's statements and could deny the 
claim. The Court reasoned that to allow estoppel would put the Govern-
ment "'at risk that every alleged failure by an agent to follow instructions 
to the last detail in one of a thousand cases'" would undermine the 
beneficiaries in the contracting process, whether it be soliciting bids, selecting bids, or monitoring 
contracts. See MODEL PROCUREMENT CODE FOR STATE AND LOCAL GOVERNMENTS (1979). 
396. For instance, in a child support enforcement contract with California, Lockheed was able to 
limit its liability to $3 million. Yet cost overruns that led to the contract's cancellation ran into the 
hundreds of millions of dollars. See supra note 8. 
397. Joshua I. Schwartz, The Irresistible Force Meets the Immovable Object: Estoppel Remedies 
for all Agency's Violation of Its Own RegulatiOns or Other Misconduct, 44 ADMIN. L. REv. 653, 661 
(1992). 
398. 450 U.S. 785 (1981). 
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underlying regulations.399 As a result, courts allow estoppel to lie against 
the government only in extreme cases, such as those involving "affinnative 
misconduct" or where the injury to the private interest substantially out-
weighs the public interest.400 By contrast, estoppel is regularly awarded as a 
remedy against private parties. This suggests that estoppel claims may 
more easily be brought in privatized welfare jurisdictions against front-line 
workers who negligently or intentionally mislead claimants. 
A word of warning is in order, however. The estoppel doctrine speaks 
in terms of agents and principals, not in terms of state action. Indeed, one 
reason given for governmental immunity from estoppel claims is a reluc-
tance to make the government accountable for the unauthorized, or ultra 
vires, conduct of its agents.401 As a result, potentially complicated issues 
exist regarding whether a private welfare provider could avoid estoppel by 
claiming to be an agent of the government. Clearly, the incentives for a 
private welfare provider to assume the cloak of governmental status differ 
with the area oflaw.402 Where state action is concerned, private entities will 
stress their remoteness from government. Where estoppel is concerned, 
private entities will stress their interconnectedness with government. And 
the current state of law may well allow them to have their cake and eat it 
too. 
399. [d. at 789-90 (quoting Schweiker v. Hansen, 619 F.2d 942, 956 (1980) (Friendly, J., 
dissenting). The reasons given for limiting estoppel of the government vary in the caselaw, and 
generally include one or more of the following; 
(I) sovereign immunity; (2) the separation of powers theory, under which certain judicial 
determinations of government liability are inappropriate; (3) lack of reasonable reliance by 
the person seeking estoppel due to the limited scope of governmental agents' 
authority; (4) the greater weight given to public interests over private interests to be 
vindicated by estoppel; (5) the desire to limit potentially vast liability; (6) protection of the 
free dissemination of government information; and (7) the fear that an estoppel rule might 
be used by government agents acting in collusion with private parties to defraud the 
government. 
Frederick S. Kuhlman, Comment, Government Estoppel: The Search for Constitutional Limits, 25 
Loy. L.A. L. REv. 229, 229-30 (199 I). 
400. Schwartz, supra note 390, at 665-66. Another notable exception at the state level to the 
general rule is Lentz v. McMahon, 777 P.2d 83 (Cal. 1989), in which the court held that a welfare 
recipient could assert estoppel as a defense in an administrative proceeding in which the government 
sought to recoup overpayments. The court stated, "estoppel against a welfare agency may be 
appropriate when ... a government agency has negligently or intentionally caused a claimant to fail to 
comply with a procedural precondition to eligibility, and the failure to invoke estoppel would cause 
great hardship to the claimant." [d. at 401-02. 
401. Kuhlman, supra note 399, at 243-47. 
402. For instance, government contractors regularly attempt to claim sovereign immunity in 
products liability cases. See generally John F. Seymour, Liability of Government Contractors for 
Environmental Damage, 21 PUB. CaNT. L.J. 491 (1992). The Supreme Court created a govemment-
contractor defense for military contractors who comply with government specifications in Boyle v. 
United Techs. Corp., 487 U.S. 500 (1988). 
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CONCLUSION 
The Personal Responsibility Act dramatically reformed welfare ad-
ministration. Welfare providers now do much more than check off boxes 
on forms and dispense checks. Rather, they engage in a wide variety of 
counseling tasks in order to carry out their mandate of putting people to 
work. This new approach results in both a lack of objective, measurable 
criteria to judge providers' performance, and an increase in the discretion 
of front-line workers. When privatization is added to the PRA's discretion-
ary mix, accountability to welfare claimants attenuates. Further, although 
the government plays a role in defining and monitoring contract terms, the 
complexity of welfare provision after the PRA makes it difficult for gov-
ernmental entities to measure private performance in a meaningful way. As 
a result, the actions of private welfare providers remain screened from 
view. 
Accordingly, it is more important than ever to locate enforceable legal 
rights for welfare beneficiaries. Unfortunately, as the preceding analysis of 
procedural protections demonstrates, privatization limits the availability of 
procedural protections. Under our current legal regime, property rights and 
accompanying due process protections derive from discretion-constraining 
standards. Likewise, standing to enforce statutory protections also hinges 
on the creation of enforceable, clearly defined rights. Simply put, constitu-
tional and statutory due process rights were conceived as constraints on 
governmental abuse of power. When private actors fill public shoes, these 
doctrines no longer fit. 
Accountability in a privatized scheme could be heightened by 
strengthening and expanding existing doctrines. Every branch of govern-
ment could potentially playa role in securing the rights of welfare benefi-
ciaries. For instance, legislators could enact express rights of action to 
enforce fair procedures, and in so doing, reduce their own enforcement 
burden while ensuring equitable treatment for our most disenfranchised 
citizens.403 Yet legislatures have been largely unsympathetic to the rights of 
the poor. While the state T ANF laws pay lip service to fair procedures, 
there seems to be a prevailing attitude that the poor are lucky to get any 
assistance, and that they should therefore swallow the "bitter with the 
sweet." Legislatures could also expand the reach of administrative proce-
dure acts and mandamus statutes to include certain types of private con-
tractors, although such expansion would surely be costly and perhaps 
undermine the perceived cost savings of privatization. Separate from leg-
islative solutions, local governments entering into valuable contracts with 
403. In this regard, it should be noted that TANF will have to be reauthorized in 2002, and lengthy 
policy debates about TANF refonn are expected at that time. See Barry L. Van Lare & Gretchen 
Griener, Reauthorization of TANF-An Early Perspective, Issue Notes (July 2000), available at 
http://www.welfareinfo.orglissuenotereauthorization.htm. 
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private entities could negotiate favorable terms for welfare recipients and 
provide express rights of enforcement by third-parties. Again, however, it 
is not clear that welfare beneficiaries have the political capital necessary to 
pressure local governments to negotiate on their behalf. 
Throughout this century, the courts have largely been the defenders of 
the rights of the poor, and perhaps now, more than ever, their vigilance is 
necessary. A more robust state action doctrine, faithful to the doctrine's 
underlying purposes, could encompass government contractors who dis-
tribute public entitlements, and thereby ensure that constitutional protec-
tions are provided to welfare claimants in privatized jurisdictions. 
Privatization has been heralded as the cure to many government ills. 
For certain, discrete municipal services, privatization may indeed be the 
necessary salve. However, the empirical evidence strongly suggests that 
privatization is not likely to improve upon government performance in 
complex social service arenas such as welfarc. Moreover, welfare claim-
ants may end up worse off than they are under even the dreariest of gov-
ernmental bureaucracies. As a nation, we have embarked on a bold 
experiment, but we have jumped in headfirst, with scant attention to the 
legal implications of this shift. Not surprisingly then, the legal rights of the 
poor have fallen by the wayside. 
